Monday, Nov. 11, 1974

Food, Famine, Fury and Fears

As Secretary of State Henry Kissinger flew to New Delhi last week, reporters accompanying him noticed that he seemed uncharacteristically subdued. Perhaps he was preoccupied with weighty matters involving Moscow and the Middle East. On the other hand, he may only have been a bit apprehensive about seeing India's proud, mercurial Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi. Their last meeting, which coincided with the start of a U.S. "tilt" toward Pakistan during the Bangladesh crisis of 1971, ended in mutual distrust. Mrs. Gandhi has since been known to turn livid at the very mention of Kissinger's name. Prospects for a successful encounter seemed dim after India's National Herald, on the day of Kissinger's arrival, published an interview with Mrs. Gandhi in which she complained that Americans regard India "as marginal to their global strategy."

Arms Control. Despite that inauspicious sign, the Secretary of State was greeted by Mrs. Gandhi with civility if not warmth. By the end of his visit, it seemed that the fabled Kissinger charm had been sufficient to its peacemaking task. Unleashing some romantic metaphors, Kissinger told reporters that the stormy "teenage period" of Indo-American affairs had now matured into the stability of an adult relationship.

The talk in New Delhi was of arms control and trade concessions. India refused to sign the 1968 Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on the ground that it discriminated against nuclear have-not nations. Since the May 18 blast that signaled India's emergence as the world's sixth nuclear power, Kissinger has expressed concern over what he calls "the export of explosive technology." He worried that India might share its nuclear expertise with politically volatile Arab countries in exchange for much-needed oil concessions.

When he left New Delhi last Wednesday, Kissinger felt confident that India would accept U.N.-sponsored restraints on nuclear technology. In order to secure Indian cooperation on this issue, Kissinger assured Mrs. Gandhi that the U.S. would continue its arms embargo against Pakistan. But he purchased a warm leave-taking in New Delhi at the risk of a cool reception one day later in Islamabad.

Kissinger also discussed the question of food aid to India. Mrs. Gandhi refuses to acknowledge publicly that thousands of people have died of starvation in the states of Bihar and West Bengal (see SPECIAL SECTION). The Prime Minister, having proudly proclaimed her country's self-sufficiency after a record harvest in 1971, was reluctant to accept any aid that made India seem to be on the American dole again.

Kissinger nevertheless negotiated an agreement that will provide India with between 500,000 and 1 million tons of inexpensively priced wheat on a long-term deferred-payment plan. The bilateral good will was further enhanced when Kissinger publicly labeled the U.S.'s attitude during the cold war of distrust toward uncommitted nations like India as "anachronistic and self-defeating." By accepting India's neutrality between East and West as "an altogether understandable and practical" position, Kissinger laid to rest a grudge that New Delhi has borne toward Washington since former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles used to denounce India's foreign policy as "immoral."

From New Delhi, the Secretary flew first to Dacca. There he conferred with Bangladesh Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman, who has expressed disappointment over the U.S.'s limited offer of food aid to his drought-stricken country.

Lavish Banquet. Kissinger then stopped in Islamabad, where he tried to fend off Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's request for American arms to match the $1 billion worth of military equipment that India has purchased from the Soviet Union since 1960. Kissinger promised Pakistan 100,000 tons of surplus wheat--but no arms. If Bhutto was disappointed, he did not show it. At a lavish banquet he happily toasted Kissinger as a "modern Metternich." On that complimentary note, Kissinger left for Iran to talk with Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi about oil prices and the Middle East.

Neither Kissinger nor the familiar "high State Department official" had much to tell newsmen about the hours of talk that the Secretary had with Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow. Kissinger did indicate, however, that progress had been made in setting up guidelines for further limitation of strategic arms. These tentative agreements will be pursued at a Brezhnev-Ford "working summit" in Vladivostok later this month. The meeting will follow Ford's scheduled state visit to Japan.

The Kissinger-Brezhnev talks about Soviet-American trade relations were less productive. Democratic Senator Henry Jackson's announcement of the compromise linking American trade concessions to an easing of Soviet emigration policy (TIME, Oct. 28) both angered and embarrassed Moscow. Kissinger, who was reportedly infuriated by both Jackson's gloating tone and his premature tuning three weeks ago, is even angrier now that he has borne the brunt of Brezhnev's displeasure for the Senator's grandstanding. Beyond that, Kissinger fears that the Soviets will try to save face by balking on the agreement.

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