War Without Boundaries
The war has been raging for more than a decade on a global battlefield. And it threatens to grow more intense. The tactics of combat include assassinations, kidnapings, skyjackings and bombings, as small cells of urban terrorists attack the institutions of the world's industrial democracies. The principal victims are not soldiers but civilians: public officials and businessmen, as well as schoolrooms of children, planeloads of tourists and trains packed with commuters.
Last week, however, terrorism suffered a dramatic setback. The West German government refused to bow to the demands of a pistol-armed band of two men and two women who had skyjacked a Lufthansa jet and embarked on a 110-hour odyssey of terror from Majorca to Mogadishu, Somalia. There, in a daring middle-of-the-night raid, West German commandos rescued 82 passengers and four crew members, killed three of the skyjackers and wounded the fourth (see following story).
The dramatic rescue came less than a month after the Tokyo government had surrendered to the ransom demands of five Japanese Red Army terrorists who had skyjacked a JAL jet with 156 passengers aboard. The determination and courage of West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who ordered the commando attack, brought jubilant congratulatory messages from many of the world's leaders. President Jimmy Carter praised the West Germans for the "courage of their decision." Israeli Premier Menachem Begin, whose country mounted the successful rescue of hostages from Uganda's Entebbe Airport on July 3, 1976, cabled, "It was indeed a salvation in which all free men rejoice." British Prime Minister James Callaghan, arriving in Bonn last week on a previously scheduled visit, warmly pumped Schmidt's hand and declared, "It's a great day for you. It's a great day for Germans. That was a superb job."
But only a battle was won in a war that knows no boundaries. The international links of modern terrorism were revealed for the world to see when the Lufthansa skyjackers--apparently Palestinians, although their real names are still not known--proclaimed solidarity with West German terrorists who had kidnaped Industrialist Hanns-Martin Schleyer on Sept. 5. Within two days after the bold rescue mission, Schleyer's body was found in the trunk of an abandoned car in the French town of Mulhouse. In a warning to governments everywhere, his killers sent a message to the far-left Paris daily Liberation: "The battle has just begun."
Schmidt was more than ready to fight. He immediately ordered postwar Germany's biggest man hunt in an attempt to track down the murderers. Three million WANTED posters flooded the country, carrying the photos of the ten women and six men suspected of being connected with the Schleyer killing. These faces were splashed across newspaper front pages and broadcast by every TV station. The prime suspect was Friederike Krabbe, 27, who is believed to have ordered the industrialist's murder. Police vans, meanwhile, began cruising through cities, their loudspeakers blaring pleas for every citizen to aid in the search. Barricades sprouted across roads and police checked identity papers; traffic was snarled.
Hours after ordering the man hunt, Schmidt appeared before a special session of the Bundestag. He warned that "terrorism is by no means dead, neither in Germany nor anywhere else in the world." Earlier in the week, the Paris daily Figaro had headlined: THE LIFE OF EVERY NATION IS AT STAKE. If that was the case, Schmidt had shown that his government was prepared to fight for Germany's life.
Schleyer was the tenth target of West German terrorists to die in the past year. Another victim was Captain Jurgen Schumann, 37, pilot of the skyjacked Lufthansa jet. In a fit of irrational fury, the terrorist leader, who called himself "Walter Mahmud," killed Schumann with a single pistol shot when the plane was on the ground in Aden, Southern Yemen. Schumann's body was pushed down the plane's emergency exit chute at Mogadishu. Had it not been for the skill of the rescuing commandos, many, if not all, of the terrified hostages might have suffered similar fates. According to the hostages' accounts, the skyjackers were sadists who flaunted their cruelty. Said a middle-aged male hostage: "They were animals, just animals." Mrs. Christine Santiago, the only adult American on board, later recalled, "Mahmud went into rages. It was terrible. He checked watches and jewelry to find any Jewish star. He said Jews were his enemies. There were three girls who were Jewish, and he said they would be executed in the morning. Then he changed his mind and said he wouldn't execute 'these three pigs.' " One of the women terrorists would walk up and down the aisles of the plane, smiling as she brushed hand grenades against passengers' heads.
