The Spirit of the Sinai Settlement

In a mood of diplomatic euphoria, Israeli and United Nations officials gathered in Jerusalem last Friday afternoon. Word flashed from Washington that Congress had finally approved a resolution under which 200 U.S. technicians will be sent to Sinai to monitor the Egyptian-Israeli accord. As a result, Israeli representatives, who had previously only initialed the interim agreements, were now prepared to sign them formally. After doing so, Israel's Foreign Ministry Director Avraham Kidron exchanged champagne toasts with the U.N. observers and glanced at his watch. In ten minutes, Kidron announced confidently, Israeli officials at Ras Sudr, on the northern tip of the Gulf of Suez, would transfer the oilfields back to Egyptian sovereignty.

Even as Kidron spoke, this historic step toward a Middle East peace was becoming bogged down in an unexpected small diplomatic snarl. The Egyptian representatives who showed up to reclaim the fields were not Egyptians but three cigar-chomping Texans who work for Mobil Oil; the corporation owns 50% of the Egyptian company that had operated the fields before Israel captured them during the Six-Day War. The Israelis in charge of Ras Sudr insisted that the Texans had to sign for the Arab Republic of Egypt. Well, no, said Engineering Consultant Billy Marcum of Dallas; he and his buddies were empowered to sign only for Mobil. Israeli Representative Meir Gueron replied that the Jewish Sabbath would begin soon. Unless Marcum agreed to represent Egypt as well as Mobil, the Israelis could not sign any transfer until after the Sabbath ended, 24 hours later. Agreement was finally reached. On behalf of a sovereign Arab nation, a Texas oilman received the field from Israel, with an Irish army captain on U.N. observer duty as witness.

Successful Crossing. The fact the deal was indeed made indicated that both sides were really concerned about creating a cooperative new spirit of Sinai. Egyptian anxiousness that the accord be carried out was apparent as the country celebrated the anniversary of the successful crossing of the Suez Canal by Egyptian troops. In other years, such an observance would have been the occasion for anti-Zionist rhetoric. This year the mood was celebratory--partly because it coincided with the religious festival of 'Id el Fitr, when Moslems end their month-long Ramadan fast.

Israel, meanwhile, was acting with equivalent aplomb. Even though Jerusalem did not sign the agreement until last week, the government had earlier decided to honor a timetable drawn up as though it had. Thus the Mobil engineers were welcomed heartily when they first arrived at Ras Sudr under U.N. escort, a day before the signing ceremony. An Israeli colonel in charge of the pullback from the fields told TIME Correspondent Marlin Levin: "We will leave the oilfields to the Egyptians just as we found them. We have even cleaned up the mosque for them."

The congressional action on which last week's moves depended came after delays that the Administration had not foreseen. The House, by a 341-69 vote, approved the congressional resolution that the White House had requested; one day later, the Senate agreed by a 70-18 margin. The overwhelming votes were deceiving; the resolution had been held back by sharp attacks from Kissinger's congressional critics and outside experts like former Under Secretary of State George Ball, who argued that Kissinger's step-by-step approach hindered an overall peace settlement more than it helped. Nonetheless, Ball urged Congress to approve the accord, since to vote it down would embarrass the U.S.

The Washington debate over the technicians foreshadowed further infighting between Congress and the Administration over the Sinai accord. Technicians and additional warning stations will cost $10 million annually to support, which Congress must still authorize and appropriate; arms programs for both Israel and Egypt must also be approved. Judging from the criticism so far, Kissinger may not get all he has promised in the way of U.S. support.

After approval of the technicians' resolution last week, Israeli leaders hailed the accord as a significant treaty binding the U.S. and Israel together to a degree that Presidents since Harry Truman's time have resisted. They were unhappy that Kissinger, in defending his diplomatic handiwork to Congress, appeared to take a less exuberant view.

Moral Obligations. The controversy involved how far Kissinger had actually committed the U.S. in the course of his shuttle diplomacy. The Secretary argued that only two items bound the U.S.--the presence of the technicians and a promise to provide Israel with oil if necessary to replace supplies lost because of the return to Egypt of the Sinai fields. Israeli experts on international law contended that the accompanying secret accords Congress made public (TIME, Oct. 13) had the force of a treaty; in their view Kissinger had also bound the U.S. to resupply Israel militarily in the case of another war and to provide military and economic aid on a planned, prolonged schedule. Israelis regarded the commitments as legal ones; Kissinger regarded them as moral obligations. If Israel were to be attacked in another Middle Eastern war, the distinction would be irrelevant. But the dispute over what the promises did represent put an uncertain cloud over the new spirit of Sinai.

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