The Cyclone in the Far East

Fresh from hammering out an Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire accord, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger took his globe-circling entourage on to the Far East last week. Compared with his frantic and masterful pace through the Middle East, Kissinger's visit to Peking, Tokyo and Seoul was almost leisurely. As the blue-and-white Air Force jet flew over the Himalayas from Pakistan, he waxed sentimental, reminding reporters that he had followed the same route on his secret mission in July 1971, which opened the door for resumption of relations between the U.S. and China.

In deference to Kissinger's new status as Secretary of State, the Chinese welcomed him with more protocol and ceremony than usual. Kissinger's plane was allowed to fly directly to Peking airport instead of making the normally prescribed stopover at Shanghai to pick up a Chinese navigator. Just 2 1/2 hours after his arrival, he was greeted by Premier Chou En-lai at a banquet in the Great Hall of the People. Chou, now 75, complimented Kissinger on becoming Secretary of State while "you are still young and vigorous." He also said that the Japanese press had dubbed him "the Middle East cyclone." Replied Kissinger: "Another trip through the Middle East and I shall be ancient."

Banquet Toast. For Kissinger, as for the Chinese, the prime purpose of the latest get-together was to discuss further improvement of relations rather than inaugurate any new policies. In a banquet toast, Kissinger pledged to "speed the progress toward normalization of relations with China." He also assured Chou, in a veiled reference to the possible outcome of Watergate, that "whatever happens in the future and whatever the Administration," the U.S. will remain friendly. Inevitably there was speculation that Kissinger's visit might culminate in resumption of full diplomatic relations. Chou, however, reminded reporters that Peking is opposed to any such move while Taiwan still has an embassy in Washington. Asked if he might make a visit to the U.S., the Premier replied, "As long as there is a representative of the Chiang Kai-shek clique there, how can I go?"

The high point of the trip was a 2-hr. 45-min. meeting with Chairman Mao Tse-tung. No details of their talks were released, but afterward the Secretary of State expressed his delight that the Chinese had chosen to describe the meeting as "friendly."

When the discussions finally wound up in midweek, the two governments released a joint communique that officials described as a "subtle roadmap" for future relations. In most respects it was similar to the carefully nuanced Shanghai communique issued after President Nixon's February 1972 visit, which formulated the "one China" principle --that is, that Taiwan is a part of China. The issue was defined then as one for the two parties to work out for themselves. This time, however, that statement was omitted, which some American officials interpret as meaning that it is up to the U.S. to make a major move toward putting the "one China" principle into practice. That could mean eventually breaking diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The November communique also called for "frequent contact at authoritative levels" between Washington and Peking and expansion of the liaison offices, which will be upgraded to embassy level in everything but name.

Kissinger's follow-up trip to Tokyo was originally designed as just that--a means of keeping the Japanese posted on the outcome of the Peking talks, but the Middle East crisis gave the visit a more urgent tone. More than 80% of Japan's oil has been coming from the Middle East. While reports of a formal Arab "ultimatum" were denied by government sources in Tokyo, TIME learned that Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani suggested to the Japanese ambassador that in order to be classed as a "friendly" nation, Japan should break relations with Israel. Tanaka told Kissinger that to get supplies, Japan would have to abandon its formally neutral stance for a pro-Arab policy, and asked for U.S. understanding. Kissinger urged him not to do so.

Mutual Distrust. The talks apparently did nothing to dispel the sense of mutual distrust that has long plagued Kissinger's relations with Japan. Both sides issued bland statements to the effect that Kissinger "understood Japan's serious predicament." But the phraseology was diplomatic euphemism. After Tanaka explained Japan's economic predicament, Kissinger's rather cold-nosed reply was that while he understood the situation, the state of the Japanese economy and what to do about it was not really his problem.

Nor did he evince much sympathy for Tanaka's political situation. The Premier explained that the Japanese Cabinet was expected to endorse the Arab interpretation of United Nations Resolution 242, requiring complete Israeli withdrawal behind the pre-1967 ceasefire lines. Earlier, Japan had taken the view that Resolution 242 must be implemented in all its parts, including Israel's right to "secure and recognized boundaries," which in Israel's view allows for changes in the 1967 lines. Out of fear that it would look like a direct rebuff to Kissinger, however, the Tanaka Cabinet decided next day to delay its announcement for the time being.

At the last minute, before flying home to Washington, Kissinger added a previously unannounced four-hour stopover in the South Korean capital of Seoul to his itinerary. A debate over Korean entry into the U.N. is about to begin, and China has reiterated its demand for U.S. troop withdrawal from the South. Seoul wanted some reassurance that Kissinger had not struck a secret deal in Peking for the reduction of American forces. What they heard was hardly reassuring. Kissinger told South Korean President Chung Hee Park that there will be no change in the U.S. military commitment until July 1974. But after that, he strongly implied, major reductions will be made, both for political and economic reasons.

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