Following Schleyer's kidnaping, Schmidt had set up two crisis staffs that met frequently in marathon sessions, at the heavily guarded Chancellery in Bonn. Elected officials and political leaders spent countless hours there in conferences, and the normal functions of the government slowed discernibly. The Bundestag dealt with only the most pressing business; the Chancellor canceled a state visit to Poland and a number of speaking engagements across the country.
Schmidt and his top aides were determined not to give in to the skyjackers, just as they had refused to yield to the ransom demands of Schleyer's kidnapers. The only decision left was when and to where the commandos would be dispatched. Largely because of a press blackout that had been in effect since Schleyer was seized, the government's deliberations were shrouded in hermetic secrecy. West German morale plummeted--particularly after news arrived of Pilot Schumann's death. But then came Mogadishu. Radio stations interrupted regular programming and punctuated coverage of the rescue and the return of the hostages with the stirring strains of Beethoven's Ode to Joy. Newspapers hit the streets with extras and thousands of copies were given away. Declared one television commentator: "It feels good to be a German today." When the freed hostages and victorious commandos returned to Germany, they received a heroes' welcome--complete with brass bands.
Hardly had the euphoria taken hold, however, when it was muted by the shocking news that four imprisoned West German terrorists, whose freedom had been demanded by the skyjackers, had attempted suicide, three successfully. Andreas Baader, 34, leader of the notorious Baader-Meinhof gang, who had been in prison since 1972, shot himself through the back of his head with a 7.65-mm. pistol; Jan-Carl Raspe, 33, shot himself with a 9-mm. pistol, just above his right ear; Gudrun Ensslin, 37, Baader's mistress before they were imprisoned, hanged herself with electrical wire. The fourth terrorist, Irmgard Moller, 30, stabbed herself in the throat and chest with a bread knife; she was rushed to a hospital and at week's end was no longer in critical condition.
Schmidt paled when told about the suicides, snapping, "But that's impossible." Indeed it should have been. All four were locked in a special, maximum-security wing at Stammheim prison in Stuttgart. Since the Schleyer kidnaping, they had been in solitary confinement, separated from each other and denied visitors (including their lawyers) and access to newspapers, radio and television. Almost daily, guards searched their cells. The suicides thus raised a number of troubling (and embarrassing) questions. How did the prisoners manage to get and hide their weapons? How were they able to learn so quickly of the failure of the skyjacking that might have won their release? How could they coordinate their near simultaneous suicides? The first answers were lame. Dr. Traugott Bender, Minister of Justice of Baden-Wurttemberg, the state in which the prison is located, volunteered that Moller "had that knife at her disposal so that at night, if she got hungry, she could [slice] something to eat." After this incredible explanation. Bender was forced to resign. The director of the prison, Hans Nusser, was summarily fired.
A investigation later disclosed that the maximum-security prison actually had been turned into something of a terrorist base. Two secret holes were found in the cells of Baader and Raspe. One was large enough to hold a pistol that could have been smuggled to the prisoners before they were placed in solitary confinement. The second hole contained elements of an ingeniously simple but highly effective communications system: batteries, wires and sockets. When connected to the cell's thermostat, they formed a primitive telegraph over which the terrorists could signal each other in code. In Raspe's cell, investigators also found a tiny radio; with it, Raspe probably followed the course of the skyjacking and learned of the rescue at Mogadishu.
Predictably, some of the terrorists' lawyers--most of whom are radicals --hinted that the prisoners might not have taken their own lives. Attorney Hans Heinz Heldmann blamed the deaths on the government. To counter such charges, Baden-Wurttemberg officials asked doctors from Switzerland, Austria and Belgium to participate in the autopsies. Concluded Zurich University Professor Hans-Peter Hartmann after his examination: "Everything we have found indicates suicide."
The terrorists presumably hoped that in death they would become instant martyrs for their radical cause. Outside Germany, news of their suicides sparked scattered but ugly protests. In the Italian cities of Turin, Bologna and Leghorn, bombs were tossed into showrooms displaying German cars. Two unoccupied German tourist buses were set aflame in Paris. In Rome, police used tear gas to disburse some 800 youths, armed with Molotov cocktails, who were marching toward the German embassy and the Lufthansa ticket office. Leftists also demonstrated in Athens and Vienna; in London, protesters chanted "Murder! Murder!" outside the German embassy.
