Rushing Toward Cairo

Anger, worry and a maelstrom of moves and countermoves

He was certainly a man possessed, but exactly what was he possessed by? In seeking to break the Middle East peace impasse, Egypt's President Anwar Sadat had stirred up a maelstrom of diplomatic moves and countermoves, and last week he remained at the center of the turbulence. In Tripoli, the anti-Sadat Arab states voted to "freeze" their diplomatic and political relations with Egypt. Sadat reacted icily by making a full diplomatic break with Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria and South Yemen. His decision produced a schism as deep as any in the 32-year history of the Arab League. Also, responding to the constant criticism of his initiatives by Moscow, Sadat summarily closed down a number of Soviet consulates and cultural offices. That reduced the Communist presence in Egypt to its lowest level since the days of King Farouk.

Uneasy at the rapid pace of seemingly uncontrollable events, President Carter dispatched Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to the Middle East for the third time in ten months to use whatever influence he might have to bring the feuding Arabs together. One of Vance's main goals was to help prop up Sadat's plan for a pre-Geneva conference on the Middle East that is scheduled to begin at the Mena House hotel near Cairo this week. Originally, Sadat had envisioned the gathering as a meeting ground, where all interested parties would settle at least some of the procedural problems blocking a full-scale Geneva conference. But at week's end the probability was that the Cairo meeting would be attended only by Egypt and Israel, with the U.S. and the United Nations on hand as observers.

Was Sadat out of control, or was he acting fast and boldly to take charge of events that were outpacing him? "I will never bow except before the people of Egypt," he told a cheering throng of about 2 million in downtown Cairo, "and I will never kneel except before God." The crowd roared its approval as Sadat dismissed the rejectionists as "dwarfs" and promised to press on for a just solution of the Palestinian problem, despite the "ailing minds of some of the Palestinians." Sadat's trip to Jerusalem last month may have shattered Arab unity, but there was no mistaking the enthusiasm of his own people. SADAT, GOD IS WITH YOU, WE ARE WITH YOU, read the banners. He has never been more popular at home. It is estimated that 85% of his people support him and, more important, Egypt's military leaders back him too.

But every step Sadat takes is perilous. In his sudden break with the radical states, he underscored the fact that he did not intend to be deterred by their opposition--or by that of the Soviets. Indeed, he has set the stage for substantial talks with the Israelis, freeing himself to proceed on his own to negotiate an overall settlement, which, if all goes well, he would present to his fellow Arabs on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

A close friend of Sadat's explained the Egyptian strategy to TIME'S Cairo bureau chief Wilton Wynn:

"Sadat will negotiate with the Israelis an overall, umbrella settlement. He will then present this to an Arab summit conference for approval. Once it is accepted [in principle], each party to the conflict will negotiate the details of its particular problem with Israel: Egypt will negotiate withdrawal from the Sinai, Syria will negotiate withdrawal from the Golan Heights, the Palestinians and Jordanians will discuss the West Bank. This will not be a separate peace, but separate negotiations." But what if the other Arabs reject the package? "How could they refuse?" replied Sadat's friend. "The whole world would be against anyone who turned down such a peace plan."

The crux of Anwar Sadat's problem is that he must eventually secure concessions from Israel that the Arabs cannot refuse--namely, an agreement in principle to withdraw from the occupied territories. Says an Egyptian official: "If we can get a commitment to withdraw, however long the time frame or whatever the conditions, we will have no problem." If not, he might have added, Sadat will have gambled away his position of leadership in the Arab world.

At the conference that will begin this week in Mena House, a 19th-century lodge, from which guests can stare out --and up--at the pyramids, the focus will be on procedural matters at the beginning. One issue to be discussed is Palestinian participation at a subsequent conference. The Egyptian formula calls for a Palestinian delegation led by a scholar like Dr. Edward Said of Columbia University, an American citizen of Palestinian origin. As co-delegates, Cairo may suggest a West Bank mayor and a low-ranking official of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Should the Israelis buy such a proposal, the Egyptians would be in a position to issue a quick call for a Geneva conference and to proceed on their own if necessary. But they also believe such a concession would be enough to bring in the Jordanians and--somewhat later--perhaps the Syrians.

To create a congenial atmosphere for this week's meeting, Egypt admitted a number of Israeli journalists and scholars and ceremoniously returned to Israeli authorities the bodies of three Israeli soldiers who had been killed in the Sinai during the October War. The official delegations to the Cairo conference itself are relatively low level. The Egyptian group will be led by U.N. Ambassador Esmat Abdel Meguid, while the Israelis will be led by Eliahu Ben-Elissar, director general of the Premier's office. Jerusalem said it would elevate the level of its representation if Cairo requested it. Moreover, it was an open secret that covert, high-level talks between the two countries would be taking place elsewhere at the same time. But Jerusalem emphatically denied reports that Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan had met privately last week with one of Sadat's top staffmen, Hassan Tohami, in a neutral country.

