Tough Talk, High Hope

It was Palestinian Leader Yasser Arafat who most recently used the phrase "guns and olive branches" to describe his approach to the Middle East conflict. But Washington appears to be using a strikingly similar concept to keep oil flowing to the West. Even as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger last week prepared for another trip to the Middle East to resume his step-by-step discussions on disengagement, U.S. officials, led by President Ford, were talking tough. Their emphasis was not merely on hopes for success by Kissinger but equally, it seemed, on hints of how the U.S. might respond if the Secretary's negotiations broke down, war became imminent and petroleum shipments were threatened once more.

In a televised White House interview with NBC, the President ignored an opportunity to deny rumors that the U.S. was training a force for desert fighting in the event of another oil embargo. "I don't think that I ought to talk about any particular military contingency plans," Ford said, thus giving some substance to rumors that three special divisions were being organized for this purpose. The Pentagon admits that three divisions are being created by using formerly chairborne soldiers, but denies that they are intended for any such specific duty.

Ford reiterated his agreement with Kissinger's widely publicized statement that a new crisis might force the U.S. to take military action. The President said that the U.S. would react only to actual "economic strangulation" and added: "I think the public has to have a reassurance that we are not going to permit America to be strangled to death." In a speech to the Economic Club of New York, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger insisted that it was "within the power" of the U.S. to prevent such strangulation. Schlesinger also reaffirmed U.S. support for Israel in the event of another Middle East war. He predicted that such a war would last no longer than three or four weeks and that Israel could be resupplied from the U.S. without difficulty.

In Jerusalem, Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin was also talking tough. In a speech to United Jewish Appeal fund raisers, the former chief of staff of Israel's armed forces deliberately chose to speak as "a military man." Said Rabin: "We do not seek war, but if war is forced upon us, the Arabs will find a stronger Israel than they think they might find." Rabin rejected Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's call for an Israeli withdrawal within 90 days on three fronts--the Sinai desert, the Golan Heights and the West Bank of the Jordan River. Deadlines have "no validity whatsoever for Israel," the Premier said.

Running Battle. The olive branch, however, was equally evident. In private, Rabin sounded more conciliatory than he had in public. Arab leaders, too, sounded more amenable than they had in recent months. Significantly, there was general Arab disapproval of the actions of three guerrillas who first attempted to attack an Israeli airliner at Paris' Orly Airport and then wounded some 20 people in a running battle with French police. "We cannot condone such acts, which only harm French and Palestinian people," said Arafat. The Iraqi government allowed the guerrillas to land at Baghdad in a French airliner that had flown them from Orly, but then arrested them. Either Iraq or the Palestine Liberation Organization may punish the men. Such threats have been made in the past after similar incidents, but never carried out. Whether the Arabs are in earnest this time remains to be seen.

At least as significant was a hint from Egypt's Sadat that eventually he might not insist on simultaneous Israeli disengagement moves on all three disputed fronts. "It would be tantamount to treason," he told the Beirut newspaper an-Nahar, "if we reject for any reason occupied Arab land that the enemy may return to us." Jordan's King Hussein made the same point to TIME. "My own view," the King said, "is that any territory recovered is important. If it is a step to be followed by others, I do not see why there should by any objection." Such flexible attitudes should help ease Kissinger's task considerably.

Overall, the mood for Middle East peacemaking was optimistic. The only danger was that the tough talk, particularly on Washington's part, could itself become an issue and complicate Kissinger's negotiations.

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