Triumph for Terrorism

In the 18 years that have passed since the last Soviet occupation forces left Austrian soil, that tiny gateway nation of Middle Europe had gained friends by being evenhanded to East and West and openhearted to anyone in trouble. When Hungarians fled the Russian repression of 1956, they were sheltered in Austria. When the "Prague Spring" ended in 1968, exiled Czechs came to Austria. Lately the troubled journeyers have been Soviet Jews en route to Israel, who used Vienna as a way station.

Last week, with a single decision, Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky had smudged his country's reputation and thrown it into an international whirl of protest. Until international attention was diverted by large scale fighting between Israel and Arab forces from Egypt and Syria, Kreisky's crisis had provided daily headlines around the world, focusing interest on the difficult question of how the rights of Jews and others can be protected against the schemes of terrorists. Kreisky's dramatic gesture came after three Russian Jews, on a train nearing Vienna and the Jewish Agency's layover facilities at Schoenau Castle, had been taken prisoner and hustled to Vienna's airport by two armed Arab fedayeen (TIME, Oct. 8). Kreisky managed to get the captives freed unharmed, but the ransom was high: he announced that he was closing down Schoenau. His decision raised consternation. But international criticism could not change Kreisky's mind, nor could Israeli Premier Golda Meir, who rushed from a Council of Europe meeting in Strasbourg to Vienna to reason with him. Mrs. Meir spent two hours with Kreisky, but in the end the disappointed leader of Israel departed the Austrian Chancellery by a back stairway.

Mass demonstrations were staged throughout Israel and many Western countries by protesting Jews. Arabs, however, were euphoric, and Egypt even sent a Cabinet minister to Vienna to congratulate Kreisky. For Europeans, it had almost come down to a choice between Arab and Jew, and either way, Europe was serving as an arena for the conflict. That hardly made it any choice at all, since most Europeans no doubt rightly felt that they were unjustly ensnarled in a blood feud. But Washington officially came down on the side of Israel. President Nixon consoled Kreisky for having to face "a painful decision," then added: "We simply cannot have governments--small or large--give in to international blackmail by terrorist groups."

Natural Target. Austrians, who despite initial dismay eventually rallied to the support of their socialist Chancellor, protested that his action was not a response to terrorism. Rather, they claimed, it was an administrative decision in which the government actually "suggested" to the kidnapers that it would alter its policy in exchange for the lives of the hostages. It was made because Austria, as one government official explained it, "was gradually becoming a battleground" in the continuing Israeli-Arab conflict. Jerusalem's Vienna-born Mayor Teddy Kollek protested in a telegram to Kreisky: "Anyone who applies different standards to Jews than those he applies to others stands accused of antiSemitism, whatever his origin." But the Chancellor, a nonpracticing Jew, denied that his action was discriminatory. He pointed out the Schoenau facility was allowed to exist as a special favor to Israel so that Soviet Jewish emigrants could be processed in an orderly--and secure--manner on Austrian soil. For the Austrians, the facility was a troublesome presence. It had to be guarded by a force of 150 Austrian police with dogs. Every train from the east or El Al jet from Israel had to be protected. Before long, the Austrians feared, an incident might occur similar to last year's Munich massacre. The solution was to close the center that was a natural mass target for Arab terror.

The Austrian oversight, however, was that neither Kreisky nor others who favored closing Schoenau fully recognized the symbolism involved. Said an Austrian diplomat: "We did not realize the emotional importance of Schoenau for Israel and therefore for the Arabs."

Though Kreisky remained firm on his insistence that Schoenau must close, it began to appear that his promise to the terrorists to ban "group travel" was all but meaningless. "We shall continue to allow the transit of Russian Jews as we have done before," he said, "but we shall keep the time allowed in Austria as short as possible. Under normal circumstances, the stay in Austria will be limited to one night." This represented a clear retreat from his initial position, which he had described as "genuine transit, without stopovers." His new position in effect will allow Russian Jews to travel freely through Austria, denying them only the sanctuary of Schoenau. Ultimately, that may cause the Austrians even greater problems, since the emigrants without the protecting walls of Schoenau will be more exposed than ever to reprisal attacks by terrorists.

