Detente: H.K. v. J.S

Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger, the two most brilliant members of Gerald Ford's Cabinet, have disagreed sharply and frequently on the meaning and objectives of detente. What are their differences? Briefly put, Kissinger thinks any nuclear exchange between the superpowers would be disastrous, involving "colossal, indeed catastrophic damage." Schlesinger is just as appalled at the prospect of such an exchange, but he argues that a limited war with tactical nuclear weapons must be seriously considered and planned for. "What we need," he has said, "is a series of measured responses to aggression that bear some relation to the provocation [and] have prospects of terminating hostilities before general nuclear war breaks out."

Schlesinger watched Moscow's rising defense expenditures with concern, counting every new missile and tank and worrying that the military balance was gradually shifting in the Soviets' favor. He feared that the perception of military strength was as important as the strength itself. Accordingly, if the Russians believed themselves to be superior to the U.S., whether in fact they were or not, they would be tempted to test American resolve. In numerous speeches, he maintained that in constant dollars U.S. defense expenditures have dropped 20% since 1964, while Soviet expenditures have increased by about 40% during the same period.

Kissinger, by contrast, feels numbers alone do not tell the story. The U.S., he says, has the power to destroy the Soviet Union several times over--and vice versa; adding to the number of American missiles would be futile. An enemy can be killed only once, his reasoning goes. He believes the U.S. needs only a "sufficiency" of arms to deter the Soviets, not a superiority, and that sufficiency already exists.

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The negotiations with the Russians over the second phase of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II) have sharpened the dispute. The talks have been at a standstill since July, when Kissinger made a series of new proposals to Moscow. The Russians did not reply until two weeks ago, and when they did, they simply passed over the new proposals.

In SALT I, signed in 1972, the U.S. allowed the Soviets numerical superiority in ballistic missile launchers (2,358 v. 1,710 for the U.S.). This advantage, Washington reasoned, was balanced by three factors: the greater accuracy of the U.S. missiles; a big American lead in the development of MIRVs -- clusters of missiles independently aimed from a big rocket as it nears target; and U.S. bombers and bases near the U.S.S.R. But, Schlesinger's Pentagon now complains, the Soviets perfected their MIRV technology sooner than anticipated, giving them an even greater potential superiority in numbers. The Russian missiles have greater throw-weights--that is, they can carry more and bigger warheads--the Pentagon also points out; thus even if the number of launchers was equal, the Soviets would have a strategic edge. In response, the U.S. military is now promoting development of the "cruise missile," a long-range, jet-propelled, guided bomb that can be launched from either a bomber, a ship or a submarine. Capable of flying close to the earth and therefore below enemy radar, the missile has a range of 1,500 miles and is extraordinarily accurate. The Pentagon says that since the cruise missile flies through the atmosphere, it should not be counted with ICBMs, which travel through space, in the SALT II ceiling. The Russians insist that it should be included.

At the same time, the Russians argue that their new Backfire bomber should be excluded from SALT II because it has only a limited range (5,500 to 6,000 miles). The Pentagon counters that air-to-air refueling could send it to the U.S. and back. The U.S.'s July proposal to the Soviets suggested a compromise that would limit both Backfires and cruise missiles. Reflecting his distrust of Moscow, Schlesinger argues, however, that the Soviets will eventually perfect cruise missiles of their own to match ours. Once they do, he says, they will unquestionably cheat in declaring how many of the easily concealed weapons are in their armory. When the whole issue of arms negotiations was raised at a recent National Security Council meeting, Kissinger and Schlesinger engaged in what one on-the-scene observer described as the most heated exchange in the Security Council in memory.

It is sometimes said that Schlesinger's profound distrust of detente stems from a fundamental pessimism about human nature, or at least about the American people. Schlesinger argues that the opposite is more nearly true. He is, he says, basically optimistic about the strength of the U.S. and the capacity of its people to respond to challenge despite a temporary lack of confidence in the wake of Watergate and Viet Nam. Thus it is unnecessary to make disadvantageous deals with the Soviet Union simply for the sake of buying time, since the U.S. will eventually snap out of its despondent mood anyway.

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It is Kissinger who is the pessimist, Schlesinger maintains, because the Secretary of State fears the West may generally be in decline and not just temporarily weakened by the events of the past decade. Indeed, Kissinger has argued that detente is necessary largely because Congress and the people will simply not stomach the effort and sacrifice necessary for confrontational policies and what Schlesinger would call a strong defense posture and a tougher bargaining stance.

In the main, Kissinger believes, detente has served the U.S. well. The U.S., he feels, has not given up anything vital to the Russians. Washington, his argument goes, has extracted from the Kremlin all that can reasonably be expected as a result of detente. More pressure might cause Moscow to reject detente entirely, just as it rejected a Soviet-American trade agreement earlier this year, when Congress insisted, as part of the package, that more Soviet Jews be allowed to emigrate. Indeed, Kissinger concludes, detente may have been oversold in the U.S. It is not a panacea for peace. It is instead a means by which two mutually hostile societies can compete, co-exist and occasionally resolve their differences.

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