Carter's Big Decision: Down Goes the B-1, Here Comes the Cruise

Carter's Big Decision: Down Goes the B1, Here Comes the Cruise

An Air Force colonel at the Pentagon wisecracked that the U.S. might eventually have to "charter an air force from Pan Am." Better yet, said another, in case of conflict "we could subcontract the whole war." Still others joked bitterly about how the service had suffered "its highest attrition rate ever on a single day."

At aerospace plants across the country, the mood was no less sulfurous. "A great surprise and deep shock," said Bastian ("Buz") Hello, B-1 division manager of Rockwell International, prime contractor for the program. The champagne bottles that had been chilled in anticipation of a celebration remained corked. The gates that were about to swing open to thousands of new employees stayed closed. Many of the 40,000 executives, technicians and assembly-line workers already assigned to the B-1 from Long Island and Cincinnati to Los Angeles and Seattle talked gloomily of hunting for new jobs. The probability that lots of them would eventually find work on other military projects did little to soften the blow. Said one official at Rockwell's sprawling Los Angeles plant: "This was the best-kept secret since the atom bomb. And that's the way it hits us."

Such was the military-industrial reaction last week to Jimmy Carter's stunning and almost wholly unexpected decision to kill the Air Force's request for 244 swing-wing B-1 bombers. The B-1s were to have replaced the aging U.S. fleet of 330 B-52s--a few of which are older than some of the men who fly aboard them. In contrast, there was jubilation among liberals like New York Representative Jonathan Bingham and Wisconsin Senator William Proxmire. who have long argued that the B-1 is an outlandishly expensive dinosaur. Iowa Democrat John Culver, a leading Senate opponent of the B1, elatedly called Carter's move a "victory for common sense--the most constructive and courageous decision on military spending in our time."

Too Many Bucks. Carter had promised during the campaign that he would kill the B1. Just a year ago, he told the Democratic Platform Committee: "The B-1 bomber is an example of a proposed system which should not be funded and would be wasteful of taxpayers' dollars." But after his election last November, he somehow managed to give nearly all the people connected with the decision the impression that he would change his mind. To their astonishment, he declared firmly at his press conference last week that, at more than $100 million per bomber, the B-1 was both unnecessary and too expensive. In effect, he decided that the bang required too many bucks.

As an alternative, Carter ordered the Air Force to load its newest weapon, the comparatively cheap (less than $1 million each) and deadly accurate cruise missile, aboard modified B-52s. He left open the possibility of putting cruise missiles aboard modified C-5A Galaxy transports and military versions of the Boeing 747. Pentagon planners estimate that Carter's plan could cost, overall, at least 20% less than building the B-1 and that it will give the U.S. just as good a capability of penetrating Soviet air defenses (see box).

Frosty Reaction. Never before has a President canceled so large a weapon system so close to production. But the crash of the B-1 has far wider ramifications than just the fate of 244 planes. For one thing, the Air Force had looked on the B-1 as a way to stave off until almost the 21st century the day when the manned bomber will be obsolete. For another. Carter's decision may make it harder to negotiate with the Soviets for a new treaty to limit strategic nuclear weapons. The reason: by dropping the B1, he is dramatically increasing U.S. reliance on the cruise missile, which the Russians view as the most worrisome threat in the American arsenal. The initial Soviet reaction to Carter's move was frosty. Commented Tass, the official Russian news agency: "The implementation of these militaristic plans has seriously complicated efforts for the limitation of the strategic arms race." Although the U.S. has proposed to the Soviets that air-launched cruise missiles be limited to a range of 1,500 miles, Carter may now come under pressure from the Air Force and hawks in Congress to extend that range.

For the short run, his decision means that the Air Force will end up with only four test models of the B-1--three have been built and a fourth will be completed in 1979--at a total cost of $4 billion. Three additional production models now under construction will probably be scrapped. The test models will be flown for several years, primarily to refine ultrasophisticated gear that jams enemy radar. This will make it easier to design manned bombers of the future--if any are built--that can penetrate enemy air defenses. Also, continuing the research will leave open Carter's option to change his mind in the event that technological breakthroughs or international political developments make the B-1 more attractive.

