Arming to Disarm in the Age of Detente
From a launch site deep in Kazakhstan near the Aral Sea, two giant Soviet rockets streaked 4,500 miles to a target area some 850 miles northwest of Midway in the Pacific late last month. It was Russia's first full-range test of its SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missile. Like the U.S. Minuteman III, it carries multiple nuclear warheads aimed at separate targets. To U.S. military strategists in the Pentagon, the successful Soviet firings were fresh confirmation that for all the genuine gains of detente, the arms race between the world's premier superpowers is still very much alive.
The Russian missile advances had been expected since the latest shots followed a series of shorter-range tests of two other new missiles on a range ending on the Kamchatka peninsula in eastern Siberia last spring and summer. Nonetheless, one of their chief consequences will be to focus this year's debate in Congress over the defense budget on the question: Is the U.S. falling behind the Soviet Union militarily? Arsenals of experts are likely to be rolled out to argue both sides of the highly complex question. But there is no dispute about the fact that while the U.S. was fighting the expensive and inconclusive Viet Nam War, the Russians were spending lavishly to improve their stores of nuclear and conventional weapons. Their armed forces are now larger than those of the U.S. and, particularly in the case of the Soviet navy, often equipped with newer hardware. More important, the continuing Russian effort, together with the ceilings imposed on U.S. arms levels in the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I) with Moscow, leads analysts to fear that in the mid-1980s the Soviets might finally overtake the U.S.
To Americans, such a prospect can only be profoundly unsettling. It was reflected in the applause for President Nixon's declaration in his State of the Union message: "We must never allow America to become the second strongest nation in the world." But how that pledge can be guaranteed is yet to be determined, and it depends as much on the Soviet Union as on the U.S. Congress and President. Both Moscow and Washington now seem poised at the beginning of another round in the nuclear arms race that could cost billions of rubles and dollars. The new round seems likely to be prevented only if the two countries decide to accept a measure of military parity, negotiate permanent limits to their nuclear armaments, and learn to accept a nuclear balance in which there is no first among equals.
Two Goals. The man in charge of the U.S. military response to the new Russian challenge is James Rodney Schlesinger, 45, who was sworn in as Secretary of Defense last July 2. By profession an economist and military strategist, the tall, pipe-smoking Schlesinger demonstrated deft and tough skills in administration and problem solving in his previous jobs as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and director of the Central Intelligence Agency (see box page 16). At the Pentagon, he has set two goals for himself: 1) to overcome the legacy of the Viet Nam War, which has left the services top-heavy with brass, depressed in morale and saddled with a so far faltering volunteer system as a replacement for the draft; and 2) to enable the American armed forces to meet the new Soviet weapons threat.
The second goal has an odd, atavistic ring to many Americans, educated by the achievements and rhetoric of the President and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to believe that the U.S. and the Soviet Union are well into a new era of trade and detente. Indeed, the two countries are on a new and significantly improved footing with each other. But because Nixon and Kissinger are rightly convinced that detente can only be constructed on a realistic equality of U.S. and Soviet armed might, Schlesinger and his Pentagon have a vital role to play in the Administration's grand design. Kissinger and Schlesinger work closely together, coordinating their moves, breakfasting at least once a week when the Secretary of State is in Washington. After two summits and SALT I, the nuclear balance is still, looking to the future, weighted to the Soviets' advantage. Schlesinger's task is to provide the muscle and tools to help Kissinger bring the balance back to center in further negotiations.
Schlesinger believes that to do his job will require spending more money on the military. Since 1968 defense has accounted for a steadily decreasing portion of total federal spending. The outlays for fiscal 1974 will total $79.5 billion; when adjusted for inflation, this is the lowest Pentagon spending since the Korean War began. Even before Schlesinger became Secretary of Defense, he was warning that cutting more out of military spending was a "self-defeating game" that might eventually give the Soviets the appearance--if not the reality --of being stronger than the U.S. Once in office, he was even more emphatic: "It is an enchanting illusion that you can simply take large amounts of money out of the defense budget and cut only fat and not muscle. It was an illusion in 1949, and it is an illusion that we can ill afford today."
