Monday, Jun. 30, 1975

Park: Survival Is at Stake

The Blue House, official residence of South Korean President Park Chung Hee, sits amidst manicured gardens in the hills overlooking Seoul. There last week TIME Diplomatic Editor Jerrold Schecter, Tokyo Bureau Chief William Stewart and Correspondent S. Chang met with Park for 1 1/2 hours. Relaxed and self-assured, Park alternately smoked a pipe and cigarettes as he propounded his views. Excerpts:

ON THE COMMUNIST VICTORY IN VIET NAM: The fall of the Saigon government was a retreat of American power. Recent developments in Indochina have obviously heightened the possibility of the North Korean Communists' provoking a war by miscalculation. The North Koreans could launch an all-out attack, but that is not feasible without help from Red China or the Soviet Union. They could also wage a limited war for limited objectives: a thrust across the DMZ, an attack on the five islands in the Western Sea, or the infiltration of guerrillas and subversives. On Jan. 21, 1968, they tried to attack the Blue House. Since that time, they have changed their tactics--digging tunnels, sending in subversive elements via Japan and attempting to instigate social disorder in South Korea.

ON THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO SOUTH KOREA: Since the Administration and leading members of the Congress have reaffirmed time and again that they will live up to the American defense agreement with Korea, I do not question the U.S. commitment. I agree with the view that as the U.S. commitment to Korea is intended to secure peace in Asia, it is a commitment to the entire free world.

ON REPRESSING DISSENT: Illegal acts that foment social disorder and confusion in the face of threats of aggression from the North must be controlled to safeguard the basic rights of the majority. People [who] criticize what we do in Korea measure the situation with the same yardstick that they use in the U.S. Here the situation is much more desperate. Only 25 miles from Seoul, an enemy is bent on destroying us. We can not allow disorder. If we liberalize internally, if we let the students riot and the workers go on strike, the resulting confusion will be utilized by the North. De Gaulle wielded extraordinary power when he took over at the time of Algeria, but there was no criticism. . . I am at a loss to understand criticism of us when we are faced with questions of survival.

ON SOUTH KOREA'S SUCCESS: We have surpassed the North Korean Communists in economic competition, while keeping them from unleashing another war of aggression. We have coped with their persistent provocations ever since the signing of the armistice agreement in 1953. This may well be our most significant achievement, since it serves as a basis for peace, and for peaceful reunification and sustained economic development as well. Today we are capable of overwhelming North Korea in all fields except the military.

ON THE REUNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA: As the North Koreans have not renounced their scheme to communize the South by force, I see slim prospects for unification in the near future. When a foundation of peace has been secured by accelerating dialogue and cooperation between the South and North, we can proceed to unification through free elections conducted in proportion to the population. But judging from their actions, the North Koreans are not interested in dialogue. Kim Il Sung has publicly asserted that he will not continue the dialogue unless the present government resigns and the U.S. withdraws its forces. They are employing the same tactics that the Viet Cong used in Viet Nam when they said they would negotiate only if Thieu stepped down. When Thieu stepped down, they said Huong was not eligible; and then when "Big" Minh came, there was nothing left to negotiate.

ON KOREAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS: Unhappy relations existed in the past between Korea and Japan. Since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1965, we have striven to maintain and develop friendly relations, accepting Japan as a partner from the broader standpoint of contributing to the peace and progress of Asia. If South Korea were communized, the security of Japan would be threatened; and there would be a danger that Japan's domestic order would undergo a sweeping change.

ON HIS AMBITIONS AS PRESIDENT: I have never worked with a view toward promoting my personal popularity. I have devoted myself to the national security and prosperity of our country. During my stay in office, I would like to achieve the basic aspiration of all the Korean people: the peaceful unification of our fatherland. To achieve it, a durable peace must first be achieved on the Korean peninsula. Therefore my immediate duty as national leader is to prevent a recurrence of war and consolidate the foundation for peace.

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