American Triumph and Commitment

On the stroke of 5 last Thursday afternoon, doors parted in the ornate council chamber of Geneva's Palais des Nations, and a four-man Egyptian delegation marched solemnly into the cavernous chamber. Minutes later, from another doorway, appeared three Israeli representatives. Face to face for the first time in 15 months, representatives of the two longtime Middle East antagonists took seats at tables carefully spaced 25 feet apart. Between them, at a third table, sat Finnish General Ensio Siilasvuo, commander of United Nations peace-keeping forces in the Middle East.

No Smiles. The two delegations studiously ignored each other, staring blankly into space or at Siilasvuo. Eventually, he passed out the giant blue folders containing the nine articles of accord and accompanying maps for a second-stage disengagement agreement between Israeli and Egyptian forces in Sinai. Without comment, representatives of each side -Major General Taha Maghdoub for the Egyptians and Ambassador-designate to Paris and longtime Prime Ministerial Adviser Mordechai Gazit for the Israelis -signed. After Siilasvuo signed on behalf of the U.N., he asked, "The ceremony is over. Are there any points to be raised?" The delegates shook their heads. Then, as stiffly as they had arrived, each side marched out of the chamber.

Thus, almost two years since they last went to war and in a grim, uneasy and almost anticlimactic milepost of history, Israel and Egypt formally accepted what U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger described as "the most sweeping document since Israel was made a state, a gigantic political agreement." If that was hyperbole, Kissinger could easily be forgiven. He had fathered the agreement and had cajoled, nudged and pressured both sides into accepting it. The Israelis were particularly resentful of that pressure and during the negotiations there was a coolness between them and the Americans that did not exist before. Beneath the veneer of friendship was a keen sense of hurt on the part of the Israelis. One of their negotiators told TIME'S Diplomatic Editor Jerrold L. Schecter that "our relationship will never be the same again. Things were said and done that have left a black mark."

In its general outline, the agreement was similar to the one Kissinger had come frustratingly close to achieving on his abortive March shuttle. Since then, the Secretary has worked patiently to narrow the gap on specific details that separated the two parties -and to restore his credibility as the world's premier diplomatic negotiator. His latest display of shuttle magic involved 13 flights between Alexandria and Jerusalem in two weeks, and at least a dozen tough negotiating sessions in each country. As Egyptian President Anwar Sadat put it, "Dr. Kissinger has had a hell of a time on both sides."

Despite the hassling over last-minute details, many of which still remain to be worked out by Israeli and Egyptian delegates in Geneva under General Siilasvuo's supervision during the next two weeks, there were no real surprises in the final accord. The general principles had been more or less accepted by both sides before Kissinger undertook his shuttle (TIME cover, Aug. 25). The Israelis agreed to move their troops out of the Mitla and Giddi passes in Sinai and also turn back to Egypt the Abu Rudeis oilfields captured during the Six-Day War. Egypt agreed in writing to let Israeli nonmilitary cargoes pass through the Suez Canal. Both sides agreed that the Middle East conflict should not be resolved by force and that neither side should "resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade." That fell short of the formal promise of nonbelligerency that Jerusalem demanded of Cairo, but the statement was the closest thing to a declaration of peaceful intentions toward Israel made by an Arab nation since the 1948 Armistice.

Civilian Experts. The Geneva accord, which will remain in force for the next three years, was unquestionably an American diplomatic triumph; but it involved an unprecedented American commitment to help maintain peace in the Middle East. The most widely debated proviso of the agreement is an article stipulating that the U.S. will send up to 200 civilian electronics experts to maintain surveillance stations in Sinai that will monitor troop and aircraft movements and report truce violations. Israel refused to ratify the pact without U.S. surveillance. Although not explicitly part of the deal, $2.3 billion in military aid for Israel in fiscal '76, as well as $700 million for Egypt, will now be presented for congressional approval by the Ford Administration. The U.S. will also guarantee oil for Israel to replace supplies previously provided by Abu Rudeis.

Reaction to the agreement throughout the world was less than euphoric. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko is co-chairman with Kissinger of the Geneva Peace Conference. Obviously angered and frustrated that they could contribute nothing to the new Sinai accord, the Russians refused to attend the signing of the articles -thereby forcing the U.S. to stay away as well. The Soviet press, which until last week had scarcely noticed Kissinger's shuttle, denounced the new agreement as "potentially dangerous" and "neglectful" of Arab needs. Understandably, the accord was bitterly attacked by Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (see box page 28).

Swinging through other Middle East countries on his way home, Kissinger received a mixed reception. Saudi Arabia's King Khalid bestowed a tentative blessing but warned that any Sinai disengagement must be followed by further negotiations over the future of the Golan Heights and Jerusalem. Jordan's King Hussein was in a frosty mood, principally because Congress has drastically chopped his request for $350 million worth of antiaircraft weaponry, including 14 batteries of Hawk missiles. In Damascus, Syria's President Hafez Assad was courteous but stiff; later Assad's Baath Party called the Sinai agreement "strange and disgraceful," and Assad pointedly refused to receive Egyptian Vice President Husny Mobarak when he appeared to explain the Egyptian view. In Israel, as she made a rare political appearance to vote for ratification at a Labor Party caucus, former Premier Golda Meir said she greeted the second-stage agreement "not with a fanfare but also not with a feeling of mourning."