After the failure of the skyjacking and the suicides of the terrorists, there was little hope that Schleyer would turn up alive. Nevertheless, West German President Walter Scheel took to television to plead with the abductors: "The whole world --East and West--is against you. I appeal to you to set your hostage free." To no avail. Twenty-four hours later, the Liberation, which had been used by Schleyer's kidnapers to convey previous messages, received a telephone call from a terrorist. He identified himself as a member of the Commando Siegfried Hausner of the Red Army Faction--the group taking credit for the abduction. "After 43 days," he said, "we have put an end to the miserable and corrupt existence of Hanns-Martin Schleyer. His death does not measure up to our grief and anger after the slaughter at Mogadishu and Stammheim." The caller then said Schmidt could "take delivery [of Schleyer] in Charles Peguy Street in Mulhouse." which is about ten miles from the German border. There, in the trunk of a green Audi sedan, police found Schleyer's corpse. Medical examination later disclosed that he had been killed shortly after the word was flashed of the Stammheim prison suicides; he had not been tortured before being shot three times.
The murder of Schleyer will unquestionably increase the tension inside West Germany. In Hamburg, West Berlin, Munich and Frankfurt, security was increased around officials. In Bonn, concertinas of barbed wire encircle government buildings, sandbagged gun emplacements protect door ways and guards with submachine guns patrol the grounds. The limousines of government officials speed along city streets tailed by escort autos with automatic weapons poking out from windows. Top-level businessmen constantly vary their daily schedules (making it difficult for terrorists to set traps for them) and are accompanied everywhere by bodyguards. (That did not help Schleyer. His three bodyguards were killed when he was captured.) Even those who are not likely to be targets of terror are affected. Observed a Dortmund barber: "They're going to hit again--somewhere. It's so terrible not to know where and when."
Security experts agree and have warned Schmidt to expect what they call a "spontaneous reaction for the freedom of other jailed terrorists." Even though the Baader-Meinhof gang has been largely destroyed, an estimated 120 hard-core terrorists remain at large in Germany; many of them claim affiliation with the Red Army Faction, the country's most dangerous guerrilla group. An additional 1,200 to 5,000 committed radicals provide them with food, money and safe houses, and occasionally join in acts of violence. The terrorists and their sympathizers "are standing, rifle by foot, waiting to go into action," says Dr. Hans-Joseph Horchem, chief of the Hamburg division of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. In the near future, he predicts a rash of explosions and arson and at least one attempt to assassinate a leading politician or judicial official.
Although the roots of terrorism reach back to ancient times, violence for political ends was not systematically used until the middle of the last century. Then it became a favorite weapon of radical nationalists; the Irish used terror against the English, and the Armenians and Macedonians against the Turks. Perhaps the most notorious and brazen of the 19th century's terrorists were Russia's Narodnaya Volya, ruthless bands of nihilists who lobbed bombs at the Czar's officials.
Anarchists killed U.S. President William McKinley, not to mention a host of European royalty. Even seemingly contemporary techniques of terror have been tested by time. Rebellious Bedouins seized French planes in the 1920s. The first in-flight skyjacking took place in 1931, when a plane was commandeered by antiregime forces during a coup in Peru.
Perhaps the most devastating of terrorist tactics, skyjacking has been in and out of favor with urban guerrillas. It crested in 1972, when there were 62 attempts. The total dropped as nations began instituting tough airport inspection procedures, but seems to be on the rise again.*
With their skyjackings, bombings and assassinations, terrorists are dangerous, desperate people. Repellent as their use of often indiscriminate behavior is, they are, undeniably, heroes to some. That may be understandable--though scarcely excusable--in the case of revolutionaries who claim to represent the aspirations of persecuted or neglected minorities. But many West Germans are furious that leftist papers in Europe have glamorized Baader and other gangsters of the Red Army Faction as selfless radicals acting on behalf of an ideological cause.
