The Third Summit: A Time of Testing
In Moscow the bands were once again rehearsing that old standby, The Star-Spangled Banner, and those familiar little red-white-and-blue flags were once again being pulled out for street decorations. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger were on their way for this week's meeting with Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev--the third summit in as many years. Yet the concept of detente has lost some of its earlier magic. Both sides will have to work hard to show that it is not only alive but thriving in 1974.
Like any good host, Brezhnev has exuded good spirits about the visit and politely deferred to his guest as to where they should go. "What he wants to see, we will show him," the Soviet leader said. Brezhnev noted that unlike the President's 1972 trip, when he visited Moscow, Kiev and Leningrad, this time they might go as far afield as Minsk in Byelorussia, Volgograd in Southern Russia, Lake Baikal in Siberia and Yalta in the Crimea, the site of the controversial summit meeting of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin during World War II. Speaking of the agreements he hoped they might reach, Brezhnev said, "I think we shall please people both in the United States and hi our Soviet land."
U.S. Ascendancy. Richard Nixon goes to Moscow severely weakened by Watergate; in recent months the Soviets have begun to take Watergate seriously and realize that Nixon might actually be removed from office. On the other hand, he is in a stronger position to negotiate than he was a month ago. His tour of the Middle East and the reversal of Soviet fortunes there, with the U.S. on the ascendancy for the first time in 20 years, concretely demonstrated that most of the world still recognizes the U.S. as the globe's leading power and freest nation.
At the same time that Nixon was hi the Middle East, the U.S. more or less patched up tattered relations with its European allies, who had gone their own way during the Middle East war and the subsequent Arab oil embargo. Henry Kissinger, who had been most angered by the Europeans' refusal to go along with the U.S. hi the winter, was all smiles at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Ottawa. He said, "I believe that the disagreements of the past year, which have resulted from the fact that we have dealt with serious people representing serious contributions to our common progress, will have strengthened us as only free people can strengthen themselves through a debate."
One of the main disagreements had been an American-French dispute over whether NATO allies were obligated to consult one another on major issues affecting their security. The U.S. felt aggrieved last fall when the Europeans made hurry-up oil deals with the Arabs without talking to Washington first. The French said that the U.S. had no automatic consultation rights. In Ottawa the problem was neatly papered over. The members pledged to consult each other, but only after Kissinger vowed that the declaration was not legally binding. He then smoothly predicted that from now on there would be "a desire to consult." That settled, the allies took a relatively tough stance toward the Soviet Union in a Declaration of Principles, warning that an attack on any member of the alliance would be an attack on all. They also agreed that the continued presence of U.S. troops in Europe was necessary to Europe's security.
Nixon will stop off in Brussels on his way to Moscow this week to meet the representatives of the 14 other NATO countries and sign the declaration. It will be a symbolic ceremony, designed largely to show the Communist powers the continuing strength of the Western alliance.
Perfervid Atmosphere. Despite Nixon's enhanced negotiating position and Brezhnev's hopeful prediction, the third Nixon-Brezhnev summit is likely to be the most difficult. Whatever the difficulties, some high U.S. officials believe that detente is imperative. Said one: "If detente comes apart, it could mean a ten-year hiatus." Arms control is the most profound issue facing the two leaders. Though detente enjoyed nearly universal approval a year ago, it is coming under increasing attack in the U.S. and other Western countries from an oddly mixed but powerful alliance of liberals and conservatives. Both groups are afraid that the U.S. gave up too much and received too little in the two previous summits. Many liberals, once enthusiastic advocates of detente, are now either opposed or skeptical, perhaps because of sympathy for Israel, perhaps because of their ingrained distrust of anything connected with Nixon--but also because of the real dangers inherent in the situation.
There are other Nixon critics who, because of his Watergate troubles, fear that he will be so desperate for the Moscow meeting to go well, and thereby boost his fading image at home, that he will sacrifice U.S. nuclear superiority to maintain the Soviet connection.