Accordingly, Nixon will ask Congress this week for Pentagon spending of $85.8 billion next year. In addition, the President will ask Congress to vote $6.8 billion for long-term Pentagon contracts and to supplement this year's defense spending by $6.2 billion. The extra money for 1974 is needed to cover inflation and military-pay increases, as well as to buy $2.2 billion worth of ammunition and weapons to replace those shipped to Israel during the Middle East war.
Inflation and pay boosts are also responsible for $5 billion of the increase in the amount proposed for next year. But the heart of the budget argument and the portion that is aimed as a warning message at Moscow is the Pentagon request for $9.4 billion for research and development of new weapons in fiscal 1975, an amount on top of the $8.1 billion being spent for that purpose this year. Schlesinger has long believed that "the appropriate means for hedging against surprise is through an enhanced R. and D. program." The budget, the first to be drawn up under his supervision, calls for money to begin research into new missiles, a new submarine and new technology that will enable the nation to fight a limited nuclear war --something less than the all-out holocaust of reciprocal annihilation on which U.S. nuclear strategy has been based for 25 years.
Is Russia about to surpass the U.S. in atomic arms? There is, unfortunately, no objective way to quantify nuclear capability. The debate usually centers on three measurements: the number of launchers, their throw weight (payload) and the number of warheads deliverable. Russia has not only more launchers than the U.S. (see chart page 18), but bigger missiles--with up to 120% more throw weight. The U.S., however, has almost twice as many warheads on its missiles. Thus, as Harvard Professor Paul Doty puts it, "If you are a [U.S.] hawk, you argue throw weight, and if you are a dove, you argue warheads."
U.S. Advantage. Even if the numbers game was not contradictory, it would not give an accurate picture of both countries' relative nuclear strength. On one level, each superpower has more than enough warheads to destroy civilization; the surplus, as Winston Churchill once said, serves only to "make the rubble bounce." In anything other than an all-out nuclear war, however, accuracy of missiles becomes the critical factor. Here the U.S. has a substantial technological advantage. It requires three of Russia's burly S59 missiles--each with a 25-megaton yield--to hit the same targets as one U.S. Minuteman III with its three warheads and total yield of 600 kilotons.
The better American guidance systems enable the U.S. warheads to strike within a quarter of a mile of the target. The Pentagon believes that Soviet missiles can do no better than hit one-half mile from the target. The Soviets depend on size to compensate for their missiles' inferior electronic brainpower.
Because of that technological advantage--and the U.S. lead in long-range bombers--Nixon agreed to grant the Russians numerical superiority in launchers in the SALT I agreements. At the time, the U.S. wrongly believed that the agreement might break the Soviet momentum in missile advances by setting a five-year ceiling on the number of offensive missiles each side can have. The U.S. was limited to 1,054 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS), 44 missile-launching submarines and 710 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The Soviets were permitted 1,618 ICBMs--91 more than they now have--62 missile-launching submarines and 950 SLBMS. The agreement set no restrictions on the number of warheads that could be placed on each rocket. Nor did it limit bombers, short-and medium-range missiles and tactical nuclear weapons that can be used on the battlefield.
Thus when the SALT I agreement was signed May 26, 1972, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, felt that there was "relative strategic [nuclear] parity" between the two countries. By 1975 half of the U.S. land-based missiles would be MIRVS (multiple independent re-entry vehicles): each launcher tipped with a package of three independently targeted warheads that can hit widely separated, preplotted targets. Some Soviet missiles in operation then also had multiple warheads, but they were not independently targeted. When fired, they sprayed from the missile launcher along a straight line like pellets from a shotgun. In addition, though the Soviets had more missile-firing submarines, U.S. subs were quieter, making them harder to detect, and many of the American SLBMS carried from ten to 14 warheads each. As a further deterrent, the U.S. maintained three times as many long-range bombers as Russia.
The rough balance of nuclear forces --and the equanimity of Pentagon planners--was unexpectedly upset last summer when the Russians conducted those earlier tests of their own MiRVed missiles. The U.S. had thought the Russians were five years away from developing MIRV. Despite the tests, Schlesinger does not expect Russia to finish development of MIRV technology before 1976--and, more important, does not expect the Soviets to match U.S. inventory before the mid-1980s. Still, the tests were a disquieting sign that the relentless Soviet momentum in weapons research is closing the technology gap.
