THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW

"Kissinger's mission was a complete failure," crowed the official Communist Party newspaper Pravda last week, quoting stories in American newspapers to support that evidently gratifying conclusion. There was indeed cause for some smugness in the Kremlin. As a result of the breakdown of U.S. mediation efforts, the U.S.S.R. stood to gain in prestige, influence and possible strategic advantage in the Middle East. Long outshone and outmaneuvered by Kissinger's diplomatic initiatives, and locked out of vital negotiations since the suspension of the 1973 Geneva Conference, the Soviet Union now has a better chance than ever before of playing a major role in any Middle East settlement.

As Washington moved last week to meet Moscow's oft-repeated demands for a resumption of the Geneva talks, Pravda 's critique of Kissinger seemed downright restrained in the face of such a clear bonanza for the Russians. At week's end, however, the Soviet press agency Tass cited charges published in some Arab newspapers that the CIA was involved in the assassination of Saudi Arabian King Faisal. Since quoting from the foreign press is a common Soviet way of expressing official views, the repetition of this patently absurd accusation was a measure of how far the Kremlin is prepared to go to exploit Middle Eastern paranoia for its own advantage.

The fact that the Soviets may now seize opportunities offered by the miscarriage of Kissinger's Middle East mission can scarcely be credited to Soviet diplomatic shrewdness or sabotage. In fact, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko promised Kissinger that Moscow would not interfere with the Secretary's shuttle talks on condition that the U.S. would agree to resume the Geneva Conference. Instead, Moscow's Middle East policy has been characterized by 1) patience in advancing long-term Soviet interests; 2) prudence in avoiding any direct confrontation with the U.S.; and 3) providing massive arms aid to favored Arab nations. With this slogging, farsighted policy, the Soviets clearly hope to establish a swath of influence from Syria to Somalia extending far into the Indian Ocean. If and when the Geneva talks resume, the Kremlin will be able to exert influence on an impressive ar ray of actual and potential Middle East allies. Items:

-- Since the October war, Syria has been rearmed by the Soviets even beyond its prewar strength, at a cost of $2 billion. Predictably, the result has been to bring Syria closer to the Soviet orbit and render it the most belligerent of the Arab confrontation countries.

-- Iraq has gratefully received more than $1 billion of arms aid from Moscow since 1973. In an effort to counterbalance U.S. influence in Iran, Moscow signed an agreement with Teh ran last February that may ultimately involve $3 billion worth of Soviet industrial and agricultural projects.

-- Egypt, in spite of President Anwar Sadat's recent arms shopping in France, remains dependent on the U.S.S.R. for weapons. No matter how edgy Sadat is about such dependence, he knows it would take years to retrain Egyptian forces to use an alternative weapons system.

Nonetheless, the Russians have a few problems of their own in the Middle East. They have yet to decide on how much military hardware to send to Egypt, whose President continues to proclaim his friendship for the U.S. The rapprochement of Iran and Iraq might lead to a lessening of the Soviet Union's influence within the Baathist government in Baghdad. The assassination of King Faisal removes a staunch anti-Communist from the scene, but 'may increase the stature of another strong anti-Communist mon arch in the area, the Shah of Iran. In general, there is little sympathy in most of the Moslem world for the U.S.S.R.

Most nations would rather deal with the U.S.

Few alarms have been raised in Washington over Soviet influence in some Arab countries. The State Department does not expect direct ad ventures by the Kremlin in the Middle East. Too much is at stake, Government experts argue, for the Soviets to incite an Arab-Israeli war, thus provoking a dangerous confrontation with the U.S.

East-West detente is still a primary pur suit. Among the items on the agenda of detente are a Strategic Arms Limitation agreement, to be negotiated at a meeting between President Ford and Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev later this year, and a summit in Helsinki next summer, winding up Brezhnev's cherished project of a European Security Conference.

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