Last Chance for Kissinger's Step-by-Step?

Since the October war of 1973, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has made five trips to the Middle East, convinced that his personalized, step-by-step approach to diplomacy will prove more fruitful than the reconvention of a multinational peace conference in Geneva. So far, Kissinger's accomplishments have borne out his beliefs. Warring armies have been pulled apart on the Sinai and the Golan Heights, United Nations peace keepers have been inserted, and some Israeli-occupied territory has been returned to Arab sovereignty.

This week, as Kissinger departed for a scheduled sixth trip to Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, there were worries that this might be the last chance for his step-by-step approach. Foreshadowing Kissinger's visit, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko concluded a Middle East tour of his own to press the Russian preference--a return to Geneva. Syrian President Hafez Assad, the most unbending leader of the Arab confrontation powers, supports that preference. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat still has hopes that Kissinger can achieve further progress; nonetheless, the joint Egyptian-Soviet communique issued after Gromyko's visit reflected Sadat's desire for eventual resumption of the Geneva conference. Even members of Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin's government, which long worried about the negative hand of Soviet diplomacy, now say that they have "no fear" about going to Geneva, even though they would prefer to negotiate with the Arabs through Kissinger.

Little Help. The Secretary said that his latest Middle East trip was merely to make soundings. He will return next month for actual negotiations based on what he learns now. If there is no movement in March, he may give up the effort. The great uncertainty was how much maneuvering room Kissinger had. The Israelis have expressed a willingness to pull back their armed forces from the strategic Mitla and Giddi passes in the Sinai Peninsula and return the Abu Rudeis oilfields to Egypt. In exchange they want a declaration of nonbelligerency from Egypt--something that Sadat cannot give until there is an overall settlement, including the Golan Heights, the West Bank and recognition of the Palestinians.

In trying to keep the step-by-step approach alive, Kissinger received little help from the Soviet Foreign Minister. Gromyko and the Syrians composed another joint call for the reopening of the

Geneva talks and also proposed a set time for discussions to begin--no later than early March, shortly before the United Nations' peace-keeping mandates in the Sinai and Golan Heights demilitarized zones expire. Gromyko obviously meant to use the Soviet-Syrian communique as a way to pressure Sadat, who so far has steadfastly resisted Soviet demands for talks in Geneva until he determines how much Kissinger's step-by-step strategy can accomplish.

Sadat apparently withstood the new pressure. After a four-hour talk with "my friend Gromyko," Sadat announced that they were agreed only on an "early" resumption of Geneva talks. Meanwhile, Sadat held to his determination to deal first step by step with "my friend Henry." Sadat, however, may feel new pressures from Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev, who, Gromyko said, intends to visit Cairo "shortly."

Order Blank. At week's end, despite Israeli willingness to make further withdrawals in the Sinai, the Secretary had not received from Jerusalem a concrete proposal of concessions that he could put to Egypt's Sadat. At the same time, he had not heard from Cairo any plan that suitably compensates the Israelis for withdrawing troops beyond the Sinai passes. Israel would like Sadat to formalize remarks the Egyptian President made in Paris two weeks ago, when he told newsmen that neither Egypt nor Syria would attack Israel. Said Premier Rabin in a speech last week: "As we say in the army, let him put it on an order blank and we have a breakthrough, a chance at agreement."

Complicating Kissinger's negotiations is a long-smoldering political crisis in Israel that limits Premier Rabin's ability to maneuver. "There is no country in the world where foreign and domestic policies are so intimately related as they are in Israel," a Foreign Ministry official involved in the U.S. Secretary's visit told TIME Correspondent Marlin Levin last week. "If Rabin gets an agreement that points to progress and the normalization of relations with Egypt, he can get over the domestic problem. Otherwise the problem will be severe."

Rabin's "domestic problem" is that while he has had no big failures as Premier since he replaced Golda Meir last May, he also has had no major successes, and his popularity within Israel is fading.

Israel's slow recovery from the war and its eroding image abroad have caused some Israelis to question his leadership. If Rabin's fragile coalition majority in the Knesset were to collapse, there are several men who are not only willing but eager to succeed him. One potential future Premier is articulate Defense Minister Shimon Peres. Another is former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, who was recently cleared by a fact-finding of responsibility for Israel's poor showing at the outset of the October war.

Although Rabin is leader of the dominant Labor Party as well as Premier, he has consistently ignored party apparatchiks and rarely sat in on their caucuses. The party is now so deeply in debt--an estimated $4 million--that its headquarters in Tel Aviv has trouble paying its telephone bills. Ironically, according to some critics, the chances of peace might actually improve if the dovish Rabin were replaced by either Peres or Dayan, both of whom have reputations as hawks. The theory is that a noted hard-liner would be better able than Rabin to convince the Israelis that they will have to give up not only large parts of the Sinai, which even opposition politicians are ready to surrender, but also the more sensitive areas of the Golan Heights and the West Bank in return for an Arab commitment to guarantee peace and secure borders for Israel.

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