Many Americans--Richard Nixon used to be one of them--still believe that Franklin Roosevelt, weakened by a fatal illness, sold out the U.S. at Yalta I by granting the Soviet Union hegemony over Eastern Europe. They are afraid that Nixon, weakened by a perhaps fatal political illness, might do the same at a Yalta II. In fact, a recently released Louis Harris survey showed 52% thinking that Nixon should stay at home until the impeachment question is resolved. Buttressing this feeling of suspicion was the sudden resignation two weeks ago of Paul Nitze, a top member of the American negotiating team on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. In a laconic but pointed statement, Nitze made it clear that he feared that Nixon and Kissinger might agree to give a strategic advantage to the Russians in the second phase of SALT.
Understandable as they may be in today's perfervid Washington atmosphere, the fears of a sellout because of Watergate seemed excessive and simplistic. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger tried to counter such alarmism by noting loyally that "the President would do nothing intentionally that would damage the national security. The President is a visceral, instinctive patriot." Besides, anything that even looked like a sellout would crush his chances for political survival. The conservatives, most of them Southerners who are expected to provide his major support in a Senate trial if the House votes to impeach him, are also the ones who are most skeptical of Soviet motives and who will most carefully examine his packages from Moscow.
Still, there is no denying that Nixon will want as many agreements as possible and that not all the fine print may be examined carefully enough. Because of Watergate, Nixon has not found the tune, energy or inclination to settle the disputes within his own Administration about what position the U.S. should take on arms control. The real danger to a fair agreement is not a Nixon sellout but the fact that the Administration might make a mistake because of poor preparation. The Pentagon is at odds with the softer position of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Kissinger is trying to reconcile them.
A week before the President was to leave, the U.S. Government had no unified negotiating stance on the myriad of details involved in SALT II. "If Henry is working on something," says one high-ranking American arms control expert, "only he, Nixon, Helmut Sonnenfeldt (State Department Counselor) and Alexander Haig know about it. It's on the back, back burner. Nobody here is working on it." Adds a State Department official tartly: "It is not possible to negotiate a comprehensive agreement within the U.S. Government, let alone with the Soviet Union."
Conceptual Breakthrough. With Brezhnev very much in control in Moscow, the Russians undoubtedly know what they want to say; but there is some evidence that they do not want to hurry on SALT either, perhaps because they fear that a new agreement would prevent them from catching up with the U.S. qualitatively. When Kissinger was in Moscow in March, optimistically predicting a "conceptual breakthrough" on arms control, he was not able, significantly, to get appointments with top Russian SALT negotiators or Defense Minister Andrei Grechko.
Though the outlook for a full-fledged SALT II agreement appears dim, the two leaders may at least achieve that "conceptual breakthrough" Kissinger sought earlier. This would be an agreement on principles, a compromise that would maintain U.S. technical superiority and Soviet numerical superiority, that could then be worked out in detail by the bureaucrats. Additionally, the Moscow summit will undoubtedly produce several lesser accords, and every day will probably see one much-photographed session at which the two leaders will jointly affix their signatures to some document. "A signing a day keeps Rodino at bay," quips one White House wit.
Among the likely accords:
> A treaty to limit anti-ballistic missile defenses to only one site in each country, plus a ban* on underground testing of large atomic weapons. The ban would be a follow-up to the 1963 treaty between the two countries that prohibited all explosions in the atmosphere, in space and under the seas. Since underground tests below 4.5 or 5 on the Richter Scale cannot be detected by the other side, the agreement bans only tests of relatively big devices, making it almost meaningless as a restraining force in the arms race, in the view of most experts.
> A ten-year agreement that would set ambitious goals for U.S.-Soviet trade through 1984. One barrier to increased trade has been the Jackson amendment, which for the past year has kept the Administration from granting the U.S.S.R. the trade concessions of most-favored-nation status until Russia allows free emigration from its borders. The amendment is designed mostly to help Jews who want to go to Israel, and Senator Henry Jackson appears willing now to compromise with the Administration if Nixon can get a promise from Brezhnev that more Jews--about 35,000 emigrated last year--will be allowed out.
Kissinger assured Jackson and other Senators last week that the Soviet Union was prepared to take the extraordinary step of giving written assurances that it will allow the emigration of 45,000 Jews.
But Jackson and others informed Kissinger that he would have to "come back with something more"--probably a promise that at least 50,000 Jews a year could leave without harassment.
> A statement of principles on the need for cooperation in energy. A joint committee will probably be set up and an exchange of scientists arranged. Specifically, the accord could lead to geological studies of Siberian natural-gas and oil reserves, with the possibility of joint exploitation.
