How to Lean on Israel

It was an extraordinary scene. Standing before the TV cameras next to the beaming Foreign Minister of an allied nation, Florida Senator Richard Stone last week denounced U.S. State Department policy. In the case of almost any other country, it would have been considered an affront to the U.S.--but not if the minister is Moshe Dayan and the country is Israel. The incident illustrates the special problems the U.S. faces in trying to push Israel toward a more pliable attitude that is necessary to bring about a Middle East settlement. Just how much leverage does Washington have?

Israel's dependence on the U.S. has grown to staggering--and probably unhealthy--proportions. American aid now amounts to nearly $2 billion annually--or $600 for every man, woman and child in the country. The aid total constitutes 16% of Israel's national budget, and Premier Menachem Begin's hawkish government is requesting $2.3 billion for fiscal 1979. The money is divided almost equally between economic and military aid, and half of the economic portion ($525 million) is a direct grant. The rest is in long-term loans at nominal (2% to 3%) interest rates.

About half of U.S. military assistance to Israel is also a giveaway--the sole exception to a 1973 law forbidding outright military gifts to other countries. On loans for hardware, Israel often receives a ten-year grace period before repayments begin rather than the customary eight. Israel usually gets the very latest U.S. weapons--sometimes even before American servicemen have been issued all of theirs.

Both money and weapons are obvious levers for nudging Israel closer to the U.S. diplomatic position. But the Administration is unlikely to yank on either one too hard. For one thing, the U.S. position in the world would be severely damaged if Israel were to suffer a military disaster. For another, any Middle East peace settlement demands the voluntary cooperation of its signatories; a too unwilling Israel would probably not honor the agreement for long.

Still, pressure is possible in the military area. The U.S. has already delayed, but not denied, shipments of F-16 fighters and other advanced weaponry, has refused to sell concussion bombs to Israel, and promised to supply Hawk missiles to neighboring Jordan.

In the economic field, Washington has protested Israeli offshore oil exploration in the Gulf of Suez. Publicity forced cancellation of a cozy arrangement under which the expenses of the 202-man Israeli arms-purchasing mission in New York was picked up by the U.S. Washington could drag its feet in helping develop Israel's own armaments industry, and refuse to deliver a promised nuclear power plant. The Administration could abolish the tax deduction that encourages Americans to send tens of millions of dollars to Israel via the United Jewish Appeal and other channels. The U.S. could end a policy of joint ventures between the two countries, like an expensive desalinization plant recently completed in Tel Aviv.

In the diplomatic area, the U.S. could reduce its support for Israel at international forums, or even abstain on votes against Israel at the U.N. President Carter could fight a public opinion battle and further publicize U.S. disagreements with Israel on specific issues. Some tough questions might be asked, for example, about whether the Israeli settlements in occupied territory, which Washington considers illegal, are in effect financed by U.S. money. The Administration could also publicly inquire about the treatment of Palestinian political prisoners (current number: 3,200), some of whom have allegedly been tortured by Israeli authorities.

Begin's government is confident, however, that Carter will not turn the screws any tighter. Reason: the influence of the Jewish lobby and Israel's powerful friends in Congress. Says one Israeli official: "If he tries to pressure us, there will be a battle royal, and it will be fought on American soil. I'm not sure we won't win." If the Israelis felt deserted by their only ally, they might conceivably launch a last-ditch Middle East war in order to cripple their Arab enemies--even though their antagonists cannot be forever subdued militarily, and there is always the danger of bringing the Soviets back massively into the Middle East. U.S. pressure for compromise must be linked to Israel's own self-interest--for the latter cannot live indefinitely in a state of siege.

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