Carter ordered the Pentagon to speed up by three years research and development of the Air Force version of the cruise missile so that it can be fully deployed by about 1983. How many B-52s will be modified--at an estimated $700,000 each, plus the cost of the missiles--is unknown. The prime candidates are the 240 "G" and "H" models that have been built since 1959. The remaining 90 B-52s are up to 21 years old. The cost of refitting the B-52s will soak up much of the money saved by abandoning the B1. The rest of the money may well be diverted to other military projects or used to shrink budget deficits.

Nobody was more surprised by Carter's decision than members of Congress. Like nearly everyone else in Washington, most had expected him to take the easy way out and compromise with the B-1 proponents by approving production of at least a limited number of the planes. Especially pleased were Carter's liberal critics within his own party. Senator Gary Hart of Colorado called the decision "encouraging and wise." Senator George McGovern of South Dakota, who said in May that he could see little difference between Carter and a Republican President, praised him for "prudence, leadership and courage."

Conservative Republicans were outraged. Snapped G.O.P. National Chairman William Brock: "A tragic error." Declared California Congressman Robert Dornan: "They're breaking out the vodka and caviar in Moscow." Republican House Leader John Rhodes of Arizona accused Carter of giving the House "a rather gratuitous slap in the face" by not announcing his decision prior to its vote on the B-1 funds. Only 48 hours before Carter dropped his bombshell, the House had beaten back, by a vote of 243 to 178, an amendment to delete from the defense budget $1.5 billion for production of five B-1s.

In fact, TIME learned, House Speaker Tip O'Neill considered going to Carter before the vote. O'Neill asked Texas Democrat George Mahon, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee: "Do you think I ought to call the President on this?" No, said Mahon. "We can handle it down the street." After Carter's announcement, O'Neill checked with his colleagues ("moseyed around the House floor") and concluded that Democratic leaders would have no difficulty persuading both the House and Senate to drop the funds or, as the White House would prefer, earmark them for cruise missiles and B-52 modifications.

Abroad, some U.S. allies were dismayed by Carter's announcement. The Japanese were worried that the decision, coupled with the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, might lead to Soviet mischief. Said Masatake Okumiya, a former air chief of Japan's Self Defense Forces: "The issue has assumed a great psychological meaning, with the result that the veto might be taken by the Russians as a sign of weakness." A senior West German general agreed. "What the West needs is the most sophisticated set of arms possible," said he. "We've already lost numerical superiority tin several categories of weapons] to the Soviets, and we can't afford to slacken on quality."

But other European allies were cheered. Most regarded the B-1 as less well suited to their defense needs than the cheaper, more flexible cruise missile, which can be launched from land-,sea-or air-based vehicles. NATO Commander Alexander Haig, for example, describes the cruise missile as an "attractive alternative" to the B-1 for the alliance's arsenal. Declared General Georges Buis, a noted French military strategist: "The B-1 is a formidable weapon, but not terribly useful. For the price of one bomber, you can have 200 cruise missiles."

The President's announcement ended a fight that has raged for a decade. Carter called it "one of the most difficult decisions that I've made since I've been in office." Even he could not pinpoint for aides the precise moment when he finally made up his mind. Says Press Secretary Jody Powell: "It began with an inclination, and it just got firmer and firmer as time went along."

According to aides, Carter decided after his election to set aside his campaign promise to kill the B-1 and consider the subject with a fresh eye and open mind. To give himself more time, he decided in January to go along with the date originally set by the Ford Administration for the final decision--June 30. As an interim step, he asked Congress to approve funds for five of the planes, three fewer than had been requested by Gerald Ford. Then, for the next several months, Carter immersed himself in technical details about the Bl. He consulted frequently with National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Budget Director Bert Lance. But his closest collaborator was Defense Secretary Harold Brown, who talked with Carter dozens of times by phone and in person.