In fact many of the alienated youths who join radical underground groups in Western democracies lack any coherent ideological or political goals. Violence is the attraction--the end, not the means. Notes Brian Jenkins, an associate director at Rand Corp.: "The act of terror itself is an ideology." Harvey Schlossberg, a psychiatrist who trains the New York City Police Department's anti-terrorist unit, contends that many urban terrorists are compensating for inadequate personalities. "If they cry and stamp their feet, no one pays attention. But by taking hostages, in a matter of minutes the whole world is watching. This helps overcome their ego deficit." What motivates many terrorists, observes University of Munich Political Scientist Kurt Sontheimer, is "a deep hatred of present society. They talk vaguely of socialism, but they offer no political theory. Nobody really knows what kind of society they envision."
The young urban terrorist, in Europe at least, claims to speak for the working class. In fact his background is most often middle or upper middle class, and the common man is as frightened of his methods as is the millionaire. Franco Ferracuti, a forensic psychiatrist at Rome University, interviewed several members of Italy's notorious Red Brigade. He found that most of them came from well-to-do, churchgoing families and had attended universities, majoring in the social sciences. All had witnessed, and many had participated in, the Europe-wide May revolution of students in 1968; the Red Brigade terrorists seemed unable to accept its failure. A number of the 16 suspects wanted by Bonn for Schleyer's murder fit Ferracuti's profile. Christian Klar, for example, studied history and political science at the University of Heidelberg and once belonged to the Young Democrats, the youth branch of West Germany's relatively conservative Free Democrats. His father was archetypically middle class--a high-ranking school administrator and riding club president. It was at Heidelberg that young Klar's "overdrawn sense of social justice and idealism" (as his father describes it) apparently drew him into the maelstrom of ultra-radical circles.
Many experts draw a careful line between the ordinary criminal and the terrorist. Explains Rand's Jenkins: "Terrorism is violence aimed at [those] people watching. Fear is the intended effect, not the byproduct. That distinguishes terrorist tactics from muggings and other forms of violent crime."
By simply thrusting their way into public consciousness, some terrorists have achieved their primary goal--attention. No faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization has ever successfully attacked a military target in Israel; furthermore, the P.L.O. was utterly humiliated by Jordan's King Hussein when he threw them out of his country in the "Black September" of 1970. But subsequent terrorist acts contributed to the P.L.O.'s high profile and credibility, at least within the Arab world, as an anti-Zionist fighting unit. Other nationalist terrorist organizations have gained recognition in much the same way.
Says Schlossberg: "You would have had to have a master's degree to know the Croatians. Who ever heard of South Molucca? Almost all anybody could have told you was that it was south of North Molucca." Today's terrorists can score such public relations victories primarily because of modern military technology. They can buy or steal some of the most modern arms in national arsenals: grenade launchers, heat-seeking rockets, sophisticated delay caps and fuses that fire photoelectrically.
Such weaponry can cut at the exposed jugulars of modern industrial societies. Explains Walter Laqueur, director of London's Institute of Contemporary History: "In the Middle Ages, if you wanted to throw a town into darkness, you would have had to smash every single street light. Today, a hand grenade tossed into a power station would be sufficient." Equally inviting and vulnerable are electronic communications networks, computer nerve centers and transportation hubs. Indeed, it is an ironic truth that at the very time terrorists are attacking Western industrial states as fascistic or oppressive, their acts are exposing how fragile today's societies can be. The Schleyer kidnapers--presumably a mere handful of hoodlums --were able to wreak havoc on West Germany.
The urban terrorist's publicity goals are simplified because modern communications ensure him a worldwide audience. Writes Laqueur in a new book called Terrorism (Little, Brown): "The success of a terrorist operation depends almost entirely on the amount of publicity it receives. This was one of the main reasons for the shift from rural guerrilla to urban terror in the 1960s; in the cities the terrorist could always count on the presence of journalists and TV cameras." Coverage of terrorist incidents can intensify the climate of fear and help discredit legitimate political authority.
