That Alarming Soviet Buildup

In boasting of gains achieved by the Soviet Union in recent years, speakers at the 25th Communist Party Congress last week almost totally ignored one impressive area of advancement: military strength. Whenever it has come to a choice between swords and plowshares, Moscow has seldom hesitated. Swords it has been. Neither bad harvests, shortages of consumer goods nor the spirit of detente with the West has braked the Soviet military buildup. In the past decade, Moscow has so expanded its forces that most defense analysts around the world agree that the U.S. is in danger of losing its strategic edge. Items:

> On land, Soviet generals command 2.5 million men, supported by 40,000 tanks, compared with the 790,000 men and 10,100 tanks in the U.S. Army.

> In the air, the U.S. has 463 heavy bombers (mostly aging B-52s) to only 135 Russian turbojet Bisons and turboprop Bears. But Soviet airspace is the most intensively defended in the world: 5,000 radar stations, 2,600 fighter interceptors, 12,000 highly accurate antiaircraft missiles. By contrast, U.S. air defense has been cut back. There are only a dozen squadrons of F106 fighters--mostly assigned to the Air National Guard--with a primary mission of intercepting Soviet bombers. With large-scale production already under way of the Backfire--a new, supersonic Soviet intercontinental warplane--Russia will narrow the bomber gap. Meanwhile, the U.S. Air Force's supersonic B-l is still in the development stage and faces stiff opposition in Congress.

> At sea, the Red fleet's admirals deploy the world's largest naval force. The Soviets enjoy clear superiority in attack submarines (253 v. 73), cruisers and destroyers armed with ship-to-ship missiles (40 v. 0) and supply ships (2,358 v. 1,009). The Soviet navy, however, would have trouble rushing troops and planes to intervene in sudden political or military crises far from the U.S.S.R. The U.S. has more bases abroad and can act quickly because of its 14 attack carriers (the Soviets have none), 1,309 Navy fighter planes (v. none for the Soviets) and nearly 200,000 Marines (v. 12,000).

> In nuclear forces, the Soviets boast 1,603 intercontinental ballistic missiles (the U.S. has 1,054) and 54 atomic submarines armed with nuclear warheads (to 41 for the U.S.). Nonetheless, the U.S. has a powerful strategic deterrent. A head start in developing launchers with multiple, independently targetable warheads (MlRVs), combined with the striking power of the B-52 bombers, gives the U.S. a 9,000 v. 3,200 advantage in deliverable nuclear bombs and warheads. Soviet improvements of nuclear delivery systems could wipe out the American advantage. Reason: the very powerful Soviet rockets, especially the SS-9, SS-18 and SS-19, are capable of launching more individual warheads than can the relatively lightweight U.S. Minuteman III missiles.

The U.S. also has, in certain areas, an advantage created by sophisticated technology. American missiles are more accurate than their Soviet counterparts, American submarines are less noisy (thus more difficult to detect), and U.S.A.F. F-4s and F-15s are more versatile and powerful than the Russian MIG 21s and MIG 23s. What worries the analysts is that this superiority may not last, since the Soviets seem determined to narrow the quality gap. Moscow publishes no figures on its military expenditures, but the Soviet Union seems to be devoting an ever greater share of national spending to defense. Pentagon experts estimate that last year's Soviet military budget was $141 billion; the U.S. spent $94 billion. In 1964 the U.S. spent $110.4 billion on defense (in 1976 dollars), while the Soviets spent $100 billion. Last week the CIA conceded that it may have been underestimating, by almost one-half, the percentage of the Soviet G.N.P. spent on defense. The agency is now overhauling its formula for appraising Soviet expenditures and is leaning toward a conclusion some Pentagon analysts have held for years: the Soviets have been spending as much as 15% of their G.N.P. on defense, compared with about 6% for the U.S.

Western experts offer several theories for the massive Soviet buildup: 1) to counter potential trouble along the 4,500-mile border with Russia's Marxist archenemy, China; 2) to maintain hegemony over Eastern Europe; 3) to overcome an "inferiority complex" vis-`a-vis the U.S. that was aggravated when Moscow had to back down during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis; 4) to provide additional arms for its adventurous clients abroad.

Most ominous is the possibility that the Soviets, despite detente, have not given up their long-term goal of dominating all of Europe, by force if necessary. Indeed, Soviet forces are no longer primarily defensive, as they were until the mid-1960s. Much of modern Russian weaponry--from missiles to tanks to fighter-bombers--is offensive, aimed at a blitzkrieg attack with quick victory as its goal. In Central Europe, the Soviets have concentrated huge numbers of fast tanks and powerful artillery; at sea, the Red fleet's ship-to-ship missiles could deal fatal, surprise blows to Western warships.

Mere Intimidation. There is no evidence that Moscow is planning a military offensive against the U.S. or the Atlantic Alliance, and it is widely assumed that the Kremlin would not now risk U.S. nuclear retaliation. Some experts, however, are not so certain. Malcolm R. Currie, Pentagon director of research and engineering, warned at a Washington press conference last week that "it would be a fundamental mistake" to believe that Soviet leaders view a nuclear war as unthinkable.

While it may never come to such a grim "doomsday" scenario, the Soviet Union's growing military muscle may well win important victories through mere intimidation. NATO Commander in Chief General Alexander Haig warns that at some future date a specific East-West pressure point could develop, as it did over Berlin and Cuba. This time, the Soviets not only would be stronger, but might also conclude that America's determination to live up to its commitments has been weakened by setbacks in Southeast Asia and southern Africa. Moscow might then risk making tough demands, on the theory that it no longer needs to fear humiliation--or defeat.

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