Signal to the Soviets-and to Carter

Jimmy Carter got his way with his choice for an arms-control negotiator--but the victory was not as clear as he had hoped. After a four-day debate, the Senate confirmed Paul Warnke's selection as director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by a vote of 70 to 29; but it approved his nomination as chief SALT negotiator by a narrower margin: 58 to 40.

The vote came only a few hours after a Carter blast at Senate opponents of Warnke; at his midweek press conference, the President accused them of being rigid hawks who simply "don't want to see a substantial reduction in nuclear weapons." Warnke's opponents quickly--and plausibly--characterized the close vote on the SALT job as a warning to Carter (and Moscow) that any arms agreement unacceptable to congressional hard-liners may face difficulty in the Senate, where a two-thirds vote is required for ratification.

Before the confirmation vote, Warnke discussed his views on arms control with correspondents from TIME'S Washington bureau. Excerpts:

Q. Do you believe the Russians are interested in effective arms control?

A. All of the signals, I would say, are positive--and this is where I disagree with some others in the field. In their own self-interest, they should be interested in effective arms control; if they are in fact spending something like 12% of their gross national product on defense [v. 5% for the U.S.], that is a hell of a burden. There has to be a question in their minds as to whether or not they can cut down on that expense.

Also, it seems to me that they must have at least some people in their power structure who are aware of the fact that the risk of nuclear war, rather than decreasing between two sane powers, is increasing just because the technology is destabilizing. [When one side develops a weapons system not covered by an arms agreement, the other side feels compelled to develop it too.]

Q. How can you be satisfied that the Russians are dealing with us in good faith?

A. A tough question. I think the basic answer is that you cannot trust the Soviet Union to do anything except pursue its own self-interest. To a degree, that is true of us too. But the fact that we have different views as to what the world ought to be does not mean that there still aren't circumstances under which it would be in our mutual interest to try to lessen the degree of military confrontation.

Q. What's in arms control for us?

A. Certainly, effective agreements would save us a hell of a lot of money. But more important, if you have effective arms control, you know you are going to have stability. If you.have unregulated competition on arms, how do you know you are building the right weapons? You would end up with a continued competition and I would say at least moments of instability during the competition. If these moments coincide with times of grave international crisis, then you have significantly increased the chance of nuclear war. Arms control is a cheaper and safer alternative.

Q. What premises do you start off with in negotiating further SALT agreements?

A. Any arms-control agreement is going to start off with obeisance to the principle of equality. I think the American people have to recognize that the process of arms-control agreement recognizes the Soviet Union as an equal military power.

Q. How serious is the worry that once negotiations resume, we will end up feeling pressed to take whatever agreement, good or bad?

A. Arms control is a "safe option" because you don't have to come out with an agreement at the end of the negotiation process. Those who fear arms control think there is going to be so much momentum established that there will in fact be a compulsion to sign something. But we have the option of just letting SALT II expire [after the October 1977 deadline]. Unless you go into a negotiation with the idea that you do not have to make a deal, you can guarantee you are going to lose.

Q. What if we get stuck with a bad deal anyway?

A. How the hell would they get us to stick with it? As soon as it became obvious that it was improvident, we would repudiate it. If you have been out-traded, you are not going to stay hooked.

Q. Will our new emphasis on human rights hurt arms-control prospects?

A. It does not trouble me. I agree with the President that you do not compromise on what you regard as a basic American position in order to improve the chances of arms control. Either the SALT negotiations are going to be considered to be in the interests of both sides, or they are not. If they are not, you are not going to get a decent deal.

Q. What about your "dove" reputation?

A. I would rather be called that than the opposite. If you look back at it, the term derived out of a position with respect to the Viet Nam War. I was a dove on Viet Nam, no question about it.

Q. Do you share the President's concern about selling a disarmament package to the nation?

A. Yes, I do. I think the American public is basically suspicious of the Russians. Almost all of the burden of proof is on the proponent of the arms-control agreement. That does not trouble me; it is the way it should be. That is why I am not at all upset about the debate [over my appointment]. If it gives any signal to the Soviet Union, it certainly is a signal that the U.S. Senate is going to view with considerable seriousness any proposal that is advanced to them. They are not going to be easily receptive to anything that is negotiated.

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