Egypt's 'Diplomatic Pre-Emptive Strike'

By most rules of diplomatic logic, the assassination of Saudi Arabia's King Faisal and the collapse of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's latest efforts at shuttle diplomacy (TIME, April 7) should have led to a period of drift in the Middle East and perhaps of rising tensions. Instead, thanks to an unexpected move by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, the next three months might still see some progress toward a second-stage disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt.

In what some Israeli officials referred to as a "diplomatic pre-emptive strike," Sadat announced that despite Kissinger's failure, Egypt would reopen the Suez Canal to foreign shipping on June 5, the eighth anniversary of its closing during the 1967 war. Sadat's declaration drew a cool response from the Israelis. "It means nothing to Israel," snapped Premier Yitzhak Rabin, since the Egyptian leader declared that Israeli cargoes could not be transported, even in ships of neutral nations, through the reopened waterway.

In effect, Sadat had converted what could have been a serious policy defeat for Egypt into a diplomatic success. He had risked his reputation in the Arab world by cooperating so strenuously with Kissinger's efforts to achieve another disengagement agreement, which would have included a further Israeli withdrawal in the Sinai. The failure of Kissinger's mission had at first seemed a victory for radical Arab leaders.

Breathing Space. At the same time as he announced that the canal would be reopened--in fact, Egyptian naval vessels have been sailing through the Suez for several weeks--Sadat agreed to extend the mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping force in the Sinai at least until July, a shorter extension than Washington had hoped for, but enough to give U.S. diplomats a little breathing space. Among other things, Sadat's maneuver 1) put pressure on the Syrians to renew their own U.N. mandate on the Golan Heights, which expires May 30; 2) strengthened his support in Western Europe; 3) pleased Moscow and thereby served to encourage the Soviets to supply Egypt with more military aid; 4) made Sadat seem conciliatory while tightening the screws on Israel to make concessions; and 5) may even, in the view of some diplomats, have opened the door for another round of Kissinger-style phased negotiation at some time in the future.

Like other Arab leaders, Syria's President Hafez Assad acknowledged Sadat's initiative as a clever ploy that would put Israel on the defensive and perhaps even contribute to a straining of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. On the other hand, Assad was characteristically leary of any Egyptian action that might reduce tension in the Middle East without at the same time leading toward a settlement between Syria and Israel. Not that the Syrian President is necessarily opposed to bilateral negotiations when they serve his purpose. He even suggested to Kissinger last month that if there should be progress between Egypt and Israel, the Secretary might care to return in May for a Syrian-Israeli shuttle.

All-Round Settlement. Publicly, Assad has always favored a resumed Geneva Conference as the best route toward an all-round settlement. Sadat does not oppose a Geneva Conference in principle, but he has hinted that Egypt is still prepared to hold further bilateral negotiations with Israel. Moreover, by implying that the conference should not be held until after the next Arab summit meeting--which is set for June--the Egyptian President has effectively delayed a reconvening of the conference until midsummer. Israel is reconciled to the idea of a Geneva Conference, but is determined that the work of the conference should somehow be broken up into "bilateral contacts" so that Israel would be able to deal with one enemy and one problem at a time.

Perhaps the most serious problem posed by Geneva is that of Palestinian representation. At last October's Rabat summit the Arab states recognized the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the "sole and legitimate" representative of the Palestinian people. The P.L.O., however, is still ignored by the U.S. and completely rejected by the Israelis. One solution, advocated by both Egypt and Syria, would be to include P.L.O. representatives within a united Arab delegation to the conference. Last week a high-ranking Israeli diplomat suggested that his government would not object to the inclusion of the P.L.O. in a Syrian delegation. Thus a compromise on this issue may be possible.