Research Gap. To high-ranking officers like Moorer, U.S. military power "has clearly peaked and is now declining." Arms Control Expert Donald G. Brennan of the Hudson Institute fears that if the purse strings are not loosened, the Soviet Union "will pull ahead both in terms of strategic and conventional forces." Both to maintain the strength necessary to make detente work and to protect itself, the U.S. cannot wait for that to happen before acting. New weapons take five to ten years to reach production. General George S. Brown, head of the Air Force Systems Command, points out that in research, "momentum is the key."
The Soviet Union keeps secret how much it spends on military research and development, and Western estimates of the figure vary widely. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute believes that it averages up to $10 billion a year, while U.S. intelligence analysts say that the current expenditure is more like $16 billion-$20 billion. In comparison, the U.S. in recent years has been spending about $8 billion annually. Pentagon Research Chief Malcolm R. Currie says that the Russians have greatly enlarged the pool of engineers and scientists available to its military effort, though it is not known how many are actually engaged in such research. In 1960 Russia had 225,000 research scientists and engineers, while the U.S. had 400,000. Today Russia has 625,000, and the U.S. 550,000. Schlesinger and other Pentagon planners complain that the Soviets have deployed one new submarine-launched missile and are testing four new land-based missiles. The U.S. is planning a new missile for the Trident submarine but has no new ICBM in the works.
Outside the Pentagon, there is widespread agreement that Russia is indeed striving to surpass the American nuclear arsenal. Declares Foreign Affairs Specialist Zbigniew Brzezinski: "SALT I on the American side was a plateauing in weapons development. Given the secrecy and level of Soviet development, the situation is increasingly less and less stable." Arid in the Kissinger-Schlesinger world view, stability is the key not only to security but diplomacy. But there is disagreement over whether the nuclear statistics have any real meaning. According to M.I.T. Political Scientist George Rathjens, "More hardware at this point is irrelevant [because] modest numbers of thermonuclear weapons will suffice to inflict levels of damage on nations that would be unacceptable under all circumstances."
Numbers of nuclear weapons, however, do have psychological importance to the people and politicians of both countries. Harvard's Doty explains: "To the extent that numbers influence worldwide opinion, then numbers become a realistic basis for argument, even though they do not have much to do with the worldwide arms situation. It is important to distinguish between military reality on the one plane and political perception on the other." In this sense, the real danger lies in giving an impression that there is an imbalance in nuclear power in favor of the Russians that would breed insecurity. Adds the Hudson Institute's Brennan: "Either we persuade the Soviets to accept reasonable limitations on strategic forces or we are obliged to maintain our forces at a level that will prevent the Soviet Union from having superiority or believing that they have superiority."
Just that was supposed to take place at the SALT II talks, which began in Geneva last March to seek a permanent agreement on limiting offensive nuclear arms. However, those talks appear to have bogged down. Under pressure from the Pentagon and Congressmen like Democratic Senator Henry ("Scoop") Jackson of Washington, who believe that the U.S. conceded too much at SALT I, President Nixon has insisted that the permanent agreement give both countries roughly equal numbers of nuclear weapons. Last October the Russians reportedly offered to halt technological improvements at the level attained by the U.S. but insisted on keeping the numerical advantage granted them by SALT I. The Soviet obduracy has led Jackson to conclude that Russia does not "view the SALT deliberations as a path to mutual security through nuclear stability based on strategic equality." As one Pentagon strategist puts it, "It is clear to all that the Russians want superiority and then they will be ready to talk to us about deals."
New Weapons. To get the talks moving, the Administration wants "bargaining chips" in the form of new weapons and argues that they may prove even more necessary if the talks fail. Nixon's budget request includes $1.3 billion to continue accelerating the development of the Trident missile-firing submarine, which eventually will cost $1.3 billion each to produce. The Navy wants Tridents to start replacing Polaris submarines in 1978. The budget also contains $500 million for development of the B-l bomber. The Air Force hopes to buy 244 of them for $11 billion by 1980 as a successor to aging B-52s. In addition, the Air Force wants $20.6 million to test-fire eight Minuteman missiles from their silos in Montana 5,000 miles into the Pacific to demonstrate the system's reliability. The budget also would permit researchers to begin work on several new weapons systems. Among the items:
> $125 million for cruise missiles that could be fired from either submarines or airplanes. Powered throughout its flight by a jet engine, the 15-ft.-long missile would fly up to 1,500 miles, hugging the surface to elude Soviet radar, and deliver its warhead squarely on target.