Kissinger, Sadat and Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin quickly moved -in differing ways and against widely varying kinds and degrees of opposition -to justify the accords. To head off congressional worries that the American commitment to provide electronics experts might become a new Viet Nam adventure, President Ford and Kissinger met last week with leaders of the House and Senate at the White House. Over coffee and rolls, Ford argued that members of the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed that U.S. involvement was worth the effort. It was a gamble, conceded the President, but the alternative was an "inevitable" war within six to twelve months. Kissinger added that the U.S. does not guarantee the accord itself and the agreement was "a victory for the modern Arabs over the radical Arabs." At the end of the two-hour session, congressional leaders agreed that both houses would unquestionably approve the installation of the electronics experts, although the money package might be shaved somewhat.

Egypt's Sadat had no real opposition at home to worry about. In fact, he was sufficiently confident of his country's mood to allow live television coverage in Egypt of the ceremonies during which Kissinger and Premier Mamduh Salem initialed the documents. The most pressing concern in Egypt now is inflation; the return of Sinai oil, the increased protection for the Suez Canal and additional U.S. aid that accompany the latest agreement will all help that problem.

Last week Sadat moved quickly to counter criticism from the Soviet Union and more radical Arab states. In a speech to a joint session of the National Assembly and the central committee of the Arab Socialist Union (Egypt's only political party), he charged that Moscow's refusal to attend the Geneva signing was "an open attempt to shatter the Arab front." He denied Iraqi charges that Egypt was willing to sign a peace agreement with Israel and, obviously more in sorrow than in anger, chided "our brother in arms," Syria, for criticizing the accord. "I tell you that we have had offers to regain all of Sinai, if we would agree to end the state of belligerency. But I refused. If all we wanted was Sinai, we would by now have got much more than we have. Egypt will always shoulder its responsibility to Syria and to the Palestine cause." Sadat coupled that statement with extraordinary praise for the "manly attitude" of President Ford in helping to set up the accord. "We've insulted the United States for 50 years and never got anything for it," Sadat noted. "As I have often said, the United States holds at least 99% of the cards in this game."

Tactical Gain. Defending the accord against cries by right-wing opposition leaders that under strong U.S. pressure Israel had given up too much for too little, Premier Rabin argued -with some justification -that "the principal significance [of the accord] is political." Some Israeli military experts argued that ironically their armed forces will actually make a tactical gain by pulling out of the passes. The U.N. buffer zone in Sinai is now four times as wide as it was under the old disengagement agreement. Moreover, Egyptian forces will be farther from the Suez Canal and their artillery and missiles. With its air superiority, Israel could easily stop an Egyptian attack under these circumstances; meanwhile, Israel is in a position to carry out its traditional "move forward and attack" style of fighting by air and armor if necessary.

The accord was endorsed not only by Rabin but also by the other members of his negotiation team -hawkish Defense Minister Shimon Peres and dovish Foreign Minister Yigal Allon. Because of the consensus, the Premier easily carried the issue through the 19-man Cabinet, as well as the Labor Party caucus, and in the Knesset, where all 120 members turned out for the nine-hour debate. Parliament ratified the agreement by a vote of 70 to 43, with seven abstentions. The most outspoken opponent was former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, who defied Labor Party discipline to oppose Rabin. "What we are getting," Dayan told the Knesset, "is compensation from the Americans in lieu of Egyptian concessions. That is good for Egypt, but bad for Israel."

Clearly there are many unanswered questions involving the aftermath of the accord. If some kind of withdrawal agreement is worked out -possibly next year -between Syria and Israel on the Golan Heights, will the U.S. also be required to provide electronics experts for this volatile front? And if so, will Congress approve? What will be the mood of America if any technicians are accidentally killed in an outbreak of fighting in Sinai? Even if Congress approves this year's aid package to Israel, will it go along with requests for an estimated $10 billion in new equipment that Jerusalem is expected to ask for in future years? What will happen if the Jewish lobby persuades Congress to curtail the amount of aid promised Egypt?

Finally, there are legitimate concerns about what is in the secret codicils to the agreement, contained in as yet unpublished letters between Kissinger and Allon and Presidents Ford and Sadat. It is known that Washington has promised, among other things, to replace Abu Rudeis oil with American supplies if alternative Middle East sources should be cut off. Kissinger denies that the guarantee is any stronger, but some observers familiar with the negotiations believe that the U.S. -at least verbally -promised also to move such oil through any Arab embargo, presumably by means of U.S. naval support.

Peaceful Holidays. Some Egyptians, and many Israelis as well, fear that the agreement may not work out quite as Kissinger envisages it. They foresee a situation in which the Sinai front becomes frozen on its present lines despite Sadat's intention to press for general peace talks after next year's U.S. presidential election. Congress might also in an election year refuse to vote aid to Arabs. The Arab oil states, for their part, might then punish Sadat by shifting their economic aid totally to Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians. Sadat -alone and abandoned -would then fall, to be succeeded by a less moderate leader. Israeli Chief of Staff General MordecaiGur summed up the Israeli mood after initialing the Sinai maps last week. "As to whether I did a good thing, I'll only know in another five years."

Last week, open war continued between Israeli forces and Palestinian fedayeen, with P.L.O. raids and rocket attacks against Israel and retaliatory raids on Palestinian camps in Lebanon by Israeli commandos. But on the Sinai front, as the new moon of Ramadan appeared last week for Moslems, and Jews once more observed the start of the High Holy Days, all was peaceful. Two years ago when those religious events coincided, Israel was suddenly embroiled in the most costly war in its short history.

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