How Much Has Angola Hurt the U.S.?

President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger have bitterly attacked Congress' ban on funds for the pro-Western forces in Angola. The administration argues that the nation's foreign policy may be so weakened by arbitrary congressional interference that the U.S. could lose the ability to inspire trust--and, when necessary, fear--in the rest of the world. "It cannot be in the interests of the United States," said Kissinger at a press conference last week, "to create the impression that in times of crisis, either threats or promises of the United States may not mean anything because our divisions may paralyze us."

These warnings are reminiscent of Administration pleas in early 1975 for last-ditch aid to failing anti-Communist governments in Saigon and Phnom-Penh. In the Wall Street Journal last week, Historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., charged the Administration with unnecessary hyperbole and suspect logic. "I strongly doubt," he argued, "that anyone in the Soviet Union is concluding today that . . . the Senate's action on Angola gives Moscow a blank check for foreign adventures."

The U.S. failure to back the anti-Communist forces in Angola surely casts some doubt on American strength and resolve--but how seriously? World reaction is divided, and opinion depends on proximity to the war-torn former Portuguese territory. In Africa, a number of moderate black leaders--as well as South Africa's Prime Minister John Vorster--are clearly anguished. In general, the moderates are less concerned about direct Russian influence and bases in Angola than about the prospect that potential Soviet client states, beefed up with Russian military and economic aid, might be tempted to interfere in the domestic affairs of their neighbors--with or without Moscow's approval. Zambia is already concerned about subversion by the M.P.L.A. regime in Luanda. Kenya and Ethiopia are afraid that Somalia, a major recipient of Moscow's largesse, might try to revive its longtime dream of a "greater Somalia" by pushing its territorial claims into southern Ethiopia and northeastern Kenya, where many ethnic Somalis live. The Nairobi government also fears that Soviet aid to Uganda might inspire its volatile President Idi Amin to push a corridor to the Indian Ocean--through Kenya.

U.S. ambassadors in Africa have tried to reassure moderate leaders, but doubts remain that Washington would do much to help them resist aggression by ambitious Soviet clients. Says one moderate African President: "American credibility is now suspect. If the Soviets were blatantly to try to subvert my country tomorrow, I'd think we might get sympathetic, clucking noises out of Washington, but not much else."

Closest Allies. In Europe and Israel, most diplomats and government leaders do not seem to be worried about America's specific military commitment to its closest allies. But Belgium's Defense Minister recently warned that the Continent "can no longer satisfy itself by trusting the Americans." The Europeans agree with Kissinger that the conflict between Congress and the White House could lead to a paralysis of American foreign policy and even to a kind of indecisive neoisolationism. Washington's lack of resolve might affect even such primary commitments as NATO or U.S. troop strength in Europe.

French, British and West German experts generally agree, however, that Angola lies outside the realm of vital Western interests, and they question whether Luanda's Marxist President Agostinho Neto will be a subservient Russian client. By and large, the Western Europeans criticize Washington for clumsily backing a sure loser--the corrupt, inept and unpopular F.N.L.A. leader Holden Roberto--and for alienating moderate Africans by not protesting South Africa's intervention in the war.

The real issue, say many Europeans, is not that Washington lacks the will to resist Communism but that it never had a strong African policy. Asserts one French official: "You can't build an African policy in a few weeks and with a few hundred million dollars. When the Russians targeted Angola, the U.S. simply wasn't there." But, adds this diplomat, "Kissinger must know that a Soviet success means only that the Kremlin has scored a point in Africa. The West can even things up by scoring a point elsewhere."

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