The Superpower Search for a Settlement

The Middle East war entered its third bitter and bloody week with no clear end in sight, as the Israelis continued to fight, in their view, for the security of their state and the Arabs to try to regain their lost territories and their self-respect. From opposite sides of the globe the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the U.S., funneled ever larger supplies of arms, ammunition and aid to their respective allies locked in combat, even as they moved dramatically to press for the terms of a peace.

The most hopeful sign that they might be making progress was yet an other of Henry Kissinger's sudden, surprise trips, this one to Moscow, where he began a series of private meetings over the Middle East crisis with Soviet Party Boss Leonid Brezhnev. Kissinger had spent much of the week with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in Washington, but he managed to cover his departure with a typical, though perhaps inevitable, Kissinger feint; he spent the evening at a glittering dinner party hosted by Huang Chen, the head of China's liaison office in Washington. That affair had been planned as a send-off for Kissingers scheduled trip to Peking early this week; actually, he had already postponed that journey for at least several day's in favor of the emergency mission to Moscow.

Kissinger slipped away from the party before midnight and jetted out of Washington aboard his presidential aircraft about 1 a.m. Saturday. The trip had been "requested" by Brezhnev, and it was clearly a compelling request. Kissinger was accompanied by no fewer than nine State Department officials, ineluding longtime Middle East Negotiator Joseph Sisco. Thus the spirit of detente, which pledges both nations to cooperate in cooling off dangerously tense areas of conflict, seemed alive and reasonably well, despite some menacing appearances to the contrary.

Indeed, were it not for those efforts at a settlement, Washington and Moscow might well have seemed on a collision course, as their supporting roles in the conflict intensified:

> Vowing to assist the Arab nations "in every way," the Soviet Union was airlifting daily some 1,000 tons of combat equipment, including highly effective SA-6 missiles, into Egypt and Syria. More than 17 Soviet ships, including six cargo vessels loaded with armored vehicles, steamed through the Dardanelles, pushing Russian naval strength in the eastern Mediterranean to about 75 vessels, well above any previous levels.

> Responding in kind, the U.S. employed giant C-5A, C-130 and C-141 cargo planes to carry 5,000 tons of equipment to Israel. Promising to replace Israel's heavy aircraft losses, the Pentagon began speeding Phantom jet fighters to the war zone. Two U.S. attack carriers and two amphibious assault carriers, each bearing 1,800 Marines, began gathering in the eastern Mediterranean, and some 50 U.S. Air Force personnel were sent to Israel to help with the airlift. President Nixon asked Congress for an emergency appropriation of $2.2 billion for Israeli resupply.

Despite the earnestness of Kissinger's trip, that rearmament duel fed fears that the Nixon Administration's most impressive accomplishment, relaxation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., might be in grave jeopardy. Much of the week's early rhetoric was hardly encouraging. Presidential Adviser Melvin Laird complained publicly to correspondents that "the only manner in which detente can be proven is by deeds, not words, and the Soviet Union has not been performing as if detente were here." A recognition that the new relationship was an enveloping issue in the crisis was echoed in Moscow by Premier Aleksei Kosygin, who protested that "the opponents of detente are trying to revive the cold war and cause mistrust in peaceful coexistence by exploiting the hostilities in the Middle East."

That was, it turned out, reassuring evidence that opponents of cooperation had not yet gained the upper hand. As the two sides began to meet at the highest levels, both seemed genuinely interested in a common goal: to end the fighting in such a way that serious negotiations toward a long-range solution to the Middle East impasse could begin. The most immediate obstacle was the ferocity of the fighting itself. Until one side gains a decisive advantage or the fighting settles into a clear stalemate, neither side seems likely to cease firing.

The week's seemingly paradoxical superpower activity, mingling risky military gestures with discreet peacemaking efforts, was part of a delicate and sophisticated policy dance. Both the White House and the Kremlin were trying to influence Middle East events to avoid a wider war on the one hand, and on the other to prevent either of the combatants from being overpowered, which would only perpetuate the regional enmity and prevent any stable solution.