There is more to detente than paper agreements. The word, in French, originally meant the release of the poised string of the crossbow, in other words, going from a state of alert readiness to a situation less tense but still ready for a fight. The Russian word razriadka has a similar meaning. Translated into political terms, both words connote a relaxation of tension, a willingness to at least lower the raised bow without necessarily cozying up to the other side.
Because of his credentials as a stern leader, Leonid Brezhnev, 67, is in a uniquely good position to further detente. No one can challenge his devotion to the advancement of Russian interests. He was the one who ordered the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, demanded ideological purity in Eastern Europe with the "Brezhnev Doctrine," and started the current drive to repress dissent at home (see box page 26). "He is not making Khrushchev's mistake," says Carl Linden, a leading Soviet affairs expert at George Washington University. "Khrushchev tried to couple relaxation abroad with relaxation at home, while Brezhnev has kept the two separate. He realizes there is a fundamental antagonism between the two spheres. Brezhnev is a hard-nosed, realistic politician, a Machiavellian prince who is acutely aware of the two-sided-ness of Soviet policy."
While Moscow is still sensitive about any nascent kult lichnosti, or personality cult, Brezhnev is nonetheless receiving a public relations buildup not seen since Khrushchev's time. In the recent one-slate Supreme Soviet elections, Brezhnev was referred to as the "first candidate" and as "head of the Politburo"--an interesting title since the Politburo supposedly has no head. If there is opposition to detente in Moscow, Brezhnev has effectively silenced it, at least publicly, and even those who are thought to be ideological hardliners, like Secret Police Chief Yuri Andropov and Party Ideologue Mikhail Suslov, now publicly support Brezhnev's foreign policy.
The reasons why Brezhnev wants detente have not changed. Apart from whatever the Soviets hope to accomplish in the nuclear field and lowering of their arms budgets, there is the fear of China and possible increased U.S. economic help for Peking. Finally, there is the Soviet need for Western technology and trade, which, if anything, has become more acute during the past year.
"On balance," admits the Political Diary, a secret publication circulated among loyal party and government officials in the late '60s, "the U.S. has maintained the strongest position in the world as far as technology and economics are concerned." It added, even more dolefully, "The united socialist camp, which had been formed after the war, disintegrated in the 1960s for all practical purposes, and the number of active and trustworthy friends of the Soviet Union has decreased significantly in the whole world in the 1960s."
Despite recent U.S. economic troubles, the statement still applies. The Soviet leaders would never publicly admit this, and probably most of them do not even admit it to themselves. But the most sophisticated of them, for all their ritual denunciations of the U.S., are continuing a relatively sophisticated process of analyzing U.S.-Soviet realities.
Georgy Arbatov, director of Moscow's U.S.A. Institute and the leading Soviet Americanologist, says that for the U.S. detente was "accommodation to the new realities of the international situation, to the changing foreign and domestic conditions in which U.S. policy is being conceived and shaped . . . Before any shift to detente became possible, it was absolutely necessary that the U.S. begin to accept the idea that the earlier course of the cold war had ceased to correspond to its interests."
Arbatov's statement is accurate enough, but it applies with equal weight to the Soviet Union, a point he makes, perhaps unconsciously, when he suggests that the fears of one side are the mirror image of those of the other side. "Senator Jackson claims that development of Soviet-American trade will indirectly help Soviet military programs," he says. "The mirror image of that is for us to ask: Should we help your domestic economic problems by trading with the U.S. and thus creating jobs there and supplying needed raw materials? By trade we do not mean mutual aid, but mutual profit."
While Arbatov obviously overestimates the advantages of Soviet trade to the U.S. economy, the fact is that detente has proceeded from mutual need and desire. Who has benefited from detente so far? Some top U.S. officials argue that beginning with the help Washington received from Moscow in extracting American forces from Viet Nam, it is the U.S. that has benefited far more. Perhaps--but the accounting is complex and far from conclusive. A score card on the progress of detente:
ARMS CONTROL. The U.S. agreed to what Nixon called "parity," an equation that includes missiles and warheads and supposedly gives each side equal strategic weight against the other. In signing SALT I, the U.S. formally acknowledged that it was no longer seeking to maintain the strategic superiority it had held for a generation following World War II.
