Turbulent Saga of Uneven Progress

Fitful starts and stops have marked China's quarter-century under Communism. Pragmatism has repeatedly clashed with ideology to produce a record of uneven economic and political development.

The highlights:

THE CONSOLIDATION of Communist control and rebuilding the wartorn country were Mao's top priorities after the 1949 defeat of the Nationalists. A totalitarian society emerged as the Communists gained control of almost every aspect of political, economic, cultural and even family life. The private economic sector was eliminated: banks, industry and trade were nationalized; forced collectivization of the farms cost the lives of at least 1 million landlords and other "enemies of the people." A five-year plan supported by Soviet loans and technical aid emphasized heavy industry.

THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD nearly destroyed the gains of the previous decade. Launched in 1958 by Mao, the Leap was intended to skip several stages in building a Communist society and make China the economic equal of Britain within 15 years. Seeking to mobilize surplus rural labor for industrial tasks, Mao ordered half a billion peasants herded into huge communes. Economic planning was decentralized, as was industry. For example, despite their inefficiency, small iron smelters were constructed in backyards. The program had some successes: reservoirs, railways, hydroelectric plants and canals were built. Yet the Great Leap wasted enormous resources and disastrously lowered productivity, ushering in the harsh economic recession and poor agricultural yields of the early 1960s. Kremlin denunciation of the Leap for not imitating the Soviet model and the withdrawal of Russian technicians from China climaxed in the Moscow-Peking rift in 1960.

RETRENCHMENT was essential. Economic order had to be restored and food production increased. Peasants, after working the required time on commune lands, were again permitted to cultivate private plots--an admission that economic incentive was still more effective than ideological exhortation. Mao resigned as head of state in favor of Liu Shao-chi (but remained Communist Party chairman). For the next half a dozen years an elite of bureaucrats, planners and pragmatists was ascendant. Ideology became secondary; priority was given to the skills needed for industrial growth.

THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION, which swept China from May 1966 to April 1969, was Mao's offensive against the new elite. His chief weapon: China's youth. Huge posters denouncing pragmatic leaders such as Liu and Teng Hsiao-ping plastered walls; they and thousands of others were forced to resign in disgrace; millions of people paraded waving little red books containing quotations from Chairman Mao. The movement careened out of control. Exhorted by Mao to "learn revolution by making revolution," the youthful Red Guard attacked "old customs" and destroyed ancient art and cultural works. Rallies replaced work; schools and universities closed. Mao had to turn to the army, led by Defense Minister Lin Piao, to re-establish order.

A STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND followed the Cultural Revolution. One protagonist was Lin, who had been designated as Mao's heir in April 1969. For still unexplained reasons, Lin apparently plotted to kill Mao in 1971; the coup was uncovered and--according to an official Peking statement--Lin was killed in an air crash during his attempt to escape to the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, many pragmatists were gradually reinstated to government and party posts. They were attacked by the radical left during a 1974 thought-purification campaign ostensibly directed against Lin and the ideas of Confucius. It now appears that the pragmatists have weathered the campaign--at least for the moment.

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