Doves v. Hawks: A Growing Debate

Israel last week discovered itself in the unusually uncomfortable position of being on the diplomatic defensive. In the hiatus that followed the breakdown of peace talks with Egypt, Anwar Sadat had neatly seized the initiative. Egypt's President announced that--even without a further withdrawal of Israeli forces in the Sinai--he would reopen the Suez Canal on June 5. Then Sadat agreed unilaterally to an extension of the peace-keeping mandate of 4,000 blue-helmeted United Nations troops, which was due to expire April 24. He also made public the release of the bodies of 39 Israelis killed during the October war.

Israelis complained that Sadat was being less than beneficent in each case--he tried to hide the fact for instance that he was getting back 112 Egyptians held in Israeli prisons in exchange for the bodies--but they were nevertheless stung by the implications of his strategy. More than that, they were still seething that the special relationship between Jerusalem and Washington had been clouded by public charges on President Ford's part and private accusations from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that it was Israel rather than Egypt that had deadlocked Kissinger's step-by-step peacemaking after 15 days of shuttle diplomacy last month.

New Concessions. Thus Premier Yitzhak Rabin's government last week decided to demonstrate some diplomatic initiative of its own. From Jerusalem came reports that the government was considering new Sinai concessions in order to resume the Kissinger talks. Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, bound for the U.S. to make some fund-raising appearances, persuaded Kissinger to receive him in Washington in order to emphasize Israel's willingness to continue negotiations.

Inside Israel, debate is growing over what caused the talks to fail and what ought to be done next. Ironically, the suspension of the negotiations was a personal blessing for Rabin; Israel's refusal to accept Sadat's terms gave the Premier his highest popularity rating in political polls since he took office last year. Nonetheless, the government was under fire from both left and right for lack of foresight and policy. "We are a crazy people," suggested Author Yoram Kaniuk, a critic on the left. "The talks fall through, and Yitzhak Rabin becomes a national hero."

Essentially, the debate is between Israeli doves on the left, who seek compromise with the Arabs, and hawks from the conservative right, who believe that Israel should concede almost nothing. About the only things they agree upon are Rabin's lack of policy and the essential requisite that Israel not surrender any territory without peace agreements. They are far apart on how much territory to give up and the mechanics of reaching peace.

Two of the most eloquent doves are Uri Avneri, 51, editor of the weekly

Ha'olam Hazeh, and Knesset Member Arie Eliav, 53, former secretary-general of the Labor Party, who resigned his membership last month protesting that Rabin's Labor-dominated coalition government was "bereft of all vision." Avneri, who has long pursued a private dialogue with Arab intellectuals, believes that Israel ought to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization before Washington does, which would foreclose Israeli options. He believes that Israel should withdraw to its 1949 borders, recognize a Palestinian state on the West Bank, and sign a peace treaty in return for Arab recognition of Israeli sovereignty. Avneri faults Rabin for being at once too anti-Soviet and too negative to Kissinger's proposals. "If the government does not want to recognize the Palestinians and it wants to keep its anti-Soviet line, how can it risk a break with the U.S.? Rabin will have no recourse but to retreat, and that may well bring him down."

Says Eliav, who is known by friends as "Lyova," or "Lion," and who describes himself as a dove with talons: "It did not take any courage for the government to say no to a half-crippled Kissinger who had Viet Nam falling on his head. But it would take courage to adopt a policy. The question is not so much one of substance but of approach." Like Avneri, Eliav would make a broad-scale offer to the Arabs: return of all occupied territories in exchange for full peace, including treaties, diplomatic relations, economic ties and demilitarized zones. "We should tell Egypt it can have all of Sinai back," he says. "We should tell Syria it can have the Golan Heights. We should also tell 2% million Palestinian Arabs that they have the right to self-determination in a state east of ours including the West Bank and Gaza." Eliav would retain Israeli sovereignty over all of Jerusalem but expand the growing city by taking in Ramallah in the north and Bethlehem in the south. He explains: "There might then be a place for an Arab capital in a greater Jerusalem."

Eliav's views to a large extent are rejected by hawks like former General Ariel ("Arik") Sharon, the Israeli Patton who turned a 1973 setback in the Sinai into victory by rolling his armor across the Suez Canal. He says, "We must explain to the Arabs what is vital to us and make them an offer on a take-it-or-leave-it basis." He would acknowledge Egypt's sovereign right to the Sinai, for instance, but would insist upon a gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces over a 20-year period. He would annex the West Bank to Israel and "turn over the territory east of the Jordan River"--meaning Jordan--to the Palestinians. "The only foreigner in Palestine is King Hussein," Sharon maintains. "The Israelis and Palestinians have been here for centuries." The Jewish state of Israel, he insists, must face the reality of living with a large Arab minority. Sharon would allow Arabs a blunt choice of three alternatives: to become Israeli citizens; to remain as "permanent residents" without citizenship, as some 80,000 others (many of them American Jews) already do; or to leave. "I am ready to talk to anyone--Palestinians, Syrians, anyone--for peace," he says. "That includes Yasser Arafat, although I think we should have killed him long ago."

Unwanted Crisis. The policy debate within Israel is bound to grow more bitter, especially since recent polls indicate that 75% of Israelis do not believe their government is doing enough to defend its position abroad. For that matter, 50% do not feel that the Cabinet, despite Rabin's spurt in popularity, has adequately explained its views at home. As the right and left become more strident, that could precipitate an untimely and unwanted political crisis.

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