Excursion in the Persian Gulf

Arab leaders such as King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and Algerian President Houari Boumedienne quite naturally decry the idea of U.S. interposition in the Middle East because of oil. Just as naturally, U.S. strategists charged with providing responses to any conceivable politico-military situation are weighing alternatives for intervention in the event of a strangling oil embargo. Two such experts with access to the thinking of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have pieced together a composite of these alternatives and filtered it out to other analysts. The composite represents high-level rumination rather than a final, actual blueprint. But it is couched in considerable detail and shows a knowledge of up-to-date military tactics and a "roughneck's" expertise in oil production.

According to the composite, any move would concentrate on the Persian Gulf Arab states that pump 54% of the oil produced by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and control 40% of the world's proven oil reserves. The primary target would be Saudi Arabia, which has 56.5% of this oil. According to the plan, the Saudis would be overwhelmed by a U.S. air-sea strike force prepared to hurl four divisions of troops at the Ghawar wellhead and the loading jetties of the U.S.-built oil facility at Dhahran.

The composite contingency plan assumes a cutoff in oil to the West because of another Middle East war, an Arab oil embargo and a White House command to the U.S. military to lift the embargo. At this order, two massive U.S. strike groups would get under way. One would move through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean and into the Persian Gulf. It would include carriers whose jets would secure air control, and ships carrying at least a division of Marines (15,000 men). The second force would include two brigades of the 82nd Airborne Division (7,600 men) now stationed at Fort Bragg, N.C. They would fly to Hatserim Air Base, a closely guarded, little-known facility in Israel, and then await further orders. In using Hatserim as a staging base, Washington would be collecting IOUs that it has accumulated by funneling billions in military aid to Israel.

Since surprise would be impossible in such an operation, the U.S. would rely instead on muscle. A slow voyage up the Persian Gulf would at least give Arab nations a chance to reconsider the embargo and possibly lift it. If they failed to do so, the two-pronged force would strike.

Saudi Sabotage. First, several battalions of airborne troops would drop on Ghawar and Dhahran to prevent the Saudis from blowing up oil refineries, storage tanks and producing wells. After securing the Dhahran airstrip--built by the U.S. and thus familiar--they would wave in the rest of the division. A swarm of C-5As, C-141s and C-130s would unload not only back-up artillery and infantry but also engineers who would get the oilfields working again. Three days after the airborne assault, the Marine units would come ashore by helicopter and landing craft.

The contingency planning assumes a Saudi response, probably by sabotage. The most serious blows are anticipated not in the oilfields themselves but on the complicated loading docks on the Gulf. To overcome any destruction of facilities, U.S. engineers would arrive with piping and other equipment. Other guerrilla activity, in a sandy area of high visibility for patrolling Phantom jets, is expected to be minimal and easily surmountable. The plan also assumes that the Soviet Union would offer no military opposition to the takeover, but might move its forces into neighboring Iraq in a show of force. The Soviets, in the view of the Joint Chiefs, have neither the desire nor, so far, the naval capability to oppose massive U.S. action in the Persian Gulf.

Within 90 days, the composite plan assumes, oil would once again be flowing westward from Dhahran.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.