Critics believe that the U.S. gave up too much and failed to anticipate Russia's growing technological sophistication (see page 25). "In the interim agreement (SALT I), we agreed to inferior numbers, but the Soviets did not agree to inferior technology," says Senator Jackson, echoing the concerns of Defense Secretary Schlesinger and the Pentagon.
Jackson, who is holding a minisummit of his own in Peking next week, conducted closed hearings with his Senate Armed Services Subcommittee last week to examine the details of SALT I. One witness was Paul Nitze, who reportedly said that Kissinger secretly assured the Soviets in 1972 that the U.S. would not replace some of its obsolete submarine launchers with new ones, as it was allowed under the SALT I treaty. It was also alleged that the Russians would be allowed to add 70 missiles to their non-nuclear submarines. Kissinger, who claims that these assertions must be based on a misapprehension of the negotiations, will have an opportunity to rebut Nitze before the committee this week. He will undoubtedly be subjected to sharp questioning.
Adding support to Jackson's observation that the Soviets really want superiority rather than "equivalency" is the history of the separate but analogous negotiations that are now going on in Vienna to reduce conventional forces in Europe (19 countries are participating in these talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions or MBFR). In Europe, the Russians and their Warsaw Pact allies have a superiority in conventional forces (850,000, v. 750,000 for NATO), and they give no indication that they are ready to surrender their advantage in a conference room in Vienna. The negotiations are stalemated.
The main counterargument to critics of arms reduction is, of course, that the only realistic alternative is a continuation of the arms race. SALT I merely confirmed the existing strategic balance. The U.S. gave up nothing in SALT I that it had not already relinquished in reduced budgets for missiles. "While the U.S. had its eyes fixed on Viet Nam, the Soviet Union had been concentrating on vastly increasing its strategic armament." says Kremlinologist Richard Lowenthal. "The Soviets entered the SALT negotiations hi a much stronger position than they had been in [in the early '60s], so that any gains they made were done through increased power and not through negotiations."
THE MIDDLE EAST. The October war put detente to its clearest test so far. It both failed and succeeded, in that order. According to Article 3 of the "Basic Principles" contained in the original agreement signed in 1972, each side is supposed to do everything in its power "so that conflicts or situations will not arise which could serve to increase international tension." The Russians clearly violated that article by not alerting the U.S. before the outbreak, even though they had advance warnings of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's intentions (see story page 32). Assuming that the Russians would keep the Arab armies on a leash, the Israelis, to their regret, completely misjudged the Arab buildup, and they failed to see that it was a prelude to war. U.S. intelligence contends that it has evidence that Moscow began preparations to send three airborne divisions to Egypt when the counterattacking Israelis approached Cairo. The threat of Soviet soldiers fighting in the Middle East caused the U.S. to call its first worldwide alert since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.
"I was surprised at the degree to which the Russians were willing to jeopardize their relationship with the U.S. in exchange for immediate gains in the Middle East," says Richard Ullman, Princeton professor of international affairs and director of studies for the Council on Foreign Relations. "On the other hand, you could say the same thing about the U.S. when it responded to a North Vietnamese offensive by massively bombing Hanoi and Haiphong (as well as mining Haiphong harbor) at just the time Nixon was going to Moscow."
If detente failed to prevent the October war, it did help in achieving the disengagement. The Soviets, who a few years ago probably would have resisted any U.S. gains in the area, have so far not wrecked Kissinger's settlement, with its enhancement of the American position. They are not happy with the rise in American influence--"All we ever got from the Arabs was a cholera epidemic," jokes one Russian official--but they are keeping their temper in check. Says an Israeli analyst: "Everything would change if Brezhnev were to fall and anti-detente forces took over in Moscow. The Russians would then immediately try to get rid of Sadat and possibly [Syrian President Hafez] Assad."
EUROPE. Charles de Gaulle started the newest phase of detente by his visit to Moscow in 1966, and Willy Brandt expanded it with his Ostpolitik in 1969, but it is the Europeans, ironically, together with the Chinese and the Japanese, who have the greatest distrust of U.S.-Soviet detente. NATO Secretary-General Joseph Luns, the distinguished, strongly anti-Communist Dutch diplomat, warned at the Ottawa meeting that the U.S.S.R. considers detente a "oneway process serving the exclusive interests of the Soviet Union." One school of Kremlinologists, centered chiefly in Britain and including such men as Robert Conquest and Leopold Labedz, label detente "the American failure." They see American losses in everything from trade to the strategic balance.
