After Viet Nam: What Next in Asia?

"We must first of all face the fact that what has happened in Indochina has disquieted many of our friends, especially in Asia."

--President Gerald Ford

In the four weeks since Ford spoke those words in his "State of the World" address, America's friends, allies or clients in Asia have grown increasingly alarmed as Communist forces dramatically swept through Cambodia and South Viet Nam and renewed their insurgent attacks on a hitherto quiescent Laos. Throughout Asia, as a result, foreign ministries were pondering how they might live with a probably united, emboldened and Communist Viet Nam and what adjustments they would have to make in their relationships with the U.S. The effect on U.S. policy will be equally profound. Washington had been examining the U.S. role in Asia for some time, and officials are speeding up a fundamental reassessment of the Asian policy that the country has followed since the defeat of Japan in 1945.

Economic Ties. For a number of Asian nations, the most prudent step seemed to be to loosen their ties with Washington. Even before the triumphant Communist offensive in Viet Nam got under way, Bangkok asked that the

U.S. withdraw its 23,000 troops and 200 combat aircraft from Thailand by next March. Last week Foreign Minister Chatichai Choonhaven announced that Thailand had reached an agreement with the U.S. to actually begin the military exodus. Even though Thai soldiers are skirmishing with Communist-backed insurgents along the country's eastern border, Bangkok has sought to open diplomatic relations with Hanoi, and is also trying to develop economic and diplomatic ties with Peking.

Some pessimistic Western observers believe that a government-encouraged wave of anti-Americanism could come next. "We've kept the U.S. forces on our soil for too long," said Seni Pramoj, the brother of Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj. "We sent our troops to fight in Viet Nam. I'm sure that the Viet Cong did not like our actions." With South Viet Nam's captured American arsenal and a rich new source of manpower--the population of both Viet Nams is about 43,000,000--Hanoi will now be the preeminent military power in Southeast Asia, and its neighbors are nervously wondering whether it will be content with last week's victory or pursue an expansionist policy. One alarming note was the immediate call for the ouster of U.S. forces from South Korea.

Closer links with the Communist states, argues Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, are "the only way to ensure our security and survival." Manila has hinted that it may ask the U.S. to renegotiate its huge Philippine air and naval bases, even though the lease runs until 1991. Marcos has sarcastically asked "whether commitments by U.S. Presidents are binding" or are merely "forms of psychological reassurances." That was a reference to the U.S.-Philippine mutual defense treaty of 1951. Although the pact was ratified by Congress, the interpretation that it requires the U.S. to "instantly repel" an attack on the Philippines is based solely on declarations by U.S. Presidents. The Philippines are actually in little danger of invasion, but Marcos is worried about the threat posed by indigenous Communist guerrillas to his regime.

Unite by Force. Even nations that have no plausible hope of making accommodations with the Communists are reassessing their positions. Taiwan's Premier Chiang Ching-kuo has said that Taiwan must be ready to defend itself by its own efforts. For South Korean President Park Chung Hee, the moral of Viet Nam is that "in the end, you count on nobody but yourself." Park's nightmare is that North Korean President Kim Il Sung may be so influenced by Hanoi's triumphs that he will attack the South and try to reunite Korea by force.

Yet all this represents something of an overreaction to the events in Indochina. The surrender in Saigon "is not the beginning of the end in Asia," said one ranking State Department official. "The U.S. is still a Pacific power, and we must demonstrate this with our knowledge and feeling."

Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew was probably correct when he predicted recently that G.I.s would never again fight a guerrilla war in Asia. Nonetheless, the U.S. Navy and Air Force, plus technology and economic-aid programs, will continue to provide plenty of muscle for an active American role in Asia (see map). The shape of the policy, however, will change. Some State Department experts argue that in the future the U.S. should place greater stress on bilateral relations; thus they foresee the eventual fading away of the ineffectual Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

The new mood at the State Department is to look more closely at Asia's population and industrial centers, natural resources, proximity to sea lanes, and American treaty commitments. By those more searching standards, several countries stand out as having great importance to the U.S.: Japan, preeminently; South Korea, whose independence is vital to Japanese security; the Philippines and Indonesia, which have vast resources; and Singapore and Malaysia, which together with Indonesia control the Strait of Malacca, the vital corridor for oil tankers traveling to Asia from the Middle East. Despite U.S. treaty commitments, Thailand and Taiwan are now viewed as being of less importance. No one writes them off, but then-political future is being weighed dispassionately. It would not hurt essential American interests if the government in Bangkok were to turn neutralist. Nor would the U.S. be seriously affected if the new regime in Taipei were to reach an accommodation with Peking.

Active Part. In the long term, Washington will probably ask Japan to take a more active--and costly--part in the region's defenses. Even though the postwar constitution explicitly forbids Japan to maintain an army or navy, many observers feel that the world's No. 3 economic power--and the premier industrial country in Asia--should take a more active military role in the Pacific. In order to demonstrate that it is not withdrawing from the Far East, the U.S. may have to undertake some kind of forceful, symbolic action. It will certainly have to maintain its garrison, including the 40,000 men in South Korea.

Having learned in Viet Nam that it cannot forever prop up an unpopular government, Washington will eventually have to put pressure on South Korea's President Park Chung Hee to liberalize his repressive regime. "This may not be the time to press Park publicly," says a State Department official, "but it has to be pointed out to him that it is in his own interest to ease up."

Whether these long-and short-term moves will reassure America's Asian friends remains to be seen. One crucial factor that may soften the adverse impact of Indochina on the U.S. is the Moscow-Peking rivalry. Fearing Soviet influence in Hanoi, Peking may oppose North Vietnamese domination of Cambodia and Laos. Peking may also be uneasy because a complete U.S. withdrawal from the region might tempt the Soviets to try to fill the vacuum. "What will happen if the Soviet Union asks the Vietnamese to use Cam Ranh Bay as a naval base?" asks a senior Washington China watcher. "Remember, that is where the Russians refueled on their way to Japan to fight the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and 1905." A colleague adds: "The Chinese have been restrained about Indochina developments. They are not all that ecstatic about the North Vietnamese dominating the region. For the Chinese, the U.S. is a counterweight to the Soviet Union." For the moment, Moscow appears restrained and content to wait for the situation to ripen (see following story).

Cordial Relations. An intensified Sino-Soviet rivalry is still a matter for speculation, however. With conditions in Southeast Asia in such flux, the U.S. cannot really disagree with the advice of Singapore's Lee to the non-Communist nations. They should, he said, establish "correct and, if possible, cordial relations" with the Communist regimes, but they should not give up on the U.S. until the dust has settled, and it is clear what the Communist takeover in Viet Nam means. At least one influential Tokyo paper, the Asahi Shimbun, believes that the U.S. may be even stronger with the burden of Viet Nam lifted. "By decisively disengaging itself from Indochina," the paper editorializes, "the U.S. has regained its freedom of action, and will make a new start."

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