Out of the Nuclear Closet

One of the worst-kept secrets in the Middle East is Israel's nuclear capability. For nearly a decade, Israel has had the materials and scientific talent needed to make atomic weapons, as well as some means of firing them on Arab targets. Jerusalem has consistently refused to acknowledge its nuclear muscle; yet since it is fooling practically no one, what is to be gained by ambiguity? Not much, argues Robert W. Tucker, professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University. In the November issue of Commentary, Tucker suggests that Israel should seriously consider making public the existence of an atomic arsenal and adopt a defense policy "based on a known nuclear deterrent."

Tucker, 51, is emerging as something of a superhawk on Middle Eastern affairs. Last January, in another much-debated Commentary article, he laid out a blueprint for a U.S. military takeover of Persian Gulf oil wells in the event of another Arab oil embargo. In an interview with TIME last week, he argued that the nuclear situation in the Middle East "is going to evolve anyway. The real question then is: What is the best way to have it evolve? My concept of an Israeli nuclear deterrent may create the context in which the Israelis will feel secure enough to move toward a permanent settlement."

As Tucker sees it, Israel's announcement of a nuclear capability would:

1) Give the Jewish state a means of competing with the Arabs' growing military strength without putting "the Israeli economy under serious strain," as would continued reliance on conventional weapons alone;

2) Provide a "substitute for territorial security," allowing Israel to give up occupied Arab territories "without the need to insist upon concessions the Arabs will almost surely not make";

3) Create an environment in which war becomes potentially so devastating that "the less responsible activists would be seen as posing enormous dangers to all parties and the need to control them would soon be expressed in policy";

4) Reduce Jerusalem's dependence on the U.S., since "with a nuclear deterrent, Israel's destiny need no longer rest in American hands."

Tucker concedes that his proposal, if adopted by Israel, would "provoke a uniformly adverse reaction abroad." He also recognizes some dangers in his suggestions, such as the start of an atomic arms race in the Middle East and disapproval by Washington that could result in "sharply reduced American arms support" for Israel. He insists, however, that the Arabs will probably acquire atomic weapons anyway. His reason: "[Their] wealth and power, as well as the ever-increasing availability of nuclear technology." In fact, last week Egypt and the U.S. initialed an agreement for the construction in Egypt of two nuclear power generators. Even so, Tucker argues, a "nuclear [weapons] environment" in the region would give the Arab states "a very great incentive and justification to move in the direction" of reaching an accommodation with Israel.

There are some flaws in this chilling proposal. Tucker claims that an Israeli nuclear deterrent would inhibit the Arab states from mounting a war of attrition. But what would prevent the Arabs from threatening nuclear retaliation? This would neutralize Jerusalem's nuclear deterrent and force the Israelis to counter an Arab attack using conventional forces. Jerusalem might then find itself bogged down in the kind of long, costly campaign that, according to Tucker, should have been averted by an open nuclear strategy. Tucker's proposals also leave little room for miscalculation. If a Middle East "nuclear balance" does not, in fact, have the "stabilizing effect" he predicts, a miscalculation by either side could trigger a war infinitely more catastrophic than any waged with conventional weapons.

It is unlikely that the Israeli government will soon follow Tucker's advice. The attitude of its leaders has not changed much since 1966, when Shimon Peres (now Defense Minister) told the Knesset: "I know that the Arabs suspect our nuclear intentions, and I know that this suspicion is a deterrent force. Then why should we allay these suspicions?" This not only keeps the Arabs guessing, but also avoids the international censure that would surely fall on Israel if it openly declared that it had become an atomic power. Nonetheless, U.S. military experts believe that the Israeli air force has modified some of its war planes to deliver atomic bombs.

Washington is convinced that Israel would use its nukes only as a last, desperate resort. State Department officials are also worried about Arab response to the kind of policy Tucker proposes. "Israel will be playing with dangerous fire," warned Tahsin Bashir, press secretary to President Anwar Sadat. "These are weapons which can wreck both houses--Arabs and Israelis--and increase insecurity in the area."

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