Arms Aid. Meanwhile, the Israelis are waiting, with barely concealed nervousness, the outcome of a well-publicized U.S. review of its Middle East policy. The Israelis are exceedingly annoyed at the credit that Sadat is getting for his foreign policy initiatives, pointing out that the reopening of the Suez Canal was something he secretly promised at the time of the first disengagement talks more than a year ago. "Sadat is selling the same merchandise twice," declared a government spokesman in Jerusalem. As for their potential troubles with the U.S., Israeli officials seem to be pinning their hopes on the U.S. Congress. "It is our view," declared an aide to Premier Rabin, "that Congress will not let the President get away with punitive action against Israel." The Israelis claim that radical Arabs would interpret any reduction in U.S. aid as a sign of American weakness and a justification of their intransigent attitude toward the Jewish state. Jerusalem further insists that a strong Israel increases U.S. leverage in the Middle East.

In Washington, the reassessment of U.S. policy was being carried out under the direction of Joseph Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and Kissinger's principal deputy on Middle Eastern affairs. In addition, Kissinger held discussions with a group of prominent public figures, many of them former high Government officials, to get advice on how to advance Middle East negotiations toward a settlement after the disappointing failure of his shuttle diplomacy. The participants in the talks included former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, former Under Secretary of State George Ball and former Ambassador Averell Harriman.

According to one State Department expert, the Administration was clearly hoping that the three-week policy study --which is concerned with the questions of how much U.S. aid is necessary and whether or not it is in the nation's best interest--would conclude that Israel had been unjustifiably inflexible. There was a strong feeling in Washington that Sadat had had sound legal and political reasons for withholding the pledge of nonbelligerency that Israel demanded in return for major territorial concessions in the Sinai. A conclusion that Jerusalem had been too inflexible, observed this expert, would strengthen Kissinger's hand within the Administration, with Congress, and perhaps even with the Israelis in the event of another round of negotiations.

Until the policy reassessment was complete, the Administration advised Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres last week, he should delay his visit to Washington to discuss new arms aid. Implicit in Washington's policy review was a warning to Israel that U.S. military aid might be somewhat curtailed; for instance, the Administration might delay shipment of two advanced U.S. weapons systems, the 170-mile-range Lance missile and the F-15 fighter aircraft, both of which the Israelis are urgently seeking.

The success or failure of any further peace talks in the Middle East depends in part upon the new rulers of Saudi Arabia, bankers to Egypt, Syria and the P.L.O. Last week King Khalid indicated that he intends to follow the moderate, pro-Western policies of the assassinated King Faisal. As expected, Crown Prince Fahd, the strongest man in the new government, became First Deputy Premier (Khalid himself holds the premiership). Next in line is Prince Abdullah, 53, commander of the 35,000-man National Guard (or "white army"), who became the Second Deputy Premier. Also named to the Cabinet was one of Faisal's sons, Prince Saud, 34, who became Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. A Princeton University graduate, Saud had previously served as Deputy Minister of Petroleum Affairs under Sheik Ahmed Zaki Yamani.

Religious Rights. Though it is pledged to support Faisal's policies, the new government implied that in the future Saudi Arabia might take a slightly more conciliatory attitude toward Israel. The spiritual leader of the Islamic world, King Faisal in recent years had become notably anti-Jewish as well as anti-Zionist. He often spoke of his desire to pray at the Mosque of Omar in an Arab-controlled Jerusalem, and even went so far as to deny the authenticity of the Jewish holy places there. While he did not quarrel with his father's words, Prince Saud conceded last week that the Saudis had "no objection to the rights of worship of any religion in the holy places in Jerusalem," adding: "But I hope that religious rights do not have to be based on occupation."

In the meantime, the fate of King Faisal's assassin, his nephew Prince Faisal ibn Musaed, remained undecided. At first the prince had been described as "mentally deranged." But on the day of the King's funeral, there had been a vivid sign that this judgment, which, under Koranic law, would have precluded execution, would not hold. As they bore the body of their slain father to his grave, two of Faisal's sons had worn the agals (braided ropes) of their white kaffiyehs draped around their necks--the Bedouin call for blood vengeance.

During the interrogation of the young prince, some of it conducted by Crown Prince Fahd, Saudi authorities concluded that the murder was the calculated act of a rational man. Last week the Interior Ministry announced that the assassin had been judged sane and would soon face trial before a sharia (religious law) court. A guilty verdict is a foregone conclusion; the prescribed penalty is public decapitation on a Friday following midday prayers.

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