Toward a Ford Doctrine?

In an interview last week with Time Inc. Editor in Chief Hedley Donovan, President Ford offered frank opinions on a wide range of international issues. Highlights:

Q. Along with all the other anniversaries and milestones, this year is the 30th anniversary of the end of World War II. Compared with the last interwar period, that is quite an improvement. Is it conceivable that we have abolished world war?

A. I can't help being optimistic. Just in terms of time, the 30-year span is an improvement compared to the 1918-1939 period. I think there is also an improvement in that we seem to have mechanisms that work better. The United Nations and other organizations, imperfect as they are, seem to have accomplished a great deal more than the League of Nations. So despite the quantum jump in military capability compared with the previous 20-year period, we have stretched the period of peace, and it is my judgment that the prospects are even better for the next decade and beyond.

Q. A great deal turns on the Soviet-American relationship. What is your own definition of detente in 1975?

A. On balance, it has been a relationship that has given both sides enough benefits to justify its continuation, whether it was in open communications or agreements in the areas of science, health, environment or otherwise. It has been a good foundation from which to build a broader and more productive relationship. SALT I [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] was a step forward, potentially SALT II would be much more significant, and I think the chances are good, not certain at this point, that we will achieve SALT II.

As long as we are realistic about detente and don't expect it to be the millennium, I think we can build from that relationship and use it for not only the relaxation of tensions between ourselves and the Soviet Union, but as an instrument in calming fears, holding back rash action and keeping the world relatively quiet so we can work for the solution of the problems on a regional basis around the world.

Q. How close do you think that would be to Brezhnev's definition of detente?

A. Relatively close. Those are the words I hear, and I think the actions taken seem to fit.

Q. What are the remaining principal uncertainties about SALT II?

A. We have a very significant problem of verification. We have the problem of what to count within the limits of 2,400 [missiles], and these are areas where there will need to be some compromise by both parties.

Q. Some of this will be settled before you and Brezhnev meet?

A. I suspect that some will be settled by the technicians who are negotiating, but just as at Vladivostok, Mr. Brezhnev and I will have to make some final decisions. At Vladivostok, we had to agree on numbers, and only he and I could do that. I suspect there will be several rather crucial decisions that he and I will make if he comes here, or we might set in motion some additional activity by the technicians if we meet and discuss them at Helsinki.

Q. If it does go through, would you visualize--leaving apart inflation--having lower defense budgets?

A. If we do have a SALT II agreement, we will probably have a relatively stabilized defense budget. If we don't have a SALT II agreement, our military budget will have to be increased significantly. The public has to understand that SALT II relates exclusively to strategic weapons; it has no relationship to conventional weapons--the Navy, where we have to continue the modernization of our shipbuilding program; our ground forces, where we have to upgrade our tanks, our personnel carriers, and so forth. So those two programs for the Army and the Navy have to be continued, and they are expensive.

Now on the other hand, if we are able to negotiate some modifications in troop commitments in Western Europe with the MBFR, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, then there might be some benefits in our defense budget in conventional warfare.

Q. Do you find it hard to convince the public that we need a substantial defense budget at the same time you entertain these hopes about detente? The people watching TV today, are they going to think if we and the Soviets can cooperate so spectacularly in space, why do we need $100 billion for defense?

A. Yes, it is difficult to make the point, but it is a logical point. I think the public has to be educated--and I mean in the right sense--that SALT II is a vitally important step, but it may be just the first step in a series of negotiations, including MBFR, that down the road would lead to a substantially modified defense budget. But until those steps are taken one by one, we cannot slash our defense budget.

Q. Why have the Russians been so restrained in the Middle East?

A. I am only speculating here, but they know just as we do that the Middle East potentially is a very volatile area.

In 1973 because of the Yom Kippur War there was a potential confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. I don't think either one of us wanted it. If there was another outbreak of war in the Middle East, a series of circumstances might develop and we again, despite detente, could be led into a confrontation. We don't want that to happen. I don't think they want that to happen. I suspect that they would rather have peaceful moves made there to avoid confrontation with us.

Q. Something seems to be working well.

A. It could be a byproduct of detente. What we really want in the end, whether you do it step by step or an overall agreement, is equitable, viable peace, and the Arabs and the Israelis living side by side in a relationship such as we have in Western Europe or other parts of the world.

