Why the Saudis Are Silent

The quiet partner of virtually every Arab nation is Saudi Arabia, whose oil-enriched coffers support Egypt, Syria and the P.L.O. But King Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd did not endorse either Anwar Sadat's proposal for a pre-Geneva summit in Cairo or Muammar Gaddafi's call for an anti-Egypt rejection-front meeting in Tripoli. What are the Saudis up to? TIME Cairo Bureau Chief Wilton Wynn flew to Jeddah and sent this analysis:

The rulers of Saudi Arabia wish Sadat well in his peace offensive. At the same time, they are afraid he will fail and are deeply concerned about the consequences of failure.

The Saudis believe the only way the Egyptian President can bring off his gamble for peace is to get major concessions out of the Israelis or, alternatively, trigger a dramatic American move that will force Jerusalem to yield. If neither event happens, the Saudis fear Sadat will lose his credibility and with it his capacity to lead moderate forces in the Arab world. Even if he were to survive politically in Egypt after such a failure, the Saudis argue, he would no longer be a significant Arab leader. Any such collapse of Sadat would leave the Saudis in a vulnerable position. They would be forced to face resurgent radicalism among the Arabs without a politically stable and influential Egypt as their first line of defense.

Despite their hopes for Sadat's success, the Saudis bluntly turned down an Egyptian plea to bless his proposed Cairo summit publicly. One reason: despite some earlier evidence to the contrary, Saudi officials insist that they were not consulted beforehand about Sadat's trip to Jerusalem. After all, a Jeddah businessman observed, "before going into a major venture you should always consult your banker." Sadat kept quiet and simply gambled that his credit would still be good.

Crown Prince Fahd and King Khalid forgave and apparently forgot after Sadat sent a high-level emissary to soothe their wounded feelings. The Saudis expressed full understanding of Sadat's objectives and made it clear that they are not opposed to a direct Arab-Israeli dialogue. The Saudis, however, also explained that they could not publicly support Egypt's move lest they weaken the broad range of contacts they have laboriously built up all across the Arab world. They now are in a position to influence such disparate and often inimical regimes as Marxist South Yemen and Somalia, Algeria and Morocco, the Christian Lebanese and the P.L.O. The Saudis hope eventually to be the effective mediator in healing the deep rift Sadat's trip has caused in the Arab world. Said Saudi Information Minister Muhammed Abdo Yamani last week: "We are trying to cool everyone down; Sadat's trip was a gesture made to ease Israel's enmity towards us, and it should not create enmity among the Arabs."

For the Saudis, Arab solidarity is essential if the Soviets are to be prevented from exploiting Arab quarrels. Communism, the Saudis believe, is almost as much a threat to the Arab world as Zionism. They feel an overall peace settlement would "deradicalize" the Arabs, whose frustrations about Israel have fostered a brand of terrorism that has frightened the Riyadh rulers. The assassination of King Faisal in 1975 (although apparently not politically motivated), the kidnaping later that year of Saudi Oil Minister Ahmed Zaki Yahmani at the OPEC meeting in Vienna (a scheme masterminded by Palestinian Leader Wadie Haddad) and last spring's costly fire in one of Saudi Arabia's largest oilfields have made Khalid and Fahd conscious of their country's vulnerability. On one point Riyadh is adamant: Sadat must not sign a separate peace agreement with Israel, though the Saudis will go along with any settlement negotiated by the four confrontation powers. Meanwhile, Riyadh will continue bankrolling the Sadat regime. Explained a high Saudi official last week: "It's not right to make the Egyptian people suffer, even if their ruler makes a mistake."

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