What the Russians Are Up To

It was like some slapstick Pat and Mike show transplanted to distant Africa. Everywhere that Nikolai Podgorny went, Fidel Castro was sure to have been. Well, almost. After inviting himself to Zambia, the Cuban leader left the band, the honor guard, the artillery poised for its 19-gun salute, waiting at the airport. Sorry, Castro decided after taking off from Tanzania, I'm going to Mozambique instead. "He asked to come," said a bewildered Zambian official. "We said yes, and that's the last we ever heard."

Podgorny himself arrived in Zambia later in the week to a warm if pro forma welcome. He did not even attempt to visit Angola--prudently, as it turned out, since Fidel had already taken the place by storm.

In Tanzania, it again rained on the Soviet President's parade. The crowds of schoolchildren and workers dutifully turned out by President Julius Nyerere for visiting celebrities had wildly cheered the fatigue-clad revolutionary from Havana a few days before. They could barely muster enough enthusiasm to wave their little flags for the aging (74) apparatchik from Moscow.

Asked if the two Communist safaris were coordinated, since the Cubans have been regarded as the Russians' surrogate in Africa, a State Department official in Washington remarked incredulously: "How could anyone possibly coordinate anything with Castro?" His journey did seem ad hoc (he called up Nyerere only a few days before and asked if he could come), but it had a purpose, and that purpose fitted in with Russia's own intentions. Africans viewed his country hopping along the borders of white-ruled southern Africa as a psychological gesture of defiance aimed at Rhodesia and South Africa. At the same time, Castro seemed to be signaling that if South Africa keeps out of Rhodesia, then Cuba will do likewise. Said Castro: "Independence is never delivered from abroad," adding that "not one single Cuban is involved" in Zaire.

Big-Power Vacuum. And Podgorny? As the first top Soviet leader to visit southern Africa, he plainly hoped to capitalize on the Russians' success in backing the victorious forces in Angola--and to take advantage of the vacuum of big-power influence on the continent. The message: Moscow, not Peking, is the true friend of the developing world. With Anglo-American efforts to help negotiate a settlement in Rhodesia at a standstill, the visit took on added meaning. Said a Western diplomat in Moscow: "The Soviets want to be around when things move in Rhodesia and South Africa, and they want to be on the side of the key 'frontline' states [Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania] when the showdown comes with South Africa."

In Pretoria and Salisbury, officials already charge that the Russians are seeking to create a pro-Soviet belt across the midsection of the continent. Angola and Mozambique, so the theory goes, are already in the Soviet camp; Zambia, in the center, would be vulnerable to Soviet pressure. But much as Moscow might like a Red belt across Africa, even Angola and Mozambique are not anxious to be totally under Soviet control. Soviet aid, moreover, still lags far behind the West's. Says a British African specialist: "We should not be sidetracked from the central fact that Russia and China are involved in a struggle for the soul of Africa, but that doesn't mean that the Africans themselves aren't grabbing all the aid they can without nailing their colors to anyone's masthead."

Some key areas of Soviet interest:

TANZANIA. Suspicious of both superpowers, Nyerere has forged strong links with China, which has given Tanzania $358 million in economic aid, compared with some $200 million from the U.S. Moscow, after having put up a mere $20 million, agreed late last week to loan another $19 million. (The Podgorny visit had been postponed for 2 1/2 years because the Soviets demanded a rally and friendship treaty. Nyerere refused--and vows that his country will not accept Russia as the dominant power in Africa.)

ZAMBIA. The fiercely independent President Kenneth Kaunda was outspoken against interference by Russia and Cuba in the Angolan civil war; last year he accused the two countries of fomenting leftist student demonstrations against him. Soviet aid is minuscule, and Western diplomats are confident that Kaunda would rebuff any attempt by Moscow to enlist Zambia in a beltlike squeeze. But given the Western setback in Angola, he might compromise. The Russians have installed Vassily Solodovnikov, the KGB'S ranking expert on southern Africa, as Ambassador to Zambia. Solodovnikov in turn is using the embassy in Lusaka to direct arms aid to Rhodesian Nationalist Joshua Nkomo, and recently forced a large Soviet embassy on reluctant Botswana.

ANGOLA. Heavily indebted to Moscow for its aid ($300 million) during the civil war, President Agostinho Neto has granted the Soviets the use of existing naval facilities on the Atlantic coast. Some 13,000 Cuban troops and technicians remain, a commitment that is likely to last for some time.

MOZAMBIQUE. Marxist President Samora Machel's first ideological allegiance was to China, but he has turned increasingly toward Moscow. The Soviet Union provides the main support for approximately 8,000 Rhodesian guerrillas based in Mozambique.

SOMALIA. The strategic linchpin of Soviet naval policy in the Indian Ocean, Somalia gave the Red navy facilities at Berbera on the Gulf of Aden in exchange for modernization of its army and air force. Trouble may be brewing over Moscow's wooing of the leftist military regime in Ethiopia, with whom Somalia has bitter territorial disputes.

Carter Administration officials say they are not worried about Soviet penetration. The feeling in Washington is that the Russians are simply too heavyhanded, too meddlesome and too racist to pull off a grand design in a place as complex as Africa. Asserts an old Africa hand in Washington: "It's very much like the Middle East. We're still the only ones talking to both sides."

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