> $248 million for advanced ICBM technology. Included in it is money for a new nuclear warhead called MaRV (for maneuverable re-entry vehicle) that could change direction in flight--something no country's ICBMS do now--to evade defensive missiles. It also would be more accurate than any existing Minuteman warhead.
> $16 million for the propulsion system of the Narwhal, a new small submarine that would carry an undetermined number of nuclear-tipped missiles and be so fast and maneuverable that it could presumably evade Soviet antisubmarine forces for years to come, though the Soviets have a surprise abuilding in that area themselves (see picture box below).
As further pressure on the Soviets to moderate their position at SALT II, Schlesinger recently disclosed that U.S. nuclear doctrine has been undergoing "major change" since last spring. For 20 years American and Soviet strategy has been based on a concept of deterrence that came to be known as mutual assured destruction. Called MAD, an acronym coined by the Hudson Institute's Brennan, the doctrine holds that peace is best maintained by threatening to obliterate an entire enemy society in retaliation for a nuclear attack. Thus, the policymakers argue, nuclear war becomes unthinkable.
Over the past three years, however, Nixon has from time to time expressed ethical and practical reservations about MAD. In his foreign policy message to Congress last May, for example, the President declared that deterrence based on the ability to kill tens of millions of Soviet citizens was "inconsistent with American values." He also said that he wanted a nuclear strategy that would have "greater flexibility," a phrase that went unexplained--and virtually unnoticed by the public--until last summer. At that time, Schlesinger disclosed that the U.S. missile force was being retriggered to give the U.S. a "counterforce" capability; i.e., the means to strike--if desired--only at Soviet military forces and installations rather than let loose a wholesale volley that would also destroy population centers.
To justify the change in strategy, the Secretary of Defense argued that MIRV advances might tempt the Soviet Union to launch a limited nuclear strike against the U.S. Under MAD, the only possible U.S. nuclear response would be an all-out attack on Soviet cities. That would not only be inhumane but suicidal, because Russia would retain enough missiles--particularly those aboard submarines, which are virtually invulnerable to attack--to obliterate U.S. population centers. Consequently, the President might decide to save American lives by not retaliating, in effect acquiescing to the aggression.
More Buttons. To avoid that, Schlesinger said, the President had to be allowed to respond in kind--for example, to destroy the submarine base at Murmansk in exchange for a hypothetical initial Russian obliteration of the U.S. base at Groton, Conn. Says Schlesinger: "We cannot allow the Soviets unilaterally to obtain a counterforce option that we ourselves lack. We must have a symmetrical balancing of the strategic forces on both sides."
The new strategy constitutes multiplying the number of buttons available to be pushed in a crisis, to provide more varieties of retaliation. As Schlesinger noted, "Most of the military objectives are already targeted." What Pentagon strategists are trying to do is war-game every limited attack the Soviets could make and program an appropriate, specific, equivalent American response to it. Declares Schlesinger: "We must maintain a military balance that offers no temptation to anybody." And, he might have added, that encourages Moscow to continue along the detente road with the U.S.
To critics, the counterforce strategy constitutes a dangerous escalation, since it changes the rules of the nuclear game: by making nuclear war more flexible, it becomes more thinkable, perhaps more tolerable, and therefore more possible. They also think it an expensive escalation, believing that it will inevitably require more accurate missiles and perhaps even bigger ones. Declares Columbia Professor Emile Benoit, an expert on the economics of defense: "We don't know how much we will spend, and we may be even less secure in the end." Indeed, the 1975 budget request includes about $10 million for a Command Data Buffer System that would allow the U.S. to switch a missile to a new target in 20 minutes. The process, which requires programming each missile's computers, now takes up to 36 hours.
Further, Benoit believes that counterforce could lead to irresistible pressure for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to build more missile defense systems. Under SALT I, both nations are restricted to token defensive systems of two antiballistic missile sites each. Some critics warn that the Russians may look on counterforce not as a defensive measure but as an offensive one, enabling the U.S. to launch a limited first strike.
