A Display of Anniversary Amity

At the Soviet birthday party, Brezhnev proposes a major test-ban treaty

It was the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, and representatives from the Communist and Socialist parties of no fewer than 104 countries were on hand in Moscow to help the Soviets celebrate their three score years in power. Present for the party, probably the biggest in Moscow's history, were such Communist all-stars as Hungary's Janos Kadar, Poland's Edward Gierek and East Germany's Erich Honecker. In the Kremlin's starkly modern Palace of Congresses, President Leonid Brezhnev rose to keynote the festivities with a 90-minute report on the state of the Soviet Union and the world. As always, he had quite a lot to say--about the latest Soviet grain harvest (somewhat disappointing), Moscow's current approach toward Peking (mildly conciliatory) and Eurocommunism.

That last subject brought on an unseemly little squabble between the Kremlin and Santiago Carrillo, 62, leader of the Spanish Communist Party. Carrillo complained that he had been barred, at the last minute, from addressing the gathering. Like Italian Party Leader Enrico Berlinguer, Carrillo had planned to defend his party's independence from Moscow. But no sooner had he submitted the speech to the translators, said Carrillo, than the Russians changed their minds and asked him if he would like to deliver it at a factory instead. Carrillo declined.

The surprise of the Brezhnev speech, however, was the Soviet leader's announcement that Moscow was now prepared to suspend its program of "peaceful" nuclear explosions, thereby paving the way for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban agreement covering both military and peaceful explosions. Declared Brezhnev: "We trust that this important step on the part of the U.S.S.R. is properly appreciated by our partners at the negotiations."

Indeed, the signs of appreciation in Washington were almost instantaneous. After months of disappointments in his negotiations with the Russians, U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance greeted Brezhnev's announcement as a "major step forward" and predicted that it would have a "useful effect" on the comprehensive test-ban negotiations that have been under way in Geneva since last July.

One test-ban agreement, outlawing nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, is already in effect between the superpowers. Two other agreements, limiting the size of underground explosions, have been signed by both sides but have not been ratified by the U.S. Senate. Nonetheless, as a top priority in its arms-control program, the Carter Administration has been pushing for a new, comprehensive test-ban agreement. Reason: it is fearful that the Russians, who have made far greater use of nuclear firepower than the U.S. for earth moving and other engineering purposes, could be gaining valuable military expertise in the process. Certainly the Soviets have shown interest in harnessing such detonations to a wide range of projects; their known tests have included the excavation of a half-mile-long canal trench in northern Russia in 1971, and the sealing of a gas well in Central Asia five years earlier.

Now, apparently, the Soviets have decided to forgo further experiments, at least to the extent of consenting to a moratorium on peaceful nuclear testing "for a definite period." Why? U.S. analysts believe the Russians are coming around to the American view that nuclear engineering projects are not economical. Washington has found that the problems of contamination and the cost of cleanup make the use of nuclear devices less feasible in the long run than conventional explosives.

In any case, according to U.S. intelligence reports, the Soviets do not have any important nuclear engineering projects scheduled for the next several years--and thus have little to lose by their offer.

The Soviets' political motive is somewhat more obscure. In March, after all, Vance was given a firm rebuff when he went to Moscow to discuss strategic arms limitations (SALT); the SALT I agreement was due to expire in October, and Vance wanted to conclude SALT II negotiations before that deadline. Instead, the Soviets sent him home with a case of diplomatic frostbite. Now they have evidently decided that it is in their interests to secure at least one important agreement with Washington. Observes TIME Moscow Bureau Chief Marsh Clark: "Events of late have indicated that the obdurate Soviet stance of last March was due to temporary factors and that Moscow is getting to know Jimmy Carter better and liking him more."

Has Moscow decided to try living with some of the President's other policy priorities? Well, not exactly. "There is much that divides [the U.S. and the Soviet Union]," Brezhnev told the Communist meeting. "But the differences are accentuated if attempts are made to lecture each other, and the result will only be a buildup of distrust and hostility, useless to our countries and dangerous to the world as a whole." This was an obvious allusion to Carter's stand on human rights. It was perhaps an oblique response as well to Administration efforts to persuade the Kremlin that the pending trial of Soviet Dissident Anatoli Shcharansky, accused of CIA connections that Carter has categorically denied, could damage Moscow's relations with the U.S. Countered Brezhnev: "Americans have nothing to gain from the Wilsonian policy of piously refusing to deal with us on the ground that our government is distasteful to them."

The Brezhnev statement on nuclear testing was not directly related to the ongoing negotiations for a new SALT agreement. But U.S. analysts were struck by another of Brezhnev's more conciliatory comments: "We are in favor of starting a downward turn in the curve of the arms race and gradually scaling down the level of military confrontation." That, noted one analyst, sounded unmistakably like a plug for SALT ii. Said he: "They're trying to strengthen detente."

It was a little early for that much optimism; even the proposed comprehensive test-ban agreement could still founder over such questions as the duration of the treaty and the verification procedures to be prescribed. But still, after so many foreign policy disappointments, the Administration seemed to have good reason this time for hoping that the Brezhnev anniversary amity might be not only a signal that the SALT deadlock is breaking but also the harbinger of a general thaw.

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