Darkness Without Exit

Even by the standards of war-torn South Viet Nam, the internal rumblings in Saigon seemed like a poor way to prepare for this week's lunar New Year's holiday. Catholic leaders, aided by students and opposition politicians, denounced South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu as an "enemy of peace." Proclaimed their "indictment," which was reprinted in several Saigon newspapers: "It is impossible to obtain peace with Thieu, because he is a product of war, was nurtured on it and survived with it." The President's response was swift and predictable. The Saigon government confiscated nine newspapers and censored a tenth; five of the papers were closed down indefinitely, and 21 journalists and publishers were arrested on charges that they were "Communist agents."

Thieu's repressive measures could not have come at a worse time. The U.S. Congress, in the midst of debating an Administration request for an extra $300 million in military aid for Saigon, was sure to react unfavorably to Thieu's latest attack on the South Vietnamese press; even the anti-Thieu papers are decidedly nonCommunist. Beyond that, a number of longtime supporters of South Viet Nam's President, including Senator Henry Jackson, seem to have given up on Thieu. "The Thieu failure is a failure of a regime to bring together all the factions to fight the war," Jackson said last week. "He brings them together by locking them up." Recognizing the new realities, one U.S. diplomat in Saigon said: "The Vietnamese have an incredible knack for bad publicity."

Random Shelling. Bad publicity, however, is only one of Thieu's problems and probably not his gravest. More serious is the fact that the military balance has in recent months been changing unfavorably for Saigon. In Military

Region Three, which encompasses the eleven provinces surrounding Saigon, the South Vietnamese have suffered several serious setbacks, including the loss a month ago of the entire province of Phuoc Long on the Cambodian border. The same day the Communists captured Phuoc Long, they dislodged Saigon's forces from the strategic Nui Ba Den (Black Virgin Mountain), which overlooks the important provincial capital of Tay Ninh, where the South Vietnamese 25th Division is garrisoned. Communist forces have launched a random shelling of the city that has driven out some 30,000 of its 350,000 residents.

In Military Region Two, which encompasses the central part of South Viet Nam, the key cities of Pleiku and Kontum are fortress outposts in an area controlled by highly mobile North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units. In the rice-rich Mekong Delta south of Saigon, where more than one-third of South Viet Nam's population lives, Communist attacks have driven government troops out of many outposts. At the same time, a blocking maneuver aimed toward Route 4 by North Vietnamese troops threatens Saigon's vital connection with the Delta.

Last Cartridge. Hanoi and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet Nam have made an important strategic shift toward greater reliance on what documents captured by Saigon call "revolutionary violence" --meaning a steady campaign of accelerated attrition. The objective is to bring about the fall of Thieu through demoralizing defeats that will erode his support in the army and among non-Communist politicians and religious leaders.

Thieu is not about to give in--or give up. As he said recently, "We will fight to the last cartridge." For their part, the Communists steadfastly refuse to return to negotiations, which were broken off last June, as long as Thieu remains in power. Saigon's anti-Communist dissidents, who published last week's indictment, agree that Thieu is the main stumbling block to peace. "The people no longer have confidence in the current leadership because it is unable to solve the war problem," said Judge Tran Minh Tiet, a probable opposition candidate for President. "If Thieu runs for a third term [in the elections next October], the war will get bigger and the country will be in total darkness--without exit." Adds General Duong Van ("Big") Minh, leader of Saigon's 1963 coup: "If you want war, keep Thieu."

Unfortunately, Tiet and Minh may very well be right. For the foreseeable future, neither Saigon nor the Communists have the strength to overcome the other side by military means--whether or not the U.S. Congress provides the aid that Thieu wants. The resulting no-win, no-lose situation benefits nobody, but the only alternative is a political compromise that has eluded would-be peacemakers for decades.

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