Monday, Jun. 02, 1975

The Tuscan Pony v. the Communists

At 67, jaunty, combative Amintore Fanfani is one of Italy's heartiest political perennials and the country's most controversial politician. A four-time Premier, he has since 1973 been secretary of the Christian Democratic Party, which has ruled Italy for 30 years. For his pugnacious leadership and almost baronial control of the party's vast machinery and patronage, he has sometimes been called, both inside and outside the party, il Padrino--the Godfather--of Italian politics.

Next month some 40 million Italians will vote in regional elections that, with considerable help from Fanfani, have taken on the coloration and dimensions of a full-scale political confrontation. At stake are nearly 1,000 council seats in 15 of Italy's 20 semi-autonomous regional governments. In polls taken last month, the Communists' showing improved by 2% or 3% over that in the last national election in 1972, which would give them an impressive nationwide total of 30%; the same polls forecast that the Christian Democrats would lose 3%, dropping to an overall 35%. But there are two jokers--or "jollies," as Italians call them--that may throw the polls out of whack: 1) some 2.5 million Italians from the ages of 18 to 21, enfranchised only in March, will be voting for the first time, and a large number are expected to mark their ballots beside the hammer-and-sickle symbol of the Partito Comunista Italiano; 2) the polls were taken prior to the elections in Portugal and Communist efforts there to override the results of the balloting.

Italy's campaign is dominated by the country's major national issue: the proposed "historic compromise" that would give the Communists a share of power in the national government. To counter this proposal, which was made in 1973 by Enrico Berlinguer, secretary-general of the Italian Communist Party, the Christian Democrats have launched a double-edged campaign. Scholarly Premier Aldo Moro, Fanfani's colleague and occasional rival, leads the left wing of the party and is the most consistent Christian Democratic supporter of a center-left alignment. Moro is stressing the conciliatory spirit of the center-left accommodation with the Socialists (who support the Christian Democrat-Republican coalition that governs the country). Meanwhile, in an effort to contain predicted leftist gains, Fanfani has hurled himself into a personal crusade against the historic compromise.

To explore this effort further, TIME Managing Editor Henry Grunwald and Rome Bureau Chief Jordan Bonfante interviewed Fanfani at his Rome penthouse. Fanfani explained that, while the June regional elections will not change "the physiognomy of Parliament," politically they could prove "the announcement of the tempest." He went on to discuss the historic compromise and a range of other political questions:

How will the Communists perform in the coming election?

They have prepared themselves very well with a great deal of penetration in the middle classes. If they succeed in not losing on the extreme left, they should hold their position. If they also succeed in their attempt to take votes from the Socialists, then they will have scored a notable success, increasing their vote by 2% or 3%.

They have tried to demonstrate that they are not old-fashioned Communists but moderates well-disposed to accept certain bourgeois systems. In addition to that, they have exploited disorder--I hope that they 'have not had a hand in creating it--so as to show that they know how to establish order. And when people are desperate for order, they will even consider sacrificing some liberty. But one must not believe that they are new and different Communists. Wherever in the world they have gone into power, however briefly, they have taken over everything, and nobody else could remove them. If this were not the case with our Communists, it would be a new miracle. Anyway, we would much prefer not to try the experience.

Will pressure for the historic compromise increase if the Communists gain in the election?

I don't believe so, if we can hold our own, or even if we lose some support. The day that the Christian Democrats accept the historic compromise, they are finished. I would add that it would also be the end of free Italy. Even in the case [of a real economic disaster], I would not advise it, because we are always at the central point: either Communism changes, really changes, and it is no longer Communism. Or Communism remains Communism and leads inevitably to a totalitarian regime.

How do the Socialists feel about the historic compromise?

They are against it. They fear that the union of Catholics and Communists will eliminate them, and therefore even the Socialists don't hold a good opinion of the Communists.

What would be the international consequences of the historic compromise?

It would create a serious threat to detente. So those who believe that the present international balance is so delicate that it cannot afford any such threat should be forcefully against it. When the Communists say that they accept the Atlantic Pact, this really means that they consider the Atlantic Pact useless. What has already occurred in Portugal is a wide outflanking of the Western area of the Atlantic Pact. After the end of the tension over Berlin, it was the turn of the Mediterranean, and now they are extending the operation to the Atlantic.

What should the West's role be in Portugal?

The approach to Portugal should have been more united before. The less the single countries interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, the better, but surely a policy of solidarity, friendship and economic cooperation in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance can create the psychological climate to encourage every country to face the dangers threatening its liberties.

What role should the U.S. play in the alliance?

The U.S. has a natural role as leader of our alliance. It has the right to ask its allies to think a bit more about their own situation. It is admirable that the U.S. came forward and on two occasions intervened in defense of the liberty of the world, in World War I and World War II. But can a country carry this burden for its whole history?

Are there dangers because the Christian Democrats have been in power for so long?

We have been in power for 30 years.

From this I draw two conclusions. Either our adversaries could not persuade the voters to change their minds. Or Italian citizens believe that if they changed they would find something worse.

Do the differing campaign themes used by yourself and Premier Moro reflect a clash among the Christian Democrats?

The Premier heads the government of all Italians. I represent the party at the head of 38% of the voters. My function is to keep it united and if possible to increase its size. The Premier's function Is to govern Italy. In the party congress of 1973, it was said that there are only two thoroughbreds in the party, Moro and Fanfani, and that it was time that we decided to run together. That was when I called myself a Tuscan pony--un cavallino Toscano--and Moro a good southern horse. In any case we are in the same race and we are running together, from different positions but toward the same objectives.

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