But Schlesinger argues convincingly that a first strike by either country is impossible until it finds a way to destroy the other's missile-firing submarines. Both fleets are expected to be virtually invulnerable for the foreseeable future, despite vast amounts of money being spent on research into antisubmarine warfare (a total of $2.5 billion a year by the U.S. Navy alone). Indeed, counterforce looks less like a fundamental change in American nuclear strategy than a forceful way of telling the Soviets that the U.S. is willing to continue the arms race if agreement on limiting nuclear weapons is not reached at SALT II. In the blunt words of a Schlesinger adviser on nuclear strategy, M.I.T. Professor William W. Kaufmann: "We will match them."
Vulnerable Forces. Nonetheless, Christoph Bertram, assistant director of the highly respected Institute for Strategic Studies in London, predicts that if the current Soviet technical development continues and no defense is found, "all U.S. land-based missile forces would be highly vulnerable by the end of the decade." One alternative would be to abandon land-based missile systems altogether--a step that has been suggested by both the Federation of American Scientists and analysts at the Brookings Institution. The idea is also supported by Fred C. Ikle, the chief of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Such a change would save billions of dollars and still leave the U.S. its missile-firing submarines and nuclear bombers. But Pentagon strategists point out that bombers can be shot down and that eventually submarines may also become vulnerable. They prefer to complicate the Russians' offensive problems by relying on the present triad nuclear force.
Pentagon planners' concerns about the changing nuclear balance of power are equaled by their worries about what is happening to the balance of nonnuclear military power. There too Russia has been dramatically expanding its forces and modernizing its equipment in recent years.
Until the mid-1950s, Russia maintained only a coastal-defense fleet. Since then, it has rapidly expanded its fleet, outbuilding the U.S. in naval vessels by a ratio of 8 to 1, and the Russian fleet of 221 major surface combat ships today sails all oceans of the world. For the most part, Russian vessels are younger than American ships (an average of about eight years v. about 18 years), and the Soviet guided-missile cruisers of the Kresta II-class pack more punch than anything comparable in size in the U.S. fleet. Norman Polmar, U.S. editor of Jane's Fighting Ships, estimates that the Soviets lead the world in antiship missiles, introduction of new technologies to warships and numbers of attack submarines. Last year the Russians launched their first aircraft carrier. At 45,000 tons, it is about half as large as the big U.S. carriers like the nuclear-propelled Nimitz. It will be able to bring helicopters and vertical-takeoff and -landing aircraft to the scene of a battle but lacks the catapult needed to launch fixed-wing fighters or bombers.
Steady Improvements. Meanwhile, the U.S. has trimmed its active fleet to 174 major surface combat ships. Nonetheless, Polmar believes that the U.S. Navy still leads the Soviets in a number oif critical areas. Among them: carrier aviation (1,120 fighters and bombers aboard 14 attack carriers), nuclear-propelled surface ships and the ability to refuel and resupply ships at sea. This last capability permits the U.S. to keep a ship at sea for a longer period of time than the Russians, though Polmar expects the Soviets to catch up within a year or two.
In tactical aircraft, the U.S. still outclasses the Russians in performance, though not in numbers; however, the Soviets have made steady improvements. According to Admiral Moorer, they produced about eight new fighters in the 1960s, a decade in which the U.S. turned out only one--the problem-ridden F-111. Now the U.S. is developing two new fighters, the F-15 for the Air Force and the F-14 Tomcat for the Navy. The Tomcat is equipped to carry the Phoenix missile, which is capable of knocking out the Soviets' newest interceptor, the MIG-25, but costs $23.3 million --more than twice the original estimated price. The Soviet Union has the edge in antiaircraft missiles. Its air defenses boast some 10,000 launchers, including the deadly SA-6, which knocked down U.S.-built jets with devastating accuracy during the Middle East war.