While Sadat rushed ahead with his plans for the conference, his friends struggled to keep up with him and, some thought, to veer him away from a fatal blunder. Crucial to Sadat is the continued support of Saudi Arabia, which indicated last week that it still backs him despite Riyadh's concern over the damage to Arab unity produced by his recent actions. "We did not support the trip to Jerusalem, but we do support Egypt," Saudi Arabia's Deputy Foreign Minister Abdel Aziz Mansouri told Correspondent Wynn, "and we are very concerned at any action that breaks the unity of the confrontation states [Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the P.L.O.]." As if to underscore the Saudis' continued support, an $80 million arms deal between Britain and Egypt for production of Swingfire antitank missiles in Egypt was announced last week. The main bankroller is Saudi Arabia.

Embarking on what he called "a mission that may be impossible," Jordan's King Hussein made quick visits to Damascus and Cairo. His aim was to narrow the distance between Sadat and Syria's President Hafez Assad, but there was no evidence that he had made much progress. Assad was also doing some lobbying. After meeting with Hussein, he flew to Riyadh, Kuwait and other gulf states in an effort to talk them out of giving further support to Sadat.

In Washington, the Carter Administration scrambled to regain its lost leverage. Until now, the Administration's long-range goal has been a Geneva conference at which all parties would attempt to negotiate a comprehensive settlement. Pushed by Sadat's moves, the U.S. has shifted to a two-track strategy: it continues to advocate a Geneva conference, but now accepts Sadat's view that any initiative that might produce results is worth supporting. In the words of one high Administration official, Geneva is no longer a "sacred, juridical" goal; there could be lesser conferences, which might then be ratified in Geneva.

The new U.S. policy brings the Carter Administration closer to the view of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who has long advocated a step-by-step approach to a final settlement. The possible steps: an Israeli-Egyptian accommodation; then an Israeli agreement with Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the moderate Palestinians; and finally a settlement with Syria triggered by a hint to Damascus --and to Moscow--that would say, in effect: "We're making progress, and if you want to be included, you'd better get moving."

Carter dispatched Vance to the Middle East with these revised tidings: to counsel moderation and sound out the possibilities for bringing Syria back into the negotiating process and to emphasize that Washington is not pushing for a separate deal between Cairo and Jerusalem. The U.S. had hoped to avoid an additional trip by the Secretary of State this year, fearing the effect of another spectacular without results. But in the end the President decided the U.S. must give Sadat all the help it can, particularly after the other Arabs rejected Sadat's invitation.

Also on the move was Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Philip Habib, who was sent to Moscow to brief the Soviet leadership on the new U.S. position and to try to gain some Soviet help in urging Syria and the P.L.O. to attend the Cairo conference. Habib got nowhere. Washington decided that it would henceforth bypass the Soviets until the later stages of the settlement process. Enraged at the turn of events, the Soviets accused the U.S. of renouncing the joint declaration of last October, in which the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to press for a Geneva conference.

Sadat's chances of success depend in large part on Israel, and as of last week there was no indication that the Israelis were prepared to announce any territorial concessions or to soften their stand on Palestinian representation at Geneva. Premier Menachem Begin returned from a five-day trip to Britain, where he rejected British Prime Minister James Callaghan's appeal to make dramatic concessions. After Sadat's visit to Israel last month, Begin had said, "This is a new situation, and I have to think it through." But if the Premier was now on the verge of announcing a new policy, he was keeping it to himself.

Sooner or later, Sadat must contend with another aspect of the new reality: the anger and humiliation of the radical and anti-Egyptian Arabs, led by Syria's Assad. Sadat's defection, his visit to Jerusalem and now his conference in Cairo have robbed the Arabs of any pretense of being a military threat to Israel. Without Egypt actively manning the southern front, a new war in the Middle East would inevitably lead the Arabs to another devastating defeat.

Thus, despite the outward signs of zeal and camaraderie at Tripoli, the mood of the summit convoked by Libya's Muammar Gaddafi was downbeat. Gaddafi stage-managed a reconciliation between P.L.O. Leader Yasser Arafat, a relative moderate, and such rejectionists as George Habash, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (see box) and Nayef Hawatmeh of the Popular Democratic Front. Notwithstanding Assad's behind-the-scenes plea that peace negotiations should not be ruled out, the intransigent Iraqis insisted that the summit partners must renounce U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which implicitly recognizes Israel's right to exist. When the other Arab leaders refused to do so, the Iraqi delegation walked out and would not sign the anti-Sadat resolution despite its tough language.

Just as the Tripoli conference was breaking up, who should arrive unexpectedly to lend his support but Uganda's unpredictable President for Life Idi Amin Dada. One departing delegate, grateful to be getting out of town ahead of Big Daddy, sighed, 'The Iraqis made it uncomfortable enough. With Amin around, it would have been grotesque."

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