Toward a New Balance of Power

In the wake of the collapse of Saigon's Thieu regime four months ago, North Viet Nam has been emerging as a major Southeast Asian power. When, for example, a mausoleum honoring the late Ho Chi Minh was unveiled during Ha noi's recent independence celebrations, the ceremony was attended by dozens of visiting foreign dignitaries. To assess Southeast Asia's changing geopolitical landscape, Otto Fuerbringer, editor of magazine development at Time Inc. and former managing editor of TIME, toured the region and talked with many of its leaders. His report:

The shape of Southeast Asia's future will be largely determined by 1) the extent to which North Viet Nam succeeds in taking over all of Indochina, 2) the thrust of the Chinese-Soviet cold war and 3) the nature and direction of the continuing U.S. presence in Asia.

There is little doubt that Hanoi would like to have all of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia under its control. Saigon and the Mekong Delta, for instance, are prizes the North Vietnamese treasure, but they would prefer to absorb them with a minimum of dissension and violence. Thus Hanoi's tactics in South Viet Nam are shrewd and pragmatic: go slow, don't push, reeducate.

Stronger Links. In Laos, Hanoi is already dominant, since it controls the Pathet Lao, which recently abolished the last vestiges of coalition government. In Cambodia, almost completely closed to the scrutiny of outsiders, it seems that Hanoi is not doing as well. While two Cambodian officials with strong ties to North Viet Nam were recently raised to high positions, an aid agreement be tween the Cambodians and the Chinese characterized the two countries as "comrades in arms." This could indicate that Cambodia is re-enforcing its links with Peking. That and Prince Norodom Sihanouk's visit to Phnom-Penh (see story page 38) bring cheer to most Southeast Asian capitals, where the hope is that a Chinese-Cambodian alliance will be able to neutralize North Vietnamese-Soviet influence and thus keep Indochina divided.

The struggle over Indochina is only part of the Sino-Soviet cold war. The Chinese fear a Russian encirclement --Moscow's allies on China's southern border could complement Soviet troops on China's northern flank. During his recent visit to Peking, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos was told by the Chinese, "Our enemy is Russia." As Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping put it, "Two-thirds of the Soviet troops are now committed to the European front. But we are anticipating the day when they will be free to turn against us."

A Little Bait. In Southeast Asia, the Soviet drive is for military bases. The Russians are eying Cam Ranh Bay, the massive port in South Viet Nam built by the U.S. for more than $130 million. Because such an acquisition would really alarm China, most observers see it as unlikely. "Whether Hanoi avoids Peking's wrath will depend on how successfully the North Vietnamese can make it appear that they are working in Asia's interest and not just in their own or the Soviet Union's," said Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. "Hanoi just cannot allow the Russians to build a base in North Viet Nam. What it can do is throw the Soviets a little bait now and then, like servicing a ship or two at Cam Ranh."

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union must content itself with an enlarged navy cruising the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea and with a dramatically enlarged presence in Southeast Asian countries. In the Laotian capital of Vientiane, the tiny office of Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, lists 150 Russians as employees. There are intelligence reports that the Soviets have brought 40 patrol boats to cruise the Mekong River border between Thailand and Laos. China, for its part, maintains close contact with the Communist movements in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, and would support any guerrilla insurrections in these nations.

The leaders and peoples of the countries surrounding Indochina, and those of Japan as well, have put the Viet Nam War behind them and harbor almost no bitterness toward the U.S. Indeed, despite some anti-American rhetoric, they hope for a continued strong American presence in Asia. If nothing else, they see the U.S. as a force neutralizing China and the Soviet Union. Seni Pramoj, leader of Thailand's Democratic Party, observed, "We have cock fights in Thailand, but sometimes we put a sheet of glass between the fighting cocks. They can peck at each other without hurting each other. In the cold war between Moscow and Peking, the glass between the antagonists can be Washington."

There are other important reasons for the U.S. to maintain its power in Asia. It has sea-lanes to protect and a western frontier to guard. Above all, there are the non-Communist countries of East and Southeast Asia that have been allies of the U.S. in the past and that the U.S. can now, in the post-Viet Nam atmosphere, assist in new ways. A lower military profile will enable the U.S. to concentrate on economic and technological aid to these nations.

Burying Grudges. With America's military presence reduced to air and naval forces (an important exception is the 42,000-man U.S. force in South Korea), the non-Communist nations of Southeast Asia have been moving toward accommodation with their Communist neighbors. This was most explicitly spelled out by Thailand's politically skilled Premier Kukrit Pramoj. In a recent speech he observed: "The thrust of our foreign policies is the burying of old grudges, the overcoming of old fears, the opening of new doors."

While Kukrit's words were directed primarily toward China, Cambodia and North Viet Nam, they were also aimed at Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. Along with Thailand, these sometime rival states now constitute the eight-year-old Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Although the organization is no more than a loose grouping, its leaders are all strong, capable rulers determined to protect their own country's independence.

It is to the ASEAN states that the U.S. will most profitably be able to extend assistance. By helping them, as well as South Korea, Washington will be aiding nations most of which are not democracies but which have significantly greater economic and social freedom than their Communist neighbors and are striving to improve the material well-being of their people.

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