Almost from the outbreak of the fighting, Kissinger and Dobrynin have remained in continual contact in Washington. Last week they lunched together, spoke two and three times daily by telephone. The two concentrated mainly on trying to frame a resolution for the U.N. Security Council that would not run into an immediate veto by nations sympathetic to either side and thus harden diplomatic positions. Kissinger and Dobrynin sought a cease-fire resolution that would also create machinery for direct negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The diplomats recognized, of course, that no such resolution would be effective until the combatants were ready for it. Kissinger was kept closely informed of Israeli attitudes toward such a prospect by Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, who was in New York attending the U.N. General Assembly.

Nixon and Kissinger also met at the White House with the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco and Algeria at the Arabs' request. While few details were announced, the diplomats, saying they spoke for 18 Arab nations, urged the U.S. to play a peacemaking role and presented some broad ideas for negotiation of a settlement.

Oil Cutoff. Putting economic pressure behind their proposals, the Arab nations announced a cutback in oil production for export, pegging it at 5% each month. Aimed mainly at the U.S., the move was also intended to exert pressure on Washington through the nations of Western Europe and Japan, which are more dependent on Middle East oil than is the U.S. Saudi Arabia promptly went further, first declaring an immediate 10% cutback in oil production and then cutting off all oil shipments to the U.S., as did Abu Dhabi, Libya and Algeria.

Obviously in preparation for the Kissinger talks, the Soviet Union dispatched Kosygin to Cairo, where he conferred with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. There were unconfirmed reports that Kosygin made specific proposals for a peace plan, including a "partial" Israeli pullback from the 1967 cease-fire lines and a DMZ, separating Israel from its neighbors, that would be patrolled by U.N. troops, some of them from the U.S. and Russia. Kosygin had been back in Moscow for only a few hours before Kissinger was on his way.

In an effort to make the diplomatic atmosphere as clear as possible, the Soviets kept their rhetoric purposely mild. Soviet publications made no effort to inflame domestic opinion against either Israel or the U.S. They did not portray the Israelis as having started the new war (the Arabs do) and did not criticize the U.S. airlift. Brezhnev declared that the fighting ought to be stopped quickly, that the U.S.S.R. would try to help bring that about, and that his nation recognizes Israel's right of existence as an independent state.

Many neutral and European analysts agree with the Kissinger view that the Soviet Union has acted so far with reasonable restraint, considering its pro-Arab history and commitments. As they see it, the Kremlin has moved in understandable self-interest to regain influence in the Middle East, after being so unceremoniously kicked out of Egypt by Sadat in 1972. Now Arab officialdom is ringing with praise of the Russians. Yet it is not in the Soviet interest, in this view, for Moscow to push for a mortal blow at Israel. That not only would clash head-on with U.S. interests, but even if successful would again reduce Soviet influence in the region. In this analysis, Moscow needs Israel as a source of tension, so that Soviet policy has a continuing role to play in the Middle East.

These experts also agree with the Administration's view that the Soviet Union still places detente among its highest priorities, partly as a diplomatic weapon in its rivalry with China (unable to match the Soviet military contribution, China has had to settle so far with mere pronouncements of support to the Arabs). Moreover, Brezhnev's whole leadership rests on his detente policy, and there is no sign of any serious second thought or new resistance to this policy within the Kremlin. The Soviet need for American food and other trade is still great, and international agreements over nuclear weapons, the emplacement of military forces in Europe, and the status of national boundaries in Eastern Europe still take precedence in Russian policy over its interests in the Middle East.

Acceptable Risk. Indeed, last week Soviet delegates still were attending SALT talks in Geneva. American businessmen were in Moscow putting finishing touches on an exhibition of oil-and gas-extraction equipment. Officials of the U.S. space program got their first on-site look at the Soviet mission-control space center, and plans proceeded for a joint space venture.

If much of the U.S. seems to take a more alarmist view of the current dangers to detente, this may well be caused by differing perspectives on what a practical detente really means. The Russians seem willing to accept and to risk American-Soviet conflict in specific and localized situations as part of the normal competition between the two powers. The U.S. seems more inclined to see linkages between situations, fearing that conflict in one area threatens the whole relationship.

Despite the tragedy of renewed fighting in the Middle East, it is conceivable that double benefits could come out of the bloodshed. Globally, if detente survives despite the strains of such a crisis, it could emerge strengthened. Regionally, the newly inspired pride among Arabs and the convincing demonstration of the fact that Israel needs practical guarantees of its physical security could create new negotiating opportunities. Both possibilities would be healthy moves toward peace in the world, albeit purchased at a terrible cost in both Arab and Israeli blood.

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