A Dr. K. Offer They Could Not Refuse

"It was made abundantly clear to me that as long as the present circumstances in Rhodesia prevailed, we could expect no help or support of any kind from the Free World. On the contrary, the pressures on us from the Free World would continue to mount."

With those words Rhodesia's Prime Minister Ian Smith last week told his countrymen in a grave 20-minute television address that the Rhodesian "rebellion" was at an end. Nearly eleven years after his government had declared its independence from British rule and its determination to maintain white minority rule in the landlocked territory. Smith and his colleagues capitulated. On behalf of their 275,000 white countrymen, they agreed to a British-American plan to transfer power to Rhodesia's 6 million blacks within the next two years. The Western powers, Smith said calmly, "have made up their minds as to the kind of solution they wish to see in Rhodesia, and they are determined to bring it about." To put it more bluntly, they made Smith an offer that he could not have refused.

Impressive Feat. At week's end, a shadow was cast on the settlement when five black African nations rejected it, saying that acceptance would, in effect, legalize "colonialist and racist structures of power." The presidents of Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Angola and Botswana called instead for Britain to convene a constitutional convention outside of Rhodesia. Still, the U.S. State Department seemed unconcerned, saying that the five nations had apparently accepted "the essentials" of the agreement.

In any event, Smith's decision marked one of the more impressive feats of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who had laid the groundwork this summer during two meetings in Europe with South Africa's Prime Minister John Vorster. Under the plan, the Rhodesian regime agreed to set up an interim government to pave the way for majority rule. It will include a council of state headed by a white, possibly Smith himself, and a council of ministers to be led by a black "First Minister." In return for accepting the plan, the Rhodesian whites were promised that steps would be taken to end both the black guerrilla fighting along Rhodesia's borders and the international economic sanctions imposed upon the country following its breakaway from Britain. The U.S. and other countries would also establish a fund to insure whites against financial losses as a result of the shift to majority rule.

Kissinger, arriving in Washington aboard his Air Force 707 at the end of his twelve-day mission, said that Smith's capitulation was "an encouraging development," but warned that it was "only the beginning" of a difficult process of black-white accommodation. While some whites in Rhodesia registered disapproval of the Smith announcement in subdued demonstrations, the first general reaction on both sides of the color line seemed to be one of relief. There was rejoicing in Highfield, Harere and other black townships, and an atmosphere of calm in the white suburbs of Highlands and Gun Hill. "The pressures were just too great," observed one leader of the ruling party. "Now we must simply do the best we can." Remarked a Salisbury secretary: "I'm glad this tightrope act is finally over, even though we lost. Now at least the future, good or bad, will be clearer for us all."

Meat-Ax Diplomacy. Kissinger's dramatic African shuttle started out quietly and methodically. After leaving Washington with a few close aides (see story page 44), Kissinger stopped in London for a talk with British Prime Minister James Callaghan, then touched bases with two of black Africa's most influential leaders, Presidents Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. Early last week, after two long sessions in Pretoria with Vorster, Kissinger sprang his surprise: a pair of lengthy meetings with Ian Smith.

The first took place at the residence of the American ambassador in the Pretoria suburb of Waterkloof, the second in Vorster's hilltop villa. Exactly what happened during the seven hours of negotiations is not known. "There were no raised voices, no dramatics," recalled one participant. "It was done with great dignity by all concerned." But another diplomat present said of the first meeting: "It wasn't Henry's usual style. There was nothing in it reminiscent of Metternich or Machiavelli. This was meat-ax diplomacy, plain and simple."

During the dialogue, as reconstructed by observers, Kissinger forced Smith to survey the chessboard of southern Africa and to accept the hard fact that his position had become hopeless. South Africa had resolved not to prop up the Rhodesians with further arms and supplies; the U.S. and Britain were committed to the principle of black rule within 24 months. A decision by the Smith regime for a defiant last stand, Kissinger argued, could only compound the perils for the whites and ruin whatever chances remained for them to work out a modus vivendi with the blacks, who outnumber them by 22 to one. Moreover, a prolonged race war in Rhodesia might give the Soviet Union an opportunity to entrench itself by giving all-out support to the guerrilla movements. Rhodesia's military resources were stretched to the limit, and a rainy season--the time of heightened guerrilla activity--was about to begin. If Rhodesia were to strike at guerrilla sanctuaries in Mozambique, Kissinger cautioned, it would raise the risk of Soviet or Cuban intervention in the guerrillas' behalf.

Safety Net. Kissinger also pointed out to Smith the advantages of an early settlement. It was his hope, the Secretary said, to create conditions under which a considerable number of white settlers would find it acceptable to stay.