On the ground, the balance of forces can be seen most graphically in Europe, which Pentagon planners still regard as the most likely place for a conventional war between the U.S. and Russia. When Nixon took office in 1969, U.S. forces were geared to what defense planners termed the "2 1/2-war concept." It meant that in theory the U.S. was prepared to fight three wars at the same time -- one in Europe, another in Asia and a "brush-fire" war somewhere else. Since the U.S. withdrew its forces from Viet Nam, how ever, the strategic premise has been changed to 1 1/2 wars, with the main event envisaged in Europe.
From the Baltic to the Bohemian Forest, some 750,000 NATO troops (190,000 of them supplied by the U.S. forces in West Germany) face approximately 850,000 troops from the Warsaw Pact nations, though not all are of top quality. The Communists hold an even greater superiority in tactical aircraft (4,300 v. 1,890) and in tanks (about 19,000 v. 6,500). Despite the antitank missiles the Arabs and Israelis used so effectively against each other last year, military planners still consider the tank the key weapon in ground combat. The Soviets have both a new medium tank (the T-62) and a new light tank in production and are testing still another new medium tank. Nonetheless, as Schlesinger points out, the U.S. and its 13 NATO allies have "other compensating advantages." The most potent is a 7,000-to-3,500 edge in small, tactical nuclear warheads, which can be lofted at the enemy forces by artillery or short-range rockets hi case of attack.
Mutual Reductions. Many people would like to withdraw U.S. forces from Europe, but Schlesinger agrees with the Administration position that such a move would be disastrous without equivalent pullbacks by Russia. He views NATO as "the spine and adhesive" that holds off Soviet political pressure and the threat of "Fin-landization" of Europe. For three months, the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries have been conducting mutual force reductions talks in Vienna, and the Administration regards keeping American sol diers in Europe as a bargaining chip that will force Soviet concessions. Says Schlesinger: "It would be foolhardy indeed not to give this pro cess a chance to work itself out." So far, however, there has been no visible progress at the talks. The chief diffi culty seems to be finding a way to compensate for the fact that the U.S. would have to withdraw troops across the Atlantic, the Russians only to then-borders near by.
Apart from meeting the Soviet challenge in Europe and elsewhere, Schlesinger must contend with the mo rale problems left over from Viet Nam, the nation's longest and most unpopular war. Some top-ranking officers are still bitter that the politicians interfered with their conduct of the war. Their resentment contributes to a crisis of the military spirit that infects all ranks and may well be more difficult to handle than the manifold problems of race, drugs and discipline.
There has been no decline in applications to the military academies, but officers like Lieut. General Albert P. Clark, superintendent of the Air Force Academy, find "that Viet Nam has made things more difficult. The military image has been tarnished to the point where it is more difficult to make a man proud of the uniform." Explains one instructor at the academy: "When we signed up to go to military school, they gave us parties. When these guys go home on leave, their girl friends won't let them wear their uniforms."
Some officers think that the situation is improving, and that pride in the military is growing again, among enlisted men as well as officers. Brigadier General Charles C. Rogers, commander of the VII Corps Artillery in Stuttgart, finds that "soldiers are beginning to wear their uniforms off duty again. Only a few do it, but that's a step forward." Moreover, he detects "an improvement in morale, military courtesy and readiness to accept traditions. Soldiers still ask 'Why?' and need explanations, but they offer much less resistance."
A more pressing problem to Schlesinger is the efficient use of personnel. Since 1968 U.S. forces have been cut from 3.5 million men and women to 2.2 million (during the same period, Russian forces grew from 3.2 million to 3.4 million). But because of what the military calls "grade creep," the U.S. Army today has one four-star general for every 20,000 men, compared with one for every 145,000 men during the Korean War. The other branches have similarly exaggerated ratios of officers to men. Moreover, only about 15% of servicemen have combat jobs, a larger portion of personnel in noncombat jobs than ever before. Schlesinger calls it the "teeth-to-tail" problem.
Last year Congress ordered the Pentagon to trim 43,000 men from the military; Schlesinger intends to cut 58,000 by July. His budget for 1975 does add one new brigade to the Army but requires the 4,000-5,000 men to be drawn from existing noncombat ranks. Schlesinger also is considering more base cutbacks. Last spring then-Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson announced that 274 military installations in the U.S. would be closed, reduced or consolidated to save $350 million a year. Schlesinger has ordered the services to recommend this spring enough other bases that could possibly be closed to save an additional $500 million a year.
