Are the Russians the Real Winners?

"We did what we had to do," said a Moscow editor last week, in perhaps an unintentionally candid characterization of the Soviet Union's recent actions in the Middle East. It was also something of an understatement. The U.S.S.R. had acted far more forcefully to try to ensure victory for its Arab clients than the U.S. had reacted to help Israel.

Even before the Yom Kippur War, the Soviets were the principal tutors and suppliers of the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces. They not only replaced the enormous Arab losses of the 1967 war but delivered hundreds of additional tanks and planes. They gave the Egyptians and Syrians sophisticated antiaircraft and antitank missiles, including the potent SA-6 missile, as well as advisers to instruct the Arabs in their use.

Before the conflict, Moscow spurred Cairo and Damascus to reorganize their armies and improve officer training. Although the Egyptians expelled some 17,000 Soviet technicians and advisers in July 1972, more than 1,000 were in Egypt when the war erupted. War supplies continued to arrive with Syria receiving more than 60% of its 300 or so combat aircraft since January of this year. The Soviets tutored Egypt in the tactics that enabled its army to quickly send troops across the Suez Canal.

Some Western military observers believe that the Soviets also helped the Arabs plan the offensive against Israel. In the days before Yom Kippur, the wives and children of Soviet advisers left Egypt and Syria, which suggests that Moscow knew the exact date of the planned attack. The speed with which the Soviets organized the complex resupply flights to the Arabs also indicates that the Russians were prepared for the war. Ready also were several of Russia's Cosmos satellites, which after launching orbited 180 miles above the Middle Eastern battlefields providing Moscow with important photographs of the battle in progress.

During the first days of the war, the Soviets did nothing to urge moderation. Instead, they suggested that other Arab nations such as Morocco, Iraq and Algeria might find it advantageous to join the fight against Israel. They dispatched an armada of AN-12 and AN-22 air freighters carrying as much as 13,000 tons of war supplies to the Arab forces. At least 50,000 tons of supplies also arrived at the Arab ports of Alexandria, Tartus and Latakia aboard 18 Russian ships. Only when it appeared that the Israelis were on the verge of encircling and eliminating the Egyptian Third Army--and, among other things, capturing a vast store of modern Soviet weaponry--did Moscow change its line and call for a halt to the fighting.

Even though its Arab clients did not succeed on the battlefield, the Soviet Union--at least for the moment--appears to be one certain winner in the Middle East war. Despite past feelings about Russian arrogance, both Syria and Egypt are now grateful to Moscow for its military and diplomatic aid--a gratitude that will grow if the Soviet Union continues its resupply effort in the post-cease-fire weeks. Having rebuilt relations with Egypt and Syria, many Middle Eastern experts agree, the Soviets can now concentrate on the primary goal of their policy in the area: broadening and developing their influence in the oil-rich nations of the Persian Gulf, where Russian strategic interests directly conflict with those of the U.S.

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