A Growing U.S.-and Global-Concern

American presidential elections are always unnerving to policymakers outside the U.S. With as many as a dozen candidates stumping America, boldly attacking this position or proudly defending that one, observers abroad see American foreign policy as falling into a quadrennial state of near paralysis. This year the problem is compounded by what has come to be known in Washington and in chancelleries abroad as "the Kissinger problem" (see box opposite). Among the signs:

-The Administration is bogging down in obtaining a SALT II agreement with the Soviets. Sharp differences over arms limitations exist, not only between Washington and Moscow but also between the State Department and the Pentagon. Some presidential advisers side with the military because they fear a new SALT agreement might be an election-year liability. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger insists that the Joint Chiefs ought to support him on SALT, if for no other reason than that an agreement would give them the cruise missiles they want. Some military men do support him, but for a different reason. They argue that an agreement would slow the arms race; without such a slowdown, they add, Moscow would win an all-out race, given the present U.S. mood on defense spending.

-Detente, a term that Kissinger did not introduce and never particularly liked, has become a political liability. President Ford intends to drop detente from his lexicon. "It's only a word," the President said last week. "I don't think it is applicable any more." The word may not be applicable -- or politically safe -- but the notion of working to reduce the risk of a U.S. -Soviet confrontation is certainly important. Yet Kissinger is being faulted for giving Moscow undue advantages in his eagerness to reach agreements.

-Sino-American relations, which Kissinger did much to restore after a 23-year break, have gone from sweet to sour. Some diplomats insist that Richard Nixon's invitation from Peking was designed not only as an honor for the ex-President but also as a slap at Kissinger for appeasing the Russians.

-In the Middle East, following last year's Sinai disengagement between Egypt and Israel, there appear to be no new options for solving the more dangerous problems of the Golan Heights and the Palestinians. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat gave new fuel to Kissinger's critics last week by revealing that the Secretary had made a number of secret agreements as part of the Sinai negotiations. One agreement pledges the U.S. to prevent Israel from attacking Syria; another binds the U.S. to bring the Palestinians into negotiations.

-In Western Europe, there is resentment over strident U.S. opposition to the growing successes of Communist parties in the West (see ESSAY page 38).

-U.S. African policy, in the aftermath of Angola, has been called nonpolicy. The U.S., with no diplomatic options after the Portuguese withdrawal, could only try -- and fail -- to match Soviet aid with covert help to two Angolan factions.

-In Latin America, a rare Kissinger visit to Washington's most neglected allies produced little more than a U.S.-Brazilian agreement to hold semiannual bilateral consultations. Brazil's neighbors are nervous about what that means. In view of Brazil's autocratic regime and documented stories of political torture, the other Latin states were astounded by Kissinger's paean to Brasilia for its "concern for human dignity and for the basic values of man."

Nor are foreign statesmen alone in their criticism of the American Secretary of State. Especially since the New Hampshire primary, "the Kissinger problem" has surfaced in every White House campaign strategy session. Some politicians are trying to make the Secretary a major issue -- too much power, too easy with the Russians. What was unthinkable a few months ago is now a vaporous but emerging thought: foreign policy, detente, SALT, or however one wishes to describe the American attitude toward the outside world, could be distorted so grotesquely by the political struggle that Kissinger indeed might be allowed to resign.

If critics like Ronald Reagan and Senator Henry Jackson stood alone, they might not be given much weight. But a lot of things are happening now to worry Americans--and friends of the U.S.: the melancholy warnings of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, new statistics showing the Soviets ahead in many areas of military strength, the Angolan debacle. For all of Gerald Ford's growing stature as a leader, foreign policy is still seen by many as Kissinger's creation.

"It is difficult today to carry on any discussion on a major problem of foreign policy," a senior British diplomat said last week, "that does not turn into a discussion about Kissinger." Quite a few diplomats obviously agree with former Israeli Premier Golda Meir, who quotes an old Hebrew saying: "Respect him but suspect him."

Kissinger is losing respect for the very reason he gained it in the first place. In three years as Secretary of State, he has totally personalized policy: he has been shuttle negotiator, congressional liaison, White House adviser and global operations chief--as well as policymaker. As long as it accomplished results, this virtuoso solo performance drew raves. Now results are harder to come by and the applause is dwindling.

Nowhere is this more obvious than in the Middle East, where Kissinger has been creative. But success depended upon momentum, and Kissinger is losing that. Moreover, he is likely to come under fresh fire as a result of two new studies of his shuttle diplomacy. Not only may there have been secret agreements with Sadat, but the new material indicates that both Nixon and Ford promised Egypt a return to pre-1967 Sinai borders, with a "substantial" return of territory as well for both Syria and Jordan.

Poor Relations. To regain momentum, Kissinger and Ford are planning Middle East visits this spring. Kissinger is also urging the Israelis to consider new talks aimed at securing a pledge of nonbelligerency from Sadat. For Egypt, he has announced the proposed sale of U.S. arms to replace Soviet equipment no longer available. So far, only six C-130 transport planes worth $39 million are included, but Kissinger hopes to provide more than that for Egypt. As Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said last week, "I wouldn't be surprised to find a rifle or two on the list." But such arms deliveries may have trouble getting by a tough "Israel lobby" in Congress, especially since Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin promised that his government would oppose them.

The foreign policy problem has been deepened by poor relations between Kissinger and Capitol Hill. After the Cyprus crisis, Congress blocked military aid to the Turks--who then closed down 28 U.S. installations. In Angola, Congress rejected Kissinger's argument that the Soviet-Cuban initiative there called for a U.S. response. Kissinger's negotiations over the Panama Canal may be ruined by a jingoistic bloc on the Hill.

Elections supposedly revitalize machinery of government, including foreign policy, and such controversies ought to be the basis of a fruitful give-and-take. Unfortunately, but perhaps inevitably, the debate seems more likely to center around Kissinger the man. Fascinating as this may be, it does not help much to frame a sound discussion of foreign policy at a difficult moment.

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