Democracies are especially vulnerable to terrorism. Totalitarian regimes, such as the Soviet Union and China, seem nearly immune. Explains Rome University's Ferracuti: "The terrorists take advantage of all the legal freedoms, and these freedoms cannot be curtailed selectively." Democratic societies impose virtually no restrictions on speech or movement and very few limits on the right to assemble and demonstrate. Palestinian guerrillas, for example, were able to operate with impunity inside Lebanon, which until the civil war was the Arab world's only viable democracy.
Planning terrorism is relatively easy in open societies. Frank Bolz, commander of New York City's anti-terrorist unit, observes that terrorists can buy "from anywhere" information about a building and its construction. In libraries, they can learn very much about a prominent individual--his address, his family. From his company, they may be able to determine his working habits. Last winter West German Terrorist Willy Peter Stoll went to the Kiel Economic Institute and researched the backgrounds of some of his country's leading industrialists. One was Hanns-Martin Schleyer.
Once caught, terrorists in democracies can often take advantage of judicial systems designed to protect the rights of defendants by allowing reasonable bail and providing relatively easy appeal.
There is no simple or definitive answer as to why West Germany has become such a fertile breeding ground for urban terrorists. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, speaking of terrorism generally to a group of European industrialists and TIME editors, correspondents and executives last week, suggested as a cause the loss of a sense of relevance by today's youth, combined with a loss of authority by democratic governments since the early postwar years. Many West German observers believe that the 1968 generation of student protesters developed an idealistic hatred of their country's sleek materialism during the "economic miracle." For many, this was a first step toward radicalism. Beyond that, Frankfurt University Political Scientist Irving Fetscher argues, young middle class German rebels were "spoiled by the rapidity of change in a technological world and by a permissive education that created revolutionary impatience." Perhaps so--but the theorists leave unanswered the question of why only a tiny minority of students make the crucial transition of character from intellectual dissenter to murderer. Some senior U.S. intelligence officials maintain that international terrorist forces, spurred by the Kremlin, have been concentrating on West Germany in an attempt to disrupt its government and undermine its citizens' confidence in democracy.
The constraints and balances of West German democracy make it unusually easy for terrorists to operate freely. With memories of the Nazi past still fresh, Bonn is reluctant to increase its police powers, fearing an outraged reaction at home and abroad. Other Europeans understandably remain very apprehensive about the re-emergence of the "bad German." The Federal Republic, moreover, has only limited authority over most police matters. Reason: the country's postwar constitution deliberately created West Germany as a relatively loose federation of states, to prevent a recurrence of Hitler's oppressive centralization. West Germany's decentralization also hinders coordinating intelligence reports on suspected terrorists.
Exploiting West Germany's permissive judicial system, accused terrorists and their lawyers have disrupted court proceedings and have even planned new acts of terror from inside their prison cells. Some 70 radical lawyers are suspected of aiding terrorists. Most celebrated may be Klaus Croissant, 47, Baader's attorney, who is believed to have carried messages from gang members inside prison to those outside. Arrested last July, Croissant jumped bail and fled to France, where, after nearly three months underground, he was caught by police in late September. He now faces possible extradition to West Germany.
What can democracies do to defend themselves in the war against terrorism? Some experts suggest increased surveillance operations (wiretaps, informers) to warn of approaching attacks. Reasons James Angleton, former CIA chief of counterintelligence: "If anything justifies a clandestine capability and counterintelligence, it is anti-terrorism." To be most effective, this would require improved international pooling of data on the movements of terrorists. Democracies could insist on tighter passenger screenings at all airports visited by their airlines; especially lax are the Spanish, Greeks and Indians, who do not want to hassle the tourists who bring in massive quantities of foreign currencies. In the last resort, democracies could maintain what experts call the "force option"--an elite military unit, like the West German commandos, ready to dash to all corners of the globe to rescue hostages.
The Israelis, who have long and bitter experience in dealing with terrorists, insist that surrendering to their demands is the worst of all responses. Most counter-terror experts agree. Says Heyward Isham, the State Department's director for combatting terrorism: "It may seem coldblooded, but the minute they think they can blackmail you, it leads to an endless chain of demands." Walter Laqueur concurs. His golden rule for handling terrorists: "The more dangerous your opponent, the greater the danger of giving in." When lives of hostages are at stake, democratic governments come under intense pressure to save them even if it means paying ransoms. One West German poll, conducted before the Mogadishu rescue but after Schleyer's kidnaping, disclosed that only 42% of the public backed Schmidt's policy of refusing to meet terrorists' demands, while another 42% favored meeting the terrorists' terms (the rest were undecided).
