Reaping a Bad Harvest

Ever since Soviet grain-purchasing agents first came scouting in the U.S. and Canada last April, the suspicion has grown that the U.S.S.R. was headed for yet another of its periodic poor harvests. Then a summer drought hit the European U.S.S.R. In October, rains, frost and snow blighted Central Asian grainfields. Prematurely freezing temperatures killed winter wheat in the Ukraine. As Soviet grain purchases mounted, U.S. Department of Agriculture specialists estimated that the Soviet grain failure might be as much as 56 million tons short of the 215.6 million ton goal set by Soviet planners for 1975.

The harsh reality emerged last week at a routine session of the Supreme Soviet, the U.S.S.R.'s rubber-stamp parliament. The 1975 harvest has been the worst since 1965, and could be as politically significant as the 1963 crop failures that helped bring down Party Chief Nikita Khrushchev. From the incomplete figures released in Moscow, Western specialists estimated that grain production for 1975 fell to about 139 million tons, or 76.6 million tons short of target.

Bad News. This was bad news for the Soviet economy, for politicians who might be held responsible, for satellite states dependent on Soviet grain and. most of all, for the long-suffering Soviet consumer. Since agriculture accounts for about 20% of Soviet output and employs one-third of the population, a disaster of such dimensions was bound to drag down the economy as a whole. Indeed, the 1976 budget presented to the Supreme Soviet showed that the target set for the growth of heavy industry in 1976 is 4.9%, compared to 7% in 1975. This drastically reduced growth rate affects primarily consumer industries, thus confounding Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev's oft-repeated promises to raise Soviet living standards. East Bloc satellite nations that depend on Russia for their bread will also be hurt.

Soviet grain purchases abroad, though massive, can scarcely make up for the 76.6 million shortfall. Washington experts believe the Soviets will buy about 30 million tons of grain from the U.S., Canada, Europe, Australia and Brazil for import by next Oct. 1. Even if more grain were available immediately on world markets, the Soviets would not be able to handle it because of their inadequate distribution system. U.S. and British brokers report extraordinary congestion at Soviet ports, where ships are now waiting as much as five weeks to offload.

In the circumstances, Premier Aleksei Kosygin's failure to appear at the opening of the Supreme Soviet session, and Brezhnev's midweek absence at a meeting, raised the eyebrows of some Western Kremlinologists. Although the latest grain disaster was a result of ferocious weather conditions, the two ailing leaders might make handy scapegoats for alleged errors in agricultural planning. Both men later reappeared in public; Sovietologists in Washington predict that Brezhnev will remain firmly in power until well after the Communist Party Congress meets next February. Indeed, Brezhnev reportedly delivered a secret speech to the Supreme Soviet attacking people who might be held accountable for the agriculture catastrophe. The most obvious targets were Agriculture Minister Dimitri Polyansky and Fyodor Kulakov, chief of the party's agricultural department. Both men have been touted as possible successors to Brezhnev, but it is now possible that their careers have been as badly blighted as the grain crop they supervised this year.

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