Arab Blackmail. Israel was concerned not so much with the closing of the Schoenau camp as with the fact that the terrorists had extracted the pledge at the point of a gun. If other governments followed suit, Israel would soon be vulnerable to Arab blackmail. The specter arose of governments around the world bowing to the most outrageous terrorist demands, such as refusing landing rights to Israeli jetliners or the cutting off of trade.

Arab satisfaction was at such a peak, in fact, that considerable publicity and credence was initially given to a statement supposedly issued by the group claiming responsibility for the Austrian operation. It warned the "friendly Soviet Union that its embassies and interests in the Middle East and the world will be a target for the strikes of our guerrillas, unless it stops emigrant operations to Israel." Arab spokesmen later claimed the statement was a hoax.

Whatever its validity, the Soviets ignored the warning, just as they have remained all but totally silent on the entire Israel-Austria imbroglio. Moscow is extremely sensitive to the question of Jewish emigration, which--though it has totaled 70,000 Jews in the past two years--goes unpublicized in the Soviet Union. The Soviets are under heavy pressure from the U.S. and other Western countries to allow Jews to leave, while they are under a counterpressure from Arabs to stop the emigration. Jews represent only 1% of the Soviet population of nearly 250 million, but they have earned a disproportionately high representation in scholarly, scientific and artistic fields. Soviet statistics show, for example, that 7% of all scientific workers are Jews. Yet Jews in many ways are second-class citizens in Russia. No works in Hebrew are permitted to be published, nor are any books in any language published there about Jewish history or culture. Zionism is considered a treasonable crime. When some Jews began to agitate for permission to emigrate to Israel--a phenomenon that arose after Israel's spectacular victory in the Six-Day War--Soviet authorities brought down a harsh campaign of suspicion and discrimination against all Soviet Jews, with the effect that more and more Jews demanded the right to emigrate.

Special Status. The result is that today Jews are widely distrusted in Russia, and yet they enjoy a special status: they now are the only group within the Soviet Union to be given the option of emigrating. In the past two years, more Soviet Jews have left Russia than have all other Soviet citizens in the past 40 years.

Arab nations complain to Moscow that the Soviet Jews contribute mightily to Israel's strength. In general, Moscow counters Arab arguments by saying that the numbers involved are relatively small, that the emigrants are of limited skills and that many more Jews have emigrated to Israel from Arab lands than from the U.S.S.R.

From their viewpoint, the Arabs have a good argument. In the 18 months since January 1972, the new Russian arrivals included 1,807 engineers, 879 physicians, 832 teachers, 324 musicians, 299 economists, and a scattering of mathematicians, physicists, chemists and biologists. This is largesse on an unprecedented scale: most Israelis agree that no other mass immigration group has contributed so much to the nation. Some of the Russians have settled on territory Israel won in the Six-Day War, which has further angered Arabs. Perhaps the most important single asset of the Russian Jews is their youth: fully 50% are under 30.

Obviously, the Israelis have no intention of permitting Austria to stanch what Israel perceives to be its future life's blood. While officially Golda Meir's government demands that Schoenau be kept open, a campaign to find other, more secure channels of emigration is quietly under way. Soviet emigrants might continue to use the Austrian route if the transit period can indeed be cut down. But Israeli authorities find great difficulty in planning for airline space, largely because they do not know how many emigrants will arrive on a given day. Says one Israeli official: "Moscow certainly does not cooperate with us. We never know who is coming for sure until we meet them at the station." To assure speedy transit, the Israelis may simply have to keep surplus jetliners available to provide quick passage from Vienna to Tel Aviv. It would be a costly but practical solution.

Israelis have long believed that the best plan is to fly the emigrants directly from the Soviet Union, but Moscow has rejected the idea on the ground that there are no diplomatic relations between the two countries. One solution considered by the Israelis: to let an American or European airline handle the task. It might also be possible to bring the emigrants out by sea, perhaps from Odessa or from a Rumanian port.

Privately, Austrian leaders now realize that Kreisky's decision, however rationalized in terms of Austria's own self-interest, was appallingly inept. Because of this belated recognition, the Chancellor has not taken any steps to interrupt the flow of Soviet Jews to Austria--at least not yet.

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