Strains in an Old Alliance

For more than a quarter of a century, dating back to the Truman Doctrine in 1947, Turkey has marched step by step with the U.S. on defense. The pattern of close bilateral relations between the two countries was later expanded under the NATO and CENTO treaties, and by 1975 U.S. military and economic aid to Turkey had reached a total of more than $6.5 billion. Last week the U.S. military-aid pipeline was abruptly cut off in accordance with a congressional order that all arms assistance be suspended until substantial progress is made in reaching a settlement on Cyprus. The cutoff was enacted last fall by an enraged Congress, following an invasion of the island by Turkish forces using American arms. Its purpose was to pressure Ankara into withdrawing its troops from Cyprus and allowing the resettlement of the 200,000 refugees (mostly Greek Cypriots) who were left homeless by the war.

Sadly enough, Congress's cutoff of aid to Turkey not only failed to break the deadlock in negotiations over Cyprus but may have exacerbated it. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger called the cutoff "a tragedy" and warned that it could have potentially far-reaching effects if Turkey makes good on its implied threat to reduce its participation in NATO, thus jeopardizing the eastern flank of the Atlantic alliance.

Serious Consequences. Official Turkish reaction was guarded; nonetheless, there was general anger at Congress's action. In Ankara, Turkish Premier Sadi Irmak suspended bilateral talks on the future of American military installations in his country, and Foreign Minister Melih Esenbel canceled talks about Cyprus with Kissinger in Brussels.

There were hints that much more serious consequences might ensue--ranging from the closing of NATO'S vital early-warning installations in Turkey, which monitor troop movements and missile activity in the Soviet Union, to a gradual shift in the country's foreign policy toward a more neutral stance. As Parliamentary Deputy Haluk Ulman put it, "If the U.S. decides that it can live without Turkey, then Turkey must learn to live without the Western world." Turkish-Cypriot Leader Rauf Denktash, moreover, warned that the aid cutoff might provoke the proclamation of an independent Turkish-Cypriot state.

The suspension of arms assistance and sales involves a total package of more than $200 million, including $90 million in sales, $80 million in grants, and $10 million for supply services. Also covered by the ban is a $230 million contract for the modernization of Turkey's U.S.-made M48 tanks, which was to have begun in two years.

For congressional opponents, the essential issue was whether such aid and sales were legal while Turkey was using American arms to occupy Cyprus. Missouri Democratic Senator Thomas Eagleton, the principal spokesman for the advocates of the cutoff, argued that the Turkish military operation on Cyprus --even though it was a response to the coup engineered by the deposed military junta in Athens--directly violated the terms of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act and the 1968 Foreign Military Sales Act. Both provide for sanctions against any ally who uses U.S. arms for other than defensive purposes and, more specifically, who uses U.S. arms against another ally (in this case Greece). In addition to the two laws governing arms aid and sales, Eagleton and his congressional colleagues pointed to a bilateral agreement explicitly forbidding Turkey's use of American arms on Cyprus without U.S. permission.

Last September Congress set Dec. 10 as a deadline for the aid cutoff "unless and until" substantial progress was made, such as a major withdrawal of Turkey's 35,000 troops from Cyprus or resettlement of a major portion--some suggested 80,000--of the Greek-Cypriot refugees. That deadline was later extended to Feb. 5.

In a meeting with congressional leaders preceding last week's cutoff, Kissinger conceded that he was unable to report the substantial progress toward a settlement that Congress required. He promised that "in accordance with the law," all military deliveries would stop. But he warned that the cutoff would "greatly complicate" his efforts to mediate peace in the Mediterranean.

Privately, Kissinger was much more outspoken. He has bitterly denounced the decision as an unwarranted interference in the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy that has come at the worst possible time. Nevertheless, he is actively seeking a compromise with Congress in support of U.S. strategic interests in Turkey that he hopes will get the Cyprus negotiations off dead center.

Several hundred demonstrators who had gathered outside the American embassy in Athens disbanded when they heard that aid had in fact been cut off, but there was little cause for jubilation among Greek officials. As one government spokesman put it, "We're still in a deadlock. It would have been much better if the threat of cutting off the aid had caused Turkey to make a significant concession, such as giving back the city of Famagusta."

There was widespread satisfaction among the Greek-Cypriot public, which saw the cutoff as the first official recognition by a Western power that Turkey was an aggressor in Cyprus. President Archbishop Makarios maintained a diplomatic silence on the development, stating that he did not wish to give the impression that he was interfering in U.S. internal affairs. Two days before the deadline, however, Makarios said that not only had there been no progress toward a settlement but "the situation, far from improving, had deteriorated."

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