He and Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs William Rogers then explained the proposal for a financial "safety net" under which the U.S., Britain and other Western countries would provide as much as $2 billion in compensation for Rhodesian whites. Civil servants would be assured of their pensions and protected against losses incurred through "Africanization" of their jobs; farmers and businessmen would be promised compensation if a black government were to decide to nationalize their property. If Smith were to refuse this proposal now, Kissinger warned, it would not be offered again.

As for the transition to black rule, Kissinger acknowledged that many details of the plan proposed last March by British Prime Minister Callaghan still had to be worked out. But he remained firm on the plan's basic tenets: acceptance of majority rule within 18 to 24 months, and formation of an interim government which, in order to bring an end to further guerrilla warfare, would have to meet with the approval of the black majority.

Late Sunday evening, Smith left for home, saying he would "report favorably" on the plan Kissinger had outlined. The Secretary stayed on with Vorster for another two hours, shifting the subject to Namibia (South West Africa), the onetime League of Nations mandate that South Africa has ruled since 1920. Some important details on Namibia remained unsettled, but Kissinger still hopes to find a way to bring the South West African Peoples' Organization (SWAPO), a leading political movement, into the territory's constitutional conference, thereby ending SWAPO's guerrilla activity before Namibia becomes independent by Dec. 31,1978.

The British government, as well as many black African states, remained openly skeptical about Kissinger's Rhodesian settlement. After all, Smith on at least two previous occasions had weaseled out on promises to yield to majority rule. This time, however, he obviously knew he had no choice.

After an inconclusive meeting of his Cabinet on the Kissinger proposal, Smith urged his colleagues to "sleep on it, and maybe dream about it." Next day they caved in. Then came a meeting of the Rhodesian Front's 50-member parliamentary caucus, which Smith characterized as "very pleasant, very constructive." Scarcely a week earlier, the party congress had voted resoundingly against majority rule. Now, in the wake of the Sunday-night massacre in Pretoria, as Smith's meeting with Kissinger was becoming known, they were asked to accept it--and they did.

Progress Reports. In the meantime, Kissinger moved quickly to keep black African leaders informed. At Lusaka he saw Kenneth Kaunda, then Julius Nyerere in Dar es Salaam. A week earlier, the Tanzanian had been distinctly pessimistic about the Kissinger mission, at least in public. This time Nyerere was in a buoyant mood, speaking with far greater candor about the substance of the proposals put to Smith than anyone else had done all week. Next, Kissinger flew to Kinshasa to brief Zaire's flamboyant President Mobutu Sese Seko, then on to Nairobi to see Kenya's venerable President Jomo Kenyatta. Led into the midst of 300 tribal dancers by his host, Kissinger attempted a few fumbling steps of his own before begging off with a quip: "Those who have seen me dance will know that we are in need of technical assistance from Kenya."

The following day he reported on the mission's progress to Britain's Prime Minister Callaghan and Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland. Publicly, Kissinger was anxious to give the British full credit for the present Rhodesian proposal; privately, he was aware that the British, having got burned over Rhodesia before, would be content to let the U.S. take the responsibility if a last-minute hitch should develop. At a press conference, Kissinger was asked what would happen if the Rhodesian problem should be turned over to Britain, as the de jure colonial power, and then fell apart. "We'll get the blame," Kissinger grinned.

How had Kissinger brought off his Rhodesian coup? "Personal charm," he quipped blithely to reporters in London. Not exactly; but to a large extent it was Kissinger's uncanny understanding of the realities of power, his shrewd timing, and his recognition that only the U.S. could play the role of catalyst that made it possible.

The pending transition of power in Salisbury raises profound questions about the future of South Africa, where unrest in the black urban townships has continued sporadically since June; last week racial violence spread to downtown Johannesburg for the first time. In Rhodesia, the immediate question is whether the rival black factions can get together to help form a government. At present there are at least six candidates for the leadership of an independent Zimbabwe, as African nationalists have long called Rhodesia. Among these, the best known--and probably the most moderate--is Joshua Nkomo, 59, who negotiated inconclusively with Smith for two months earlier this year. Another is Robert Mugabe, 51, a largely self-educated teacher, who is a member of the powerful Shona tribe (which makes up about 80% of Rhodesia's black population), and who has a wide following among Rhodesian guerrillas based in Mozambique.

Whoever becomes First Minister of the interim government, it will have to be someone who has the clout to end the fighting. If he does not, the whole settlement, with its promise of a breakthrough in southern Africa's racial stalemate, will be in jeopardy.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.