They also believe that detente is weakening NATO, which last week celebrated its 25th year as a deterrent force.
It is hard, observe these critics, to convince financially strapped European voters that they should spend money on defense while Nixon and Brezhnev are linking arms in Moscow--a reaction they charge that Moscow anticipated as one of its major advantages from detente.
If NATO is weaker than it was ten or 20 years ago--and it almost certainly is--the blame does not rest so much with detente as it does with changing times. The erosion can be attributed, in part, to the Viet Nam War and Washington's turning away from Europe to Asia. It can also be partly traced to the obstructionism of France and Charles de Gaulle's decision to kick NATO troops off French soil in the mid-'60s. But NATO is far from moribund. Coming after the squabbling within the alliance last winter, the Ottawa meeting offered reassuring evidence of that fact. The meeting changed nothing except the atmosphere, but that in itself is of some importance. The new French government of Valery Giscard d'Estaing seems much more committed to the alliance than its Gaullist predecessors, and Washington too seems more relaxed. The recent defeat in the Senate of attempts to cut U.S. forces in Europe unilaterally also helped NATO retain a measure of viability.
The Europeans have another reservation about detente. They are worried that a "superpower condominium" will settle major issues without consulting them. Former French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert, for instance, believed that detente was not really a relaxation of tensions but an equilibrium of power, "a kind of modus vivendi in the management of world affairs between the U.S. and the Soviet Union." Jobert was probably right, at least in part, but the Europeans cannot realistically expect an equal voice with Moscow and Washington so long as they remain divided among themselves.
Despite the critics, detente has worked well for both sides in Europe, and each side has given up something and gained something. Through a series of agreements, the West has recognized the division of Germany and Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe, something the Soviet Union had long sought. Notwithstanding its symbolic importance, this was, like the SALT agreement, nothing more than a concession to reality, an acknowledgment of an already existing situation. "The most striking success of detente has taken place here in Central Europe," says Lowenthal. "The four-power agreement on Berlin, for example, has been an unqualified Western success, and it has greatly increased the security of the city. For the first time, the Soviet Union and East Germany have recognized the city's institutional ties to West Germany."
TRADE. Soviet-American trade has jumped from $200 million in 1971 to $ 1.5 billion in 1973, with the dollar-ruble balance 7 to 1 in favor of the U.S., which buys Soviet vodka, platinum, diamonds and chrome ore and sells oil-and gas-drilling equipment, machinery and electronic gear, including computers. The Russians have been eager for loans and technological know-how, and so far they have got some of both. Only in May Nixon intervened with the Export-Import Bank to approve a $180 million loan for eight Soviet ammonia fertilizer plants and the attendant gear to move the fertilizer to distribution centers. Partially because of the Jackson amendment, however, Nixon has not been able to deliver on his other promises for loans and tariff concessions. "My firmness has resulted in some movement," Jackson says, defending his stand. "The only real charge against me is that I believe in driving a hard bargain. If I had followed a soft line, there would have been no Jewish emigration."
Further expansion of trade must be approved by Congress, which is skeptical of deals with the Soviets after the disastrous experience of the 1972 wheat sale. Last week a bill was introduced in Congress that would require congressional approval of all loans over $50 million --relative chicken feed in international finance.
Many question why the U.S. should be so eager to help the Russians catch up economically and technically. European critics contend that American corporations have been pressured by the Nixon Administration to give invaluable information to the Russians. "It was a giveaway of technology," says Walter Laqueur, director of London's Institute of Contemporary History. "It induced American industrialists to make their technology available for nothing or for a symbolic price. I do not mean agriculture or pharmacology either. I mean things that could be helpful to the [Soviet] army and space programs."