One of the goals of urban terrorist violence is to force democratic societies to crack down harshly on dissent, thereby alienating the populace and "proving" that the bourgeois definition of freedom is a sham. Thus libertarian states face a delicate balancing act in trying at the same time to limit opportunities for terrorists and to preserve essential freedoms. Two of the European countries most deeply affected by terrorism are opting for more stringent controls, although the proposed legal changes are far from authoritarian. Italy is considering preventive detention, which would allow police to hold terrorist suspects for 48 hours without charges. Schmidt's Cabinet has submitted a bill that would stiffen prison terms and toughen trial procedures; lawyers, for instance, would be barred from the courtroom if they were suspected of collaborating with terrorists.
There is predictable support for harsh sentences as a deterrent. London's Daily Express last week urged: "Hang them all and hang them high." Laqueur notes that while "the fate of the terrorists of the 1880s and 1890s, when apprehended, was not an enviable one, no West European, North American, Japanese or Middle Eastern terrorist of the 1960s or 1970s has been executed."
One major obstacle to an effective anti-terrorist campaign is the lack of a truly global consensus on the issue. Since 1963, six major international conventions dealing with aspects of terrorism have been adopted by consortiums of nations. But as long as there are states that will not sign such agreements, and no punitive measures can be taken against them, enforcement is impossible. A number of countries, notably Libya, South Yemen, Iraq, North Korea and Cuba, provide terrorists with money, arms or a haven; they seem to enjoy watching the industrial democracies squirm. Tough anti-terrorist resolutions have been presented at the United Nations; they usually suffer endless delays and are then emasculated. Following Lufthansa Pilot Schumann's death, Derry Pearce, president of the International Federation of Airline Pilots Association, threatened a worldwide two-day pilots' strike unless the U.N. finally acted against skyjacking. After a promise from Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim that an "urgent item" on the issue will be brought before the General Assembly this week, Pearce announced that the strike had been postponed.
A new, larger consensus on terrorism may be emerging. The Soviet Union, which rarely says anything good about West Germany, gave favorable coverage to the commando rescue mission. East German Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer offered his country's services in dealing with Somalia. And, of course, Somalia --long among the world's most notorious havens for skyjackers--cooperated in the rescue.
It can be argued that terrorism's present significance is less in what has happened than in what people fear might happen. In raw numbers, terrorists are few, as are their victims. From 1967 to 1975, terrorists the world over took 800 lives and wounded 1,700--a disturbing total but one that, notes a CIA study, is dwarfed by the 19,000 homicides committed in the U.S. in 1976 alone. The study also points out that the price tag of all terrorism to date (including ransoms paid and property damaged) falls well short of the $500 million in damage that vandals inflict on U.S. school buildings in an average year. Despite the verbal threats they hurl at established order, contemporary terrorists have yet to trigger a revolution or topple a government.
So long as terrorism remains what N.Y.U. Professor of Government Mark Roelofs calls "a popular form of ultimate protest," free societies that choose to remain free will be subject to the risks and fears of violence. Indeed, the potential for evil will soar if terrorists get their hands on new biological, chemical and radiological--to say nothing of nuclear--arms with which to frighten the innocent. Warns Laqueur: "In ten or fifteen years, terrorists will have the weapons of superviolence; then perhaps even a single person will be able to blackmail an entire town, district or country." To combat tomorrow's terrorist, new and creative measures, as well as an unprecedented degree of international cooperation, will be required. The one certainty is that civilization's war on terrorism will go on.
* Many skyjackings are not connected with political terror. Last week in Grand Island, Neb., Thomas Michael Hannan, 28, forced his way aboard a Frontier Airlines 737 and had it flown to Atlanta. He eventually released his 15 hostages and shot himself when his demands for $3 million and the release from jail of a male friend were not met.
This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.