Schlesinger must also devise a way to keep up the quality of the military's enlistees. In June 1973 the military draft ended, and the services began depending entirely on volunteers. Thanks to their more dramatic missions and weaponry, the Air Force and Navy have been able to meet their recruiting quotas. But the volunteer Army has not, and so far the quality of the volunteers leaves something to be desired. High school graduates now make up only 54% of the Army's ranks (and only 41% of the volunteers during the last three months of 1973), compared with 67% ten years ago. Blacks accounted for 27% of the new recruits in the last eleven months of 1973; in 1970 only 13% of all Army men were black.
Schlesinger says that the Pentagon "cannot guarantee the success of a volunteer Army" but will make every effort to make it work. As an inducement to volunteers, Congress has approved bonuses--$2,500 for a high school graduate enlisting for four years in a combat arm, $15,000 to a doctor who signs up--and has dramatically raised military pay. It now costs taxpayers $12,448 a year to maintain each person in uniform, compared with $3,443 in 1950. In all, the volunteer force has added $3.1 billion a year to the Pentagon budget. Manpower now accounts for 56% of defense costs, compared with 43% ten years ago. Still, even skeptics like Chairman John Stennis of the Senate Armed Services Committee agree that the volunteer Army should have three years to prove itself before a decision is made about whether to resume the draft.
Dwindling Reserves. Pentagon costs have also sharply escalated because of the energy crisis. In 1973 the military spent $1.6 billion for fuel; next year it estimates the cost at $3.1 billion, despite a drop of about 17% in usage. The savings were accomplished by such measures as cutting the time spent by ships at sea by as much as 20% and military flying time by 18%. Schlesinger says that there has been "some degradation of readiness," even though in the event of a war the military could commandeer fuel from civilians. Still, the cutoff of Middle East oil caused reserve stocks to dwindle to 15% of capacity (the actual figures are classified). The Pentagon expects the Arab oil embargo to end soon and military reserves to be back to normal by the end of June.
Schlesinger argues that big as the proposed $85.8 billion budget for 1975 sounds, it is really rather modest. Allowing for inflation, it is about $8.7 billion less than was spent in 1964, before the big Viet Nam buildup began. The proposed 1975 outlays would consume 5.9% of the U.S. gross national product --the same portion as last year but far less than the 8.3% of the G.N.P. spent on defense in 1964. Pentagon spending for 1975 also would amount to only 27.2% of the planned federal budget for the year, down almost one percentage point from this year. In 1964 42-c- of every federal dollar went for defense.
Sharp Attacks. Similar arguments, as well as an intense lobbying campaign that involved buttonholing about 70 Senators, enabled Schlesinger to get the Pentagon's 1974 procurement budget through Congress virtually unscathed. This year though, congressional critics will make a sharp attack on the counterforce nuclear strategy. Democratic Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa complains: "Either the doctrine is nothing new or it is the opening gun in a new arms race leading to a first-strike capability for the U.S. Schlesinger ruled out our seeking a first-strike force in his confirmation hearings. Is he now trying to reverse himself?" Warns Democratic Senator Thomas J. Mclntyre of New Hampshire, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Research and Development: "If Schlesinger is trying to pick a fight on first-strike capabilities, he's going to get one."
Other than that debate, Schlesinger will probably encounter little opposition to his budget from Congress. Its members are too preoccupied by Watergate, too worried about an economic slowdown and too apprehensive about the Russian advances in rocketry to make much of a fight. Even Democratic Representative Patricia Schroeder of Colorado, who has been a consistent critic of Pentagon spending, predicts: "The budget will come barreling through."
Schlesinger sees no contradiction in the U.S.'s arming itself with new weapons at the same time that it seeks to disarm through agreement with Moscow. Russia, he says, "is still a totalitarian state" and must be dealt with "in a cautious process." He further explains: "It is necessary for the U.S. to participate in the maintenance of a worldwide equilibrium of forces, and this requires the American people to do what to some seems to be inconsistent: to pursue detente--an alleviation of political tensions--and to maintain an adequate defense capability. We want to have a relaxation of political relations with the Soviet Union, and at the same time our military posture must be sufficiently strong so that we maintain worldwide equilibrium of military forces."
This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.