Sadat: Keeping Some Options Open

In a 90-minute interview with TIME's Cairo Bureau Chief Wilton Wynn last week, Egypt's President Anwar Sadat indicated his willingness --under certain conditions--to renew the mandate of the United Nations peace-keeping force for longer than three months and to consider allowing nonstrategic Israeli cargoes to transit the reopened Suez Canal. Excerpts:

ON THE U.N. PEACE-KEEPING FORCE. I had already agreed during my negotiations with Kissinger to extend the mandate of the United Nations force for one year instead of six months on condition that the disengagement agreement be fulfilled and the Israelis pull back. But after the Israeli rejection, that is past tense. I have made it three months because I want to send a message to the U.S. and the world, an urgent message. But at the end of three months, I will be ready to reconsider my decision if the peace process is being pushed and the momentum maintained.

ON REOPENING THE SUEZ CANAL. There is a [security] problem, but to show my peaceful intentions and to ease the situation for our friends all over the world--Western Europe, Africa and Asia--for world prosperity and for our own benefit, I am ready to take this risk and protect the canal. According to the Constantinople Treaty of 1888, if there is a state of belligerency between Egypt and any other country, that country is not permitted to use the canal. Even if [the Israelis] ask for their cargoes to pass through in other flagships, we have the full legal right to prevent it. But when the canal is opened it will depend on the conduct of Israel whether their nonstrategic cargoes will be allowed to transit the canal.

ON EGYPT'S REFUSAL TO SIGN A NONBELLIGERENCY AGREEMENT. We were ready to accept a text committing us not to resort to the use of force during the peace process. The difference between this and nonbelligerency is that if I had agreed to the latter while part of my land and other Arab land is occupied it would mean I am inviting the occupiers to stay. But agreeing not to resort to force during the peace process means we would continue to push the peace process to a final solution.

ON THE GENEVA CONFERENCE.

I do not want the Geneva Conference to reach a stalemate as a result of polarization. It could happen; even Israel predicts it. But we seriously want to reach peace, and so I have made my suggestion that Western European countries like Britain and France and perhaps some Third World countries be invited. We want to get away from a situation in which the Soviets seem to back the Arabs and the Americans seem to back Israel and we reach a stalemate. With others invited, we get away from the cold war. I am also asking that Jordan and Lebanon participate. They are states in confrontation with Israel. We need them, because we are working for a lasting peace in the area.

ON PARTICIPATION OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. Having them represented [at Geneva] by an Arab League delegation is a possibility. I am trying several approaches so that we won't come to a standstill. But finally the formula must be agreed on by the Palestinians. Until now I have no answer from them.

ON THE GENEVA AGENDA. There will be no peace so long as there is occupation. Because this is a fact, I don't believe we will be discussing withdrawal from the occupied territories. We may discuss a timetable but not the principle of withdrawal itself. This is taken for granted. The conference should concern itself mainly with mutual security questions. I need guarantees more than Israel does, and I am ready to accept them from whatever body can offer them, whether it's the two superpowers, the four powers, the five powers [including China] or the U.N. Security Council. We might discuss stationing of a U.N. contingent on both sides of the borders. I don't agree to joint [Israeli-Egyptian] patrols, but I would accept some kind of mixed commissions under U.N. auspices, to meet from time to time. I agree to certain demilitarized zones, but on condition it be reciprocal.

ON THE U.S. ROLE. We do not ask America to be on our side, nor do we ask America to drop Israel. We know that in the U.S. you have certain special relations with Israel. But one question that must be clarified, to us, to Israel and to the whole world: Is the U.S. protecting Israel within its borders or is it also protecting Israel in its gains of others' lands? From our side, we have no objection at all that America protect Israel within its borders, even to the extent of providing every Israeli with a tank and an airplane. But I think the time has come that the U.S. should understand its interest and its friendships in the area and should take an objective look.

ON CHANCES OF AN ARMS-LIMITATION AGREEMENT. I quite agree to this theory on one condition: that Israel must fulfill before everything else its obligations under [Security Council] Resolution 242 and withdraw from all Arab territory. At that moment we would be on an equal basis and at that moment I will be willing to accept such a proposal. But now there is a very dangerous situation in which the [military] balance is completely in favor of Israel while at the same time they occupy Arab land.

ON THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. I would be willing to ratify it if Israel does.

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