Monday, Jul. 21, 1975
Rabin: 'Egypt Has to Behave'
Both before and after his Saturday meeting in Bonn with Henry Kissinger, Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin discussed the current state of Middle East negotiations with TIME Diplomatic Editor Jerrold L. Schecter and Reporter David Halevy. Excerpts from the interviews:
ON THE SINAI PASSES
I do not want to be specific, but the question is to what extent Israel will be able to maintain its defense line. This line has to be the kind that would allow Israel--if two, three, four or five years from now no overall agreement is reached--to make sure that military threats as a backing for extreme political demands on the part of Egypt are not such a threat to Israel that we will be forced to do something we do not want to do politically.
ON THE ABU RUDEIS OILFIELDS
Oil is not blood and so we have not made this issue a make or break issue for an interim agreement.
ON AN AMERICAN PRESENCE
I believe that no one can do it better in terms of warning stations for Israel than Israelis and for Egypt than Egyptians. If Egypt will not agree to that then it raises a question as to what the Egyptian intentions are.
ON AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT
An interim agreement by no means should give the feeling that under the threats of war and oil embargo, the U.S. can put pressure on Israel to accept all that the Egyptians want. That would only be an invitation for increased blackmail. The way to cope with it is to show Egypt that [it] cannot achieve everything it wants.
ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA
I doubt [that] it is possible to achieve another interim agreement with Syria because geography and topography do not allow the kind of maneuverability we have in the Sinai. However, if efforts at an interim accord with Syria fail, it should not affect the behavior of Egypt. Cairo should be bound regardless of what happens between Israel and Syria. If an interim agreement with Syria is not reached, it should not prompt the U.S. to begin any new reassessment of the Middle East situation.
ON RELATIONS WITH JORDAN
I doubt there is any possibility of an interim agreement with Jordan within the context of its demand for an Israeli withdrawal five to six miles all along the Jordan River.
ON THE ROLE OF THE U.S.
The U.S. takes upon itself not only the glory that may be achieved but also the responsibility for the maintenance of the agreement. I'm not saying the U.S. has to be in Egypt or Israel. But I am speaking of the moral, political and practical responsibility. Let's not belittle the positive role of the U.S. and the responsibility it puts on the U.S.
ON THE PALESTINIANS
The so-called Palestine Liberation Organization is not going to be a partner for negotiations with Israel. I clearly distinguish between the Palestinian issue and the so-called P.L.O. We have to cope with the issue; we have to find a solution for it. I believe it has to be found within the context of a peace agreement between Jordan and Israel.
ON THE AFTERMATH OF AN ACCORD
I expect a relaxed period of several years--no pressure, no threats. An accord has to give some years of relative tranquillity. After that, seeing what will happen in Egypt and other parts of the Arab world, we will be ready to negotiate in a very detailed and prolonged way on the elements of an overall agreement. But whatever may happen in these talks about an overall agreement --especially if they do not succeed or if they come to a deadlock--Egypt has to behave in accordance with the interim agreement.
ON THE TEMPO OF THE TALKS
Don't expect any miracle in the next week, or two weeks, or even three weeks. It is still a long process. For one thing, Israel will not enter into any agreement unless all of the commitments of the past disengagement are carried out.
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