Q. On the Mediterranean front, socalled, do you share in the apprehension that the southern side of NATO is in considerable danger?

A. It is very disturbing, the recent developments in Portugal. We certainly didn't approve of the previous dictatorship in Portugal, but if there is a Communist dictatorship in Portugal, that is as bad as a dictatorship from the right.

We hope that the rights of the Portuguese people for freedom, a democratic form of government, will develop. At the moment, it is very disappointing. They had a vote and the Communist Party got only 12% to 13% and yet there appears to be an abnormal Communist influence in the Portuguese government.

It would be very difficult for me to understand a Communist government [as] a part of NATO, so that development, if it transpires, would adversely affect the strength of NATO.

In Italy, we obviously were disappointed with the election results. We hope that the present government can strengthen itself. They have two years more before their next general election, and if the economic situation improves, if the government is able to meet the demands of the people, more recent Communist gains may be negated in that next election.

The situation on the eastern flank of NATO, because of the dispute between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, does worry us very greatly. As you know, we have been working very hard to try and assist the parties in their negotiations, and one of the things we sought to do is to lift the arms embargo imposed by the Congress because we don't believe that Turkey will really negotiate under the threat of the continuation of the arms embargo. If that is lifted, the prospects for meaningful negotiations between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots are good.

Q. When you said you could not visualize a Communist government in NATO, could you visualize a government having Communists in it, such as an Italian government?

A. We would feel that the development wasn't healthy for the future of NATO.

Q. Do you feel that in the light of all of this uncertainty in the Mediterranean the Soviets are attempting to take advantage to strengthen their strategic posture?

A. Their visible activity has been not too obvious, I think, to ourselves or to others. In addition, some of the national Communist parties tend to dissociate themselves publicly from the Kremlin. Whether that is a real cutting of their relationship with the Kremlin I would doubt, but that is the impression they try to create.

Q. I was trying to make a list the other day of the number of democracies left in the world, and I could only get up to 21 out of 150-plus countries. I wonder how you see democracy in this world. Is it a minority habit that is contracting?

A. It is sad to see, but with the action in India, which is at least a temporary demise of democracy, it makes the United States the largest democratic nation in the world. The fact that we are a minority, I mean the democratic nations being a minority, does not destroy my total faith in that system of government.

I still feel over the long haul it is the way that people ought to live, that they control their governments, not that self-imposed heads of state control them.

Q. Well, to the extent that there is any revival of isolationism in this country, I wonder if it does not reflect the feeling that we democracies are a minority.

A. The trend toward isolationism or neo-isolationism really developed in the latter stages of the Viet Nam War. It is my general impression that the American people are now gradually shifting to a broader view and the trend toward isolationism may have turned. I notice this in the way Congress is reacting. This year, for example, we didn't have the same difficulty in defeating the several amendments which were aimed at forcing us to unilaterally bring back some of our troops from NATO.

Q. Does Henry Kissinger's speech yesterday in Milwaukee indicate that we are taking a tougher line toward the Third World and Fourth World?

A. I don't know whether you call it a tougher line, but I think the newer members of the United Nations have to recognize that they are a part of the world family now, and with that they have a responsibility to look at the circumstances in a broader way than just whether they are a group of underdeveloped countries.

If they don't act in a broader responsibility, they could destroy the United Nations, as the League of Nations was destroyed, and that would certainly not be to their best advantage.

Q. Do you have in mind anything that could come to be labeled as, say, comparable to the Nixon Doctrine, or his "generation of peace"? Is there going to be a Ford Doctrine--is there already?

A. I think we built on the doctrine of the previous Administration. If we can perform an effective role in the Middle East, if we can make some substantial achievements in SALT II, MBFR, in our relationship with the Soviet Union, if we can make headway in our relationship with China, keep a presence in Southeast Asia and have an impact on maintaining the peace in that area . . . I don't like to label what we are doing a "doctrine." I would rather have this Administration known as a problem-solving Administration in the pages of history.

Q. You may not prevent somebody else from discovering a Ford Doctrine.

A. No, but actually that is the way we try to handle our domestic problems too. It is not liberal, conservative; it is a recognition that you have a problem and we better find an answer. Sometimes you are accused of being left or right, but when you get all through, if you have the problem solved, that is what the public wants.

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