Final Countdown. Carter also met occasionally with outside advisers and members of Congress, listening to their arguments and sometimes offering tentative analyses of his own. He appears to have given no hints about which way he was leaning, though some visitors left with the impression that he was about to approve construction of a limited number of B-1s. Apparently those who were for the B-1 heard what they wanted to hear, while those who opposed it distrusted Carter and assumed the worst.

Carter began the final countdown on June 1, when he received an inch-thick pile of Defense Department memos and reports, bound together in a red folder and indexed with twelve gray tabs. The material made no recommendations but laid out--with the help of graphs, charts and maps--"three options:

1) Build between 150 and 244 B-1s.

2) Refit the newest models of the B-52--about 15 years old--to carry cruise missiles.

3) Modify wide-bodied C-5A Galaxies or Boeing 747s to carry cruises.

The National Security Council sent him a set of options with a slightly different slant. Carter had also accumulated a stack of newspaper and magazine clippings and memos on the B-1 from members of Congress, the Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Everything he read raised further questions, which he explored with Brown at four long meetings and several short sessions in the White House.

The President spent the final weekend at Camp David, reviewing his B-1 papers, including a check list of 49 pro and con arguments that he had written down on a yellow legal pad. He found especially meaningful a Brookings Institution study that concluded in February 1976 that the B-1 should be scrapped and B-52s should be armed with cruise missiles. When he returned to the White House on Monday morning, his "inclination" had become firm enough for Powell to predict privately that Carter would cancel the B1. Brzezinski and Lance were behind him. By late Tuesday, Carter told aides that he had made up his mind but would not reveal his decision until he had reviewed the case one more time the next morning with his Defense Secretary.

When Harold Brown took office in January, he was leaning toward the B1. Said he: "The big advantage [of a manned bomber] is that it complicates the other side's problems. The question is how much can you afford to pay for that as compared to the other ways you could spend the funds." Brown had served as Air Force Secretary in the Johnson Administration and believed thoroughly in the manned bomber as an essential element of the American strategic triad (the other two: land-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles and sea-launched missiles). Even earlier, as the 33-year-old chief of research for the Pentagon during the Kennedy Administration, Brown had helped to kill the B-1's precursor, the high-flying B-70, as too vulnerable to Soviet air defenses. It was Brown who then ordered up the preliminary studies for the plane that evolved into the B1. This gave him a label that he disowns: "Father of the B-1." Says Brown: "Yes, I started the so-called Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft Program. But it's a long way from studies to hardware, and I won't take credit or blame for the full gestation and early childhood of that particular offspring."

Sense of Relief. After taking office in January, Brown grew increasingly impressed with the tremendous advances in cruise-missile technology. While he continued to believe that the U.S. should have an effective manned-bomber force, he finally concluded that the B-1 was not indispensable and that the modified B-52 option would do the job as effectively. According to an associate, Brown also quickly picked up signals from Carter about which way the President was leaning. In any event, Powell said, "when the President and Brown sat down, it was clear that each knew the other's point of view and they were the same. The meeting was basically to ratify the decision."

One of the most telling arguments against the B-1 was the enormous projected cost--$24 billion for 244 planes but a total of nearly $100 billion when the price of its nuclear armaments, operating costs over 20 years and inflation were included. A day after Carter's announcement, Brown told a news conference that the B-1 would have been a more attractive option if it had been 30% cheaper.

Carter was also impressed by Pentagon reports that despite the B-1's speed of up to 1,320 m.p.h. and its ability to slip under enemy radar defenses, weapons advances would probably make it vulnerable to Soviet defenses by the 1980s.

Although Carter once predicted that the decision would be a lonely one, the burden did not appear to have weighed heavily on him. Was he relieved to have it done with? Said Powell: "As with any difficult decision, there has to be some sense of relief." Still, Carter's decision will hold only until the refurbished B-52s begin to require replacement. Then the debate over a new generation of bombers, if there is to be one, will resume. Certainly, few in the Air Force would agree that the manned bomber has no future. But this is a problem that Carter, by virtue of his B-1 decision, will be leaving for his successor to resolve.

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