Privately, American businessmen agree that the Administration has been pressuring for deals with the Soviets, but so far they have resisted selling the advanced technology, like high-speed computers and microelectronics, that could help the Soviet arms efforts. The businessmen are more than willing to trade low-grade technology and most other products, but they see little long-term profit in selling complete plants. Lockheed and Boeing, for instance, are now dickering with Moscow on the sale of jumbo jets, but they are not eager to give what the Russians really want, complete plants that can turn out jumbo jets in Moscow or Minsk. In sum, it seems unrealistic to expect the Soviet Union to remain technologically backward forever, and if the U.S. does not help, others will.
In a food-short, energy-short world, however, there certainly is some advantage to America in helping the Soviets increase their agriculture yields or tap their natural resources in return for gas and oil. There is a danger that the U.S. might give away too much or become too dependent on Soviet resources, but there is an advantage, too, in seeking fuel from many sources and becoming less dependent on the Middle East.
FREEDOM IN THE SOVIET UNION.
detente has paradoxically caused even greater repression inside the Soviet Union, and critics charge that Nixon and Kissinger have conveniently closed their eyes to the fact that the men in the Kremlin run a harsh and brutal regime. The price of detente to the Russians, they say, should be a relaxation internally. Andrei Sakharov, the most prominent Soviet dissenter remaining after the expulsion of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, goes so far as to contend that detente with a closed, repressive society like the Soviet Union's is perilous and foolhardy. Since it does not have public opinion to contend with, Russia could change policy overnight, as it did in the Stalin-Hitler Pact of 1939. "No one should dream of having such a neighbor," Sakharov says, "especially if this neighbor is armed to the teeth."
Many Europeans agree, and they are trying to make their point to Moscow in the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe now meeting in Geneva. The Russians want the conference only to approve the frontiers of Central Europe, thus legitimizing Moscow's control of Eastern Europe. The Western Europeans are demanding in return that the Kremlin agree to a freer movement of people from East to West and prior notification of military maneuvers inside the East bloc. Russia has refused, maintaining that its domestic affairs are no one's business. The conference is stymied as a result.
However reluctantly, Nixon and Kissinger largely accept the Russian view. They contend that the Soviets are no more likely to change their system under outside pressure than the U.S. would be. If the Russians had to make a choice between detente and internal freedom, detente would be sacrificed in a minute. East-West understanding --and the avoidance of nuclear war--is more important than making a moral point, they say, particularly since insisting on the moral point would bring no results. By allowing some Soviet Jews to leave the country, Brezhnev has already made a considerable concession, by his lights anyway. To the unprecedented extent that Brezhnev has given in, detente has already produced a measure of freedom in the Soviet Union.
Overall, many of the individual points against detente are well taken, and the rhetoric in favor of detente has often been overblown. But a large number of the anti-detente complaints are beside the point. They seem to be based on the unrealistic premise that detente is not just a lessening of tension but something close to a marriage contract. Too many people have expected too much, and are now suing to annul a union that never in fact existed. "detente just isn't a heady, euphoric thing," says Richard Ullman. "The word almost does us a disservice. It simply means a cool understanding. It has a connotation of arm's length, mutual interest."
In fact the Russians have not given up their plans to promote Communism by every means they can, foul as well as fair. Nor has the U.S. lost its belief that democracy is the best system.
Desire to Live. Egon Bahr, who was Willy Brandt's chief detente strategist, compares Moscow's position to that of the Catholic Church. "Even today the church takes the position that there is only one way to God, namely through itself," says Bahr. "The only difference is that it will no longer conduct a Thirty Years' War because of that. detente is the task of continuing the ideological dispute between democracy and Communism without the danger of war.
detente is a difficult, tough, troublesome, long-lasting business, a permanent process. It is absolutely necessary because the policy of confrontation leads nowhere."
detente is not so much a question of trusting the Russians. It is rather a question of analyzing motives and interests and judging whether they coincide. Beyond everything else is the mutual desire to stay alive. "They don't want to live in an era of incalculable dangers either," says Adam Ulam, director of Harvard's Russian Research Center. "detente is very good for our nerves, and even though the Russians have pretended to have stronger nerves than we do, in effect they also appreciate an easing of these tensions." In an era of nuclear proliferation, that is a statement that both Nixon and Brezhnev can agree upon--and ponder --while they are presenting their toasts this week.
* Other countries are going ahead with the much more dangerously polluting atmospheric tests. Last week both France and China exploded atmospheric nuclear devices.
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