Monday, Jan. 16, 1978
Sadat's Confidence Restored
The next step is a "declaration of principles "
Only a week earlier, a distressed Anwar Sadat had told journalists that he was disappointed and embarrassed by Jimmy Carter's comments rejecting the concept of a Palestinian state on the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip. But after a 45-minute talk last week in Egypt's southern town of Aswan, the Egyptian and American Presidents once more proclaimed themselves in agreement. Sadat went so far as to say their views were "identical."
Well, almost. No mention was made of a Palestinian state, and Carter avoided using the term self-determination, which Israelis fear would inevitably lead to the formation of a Soviet-supported state headed by Palestine Liberation Organization Leader Yasser Arafat. But Carter spoke of the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people," including the right "to participate in the determination of their own future"--and that was good enough for Sadat. Said one elated Egyptian official: "Our press already is interpreting Carter's statement as self-determination. The Israelis probably will interpret it differently. But if we can agree on that statement, it will serve a purpose very much like Resolution 242* ambiguous enough so that each can accept it on his own terms but positive enough to form the basis for serious negotiations." Menachem Begin, whom Carter telephoned from Air Force One to report on his Aswan talks, still maintained that his government favored "full autonomy," not self-determination, for the Palestinians. But a high Israeli official said privately of the Carter-Sadat statement: "We can live with it."
On his way back to Washington at week's end, Carter sought to take a somewhat more detached position on the whole question of a Palestinian state than he had expressed a week earlier. His own "preference" was unchanged, he said, but the President added that if Israel and the Arabs should agree to such a state (which at this stage Israel would not do), the U.S. "would not object."
The Carter-Sadat statement at Aswan could form the basis for that much-pursued but elusive "declaration of principles" that Sadat and Begin tried to formulate at their Christmas summit in Ismailia. If the Egyptian and Israeli Foreign Ministers, who are scheduled to meet next week in Jerusalem, can agree on a declaration of some substance, Sadat will once again be able to invite the other Arab states to join the talks. If they still refuse to participate, Sadat may consider himself free to go ahead and make a deal with the Israelis on Sinai. He would call it not a separate peace but a step toward a comprehensive agreement.
A joint declaration calling for Palestinian self-determination would open the way for Jordan's King Hussein to enter the negotiations. Hussein met twice with Carter over the New Year's weekend in Tehran. Though he was opposed to joining the talks now, the King spoke optimistically about bringing even the Syrians into the talks once the Israelis had agreed to the principle of withdrawal from the occupied territories. Ideally, the King would like to see the West Bank rejoined to his kingdom in the form of a federation of Palestinian and Jordanian states under his Hashemite crown. But since he does not want to arouse the ire of radical Arabs by seeming to covet the West Bank against the will of the Palestinians, Hussein proposes a plebiscite for the West Bank and Gaza under U.N. auspices.
In Riyadh, Saudi Arabian King Khalid and other officials welcomed Carter warmly. In private, however, they were fairly obdurate--partly because of a split in the royal family over the Sadat peace initiative. The Foreign Minister, Prince Saud, was furious that the Egyptian President did not consult the Saudis before making his famous trip to Jerusalem in November, and opposes any overt show of support for Sadat now. On the other hand, Prince Abdullah, commander of the
National Guard, is sympathetic to Sadat. So is Kamal Adham, the King's top security adviser. Crown Prince Fahd, who is First Deputy Premier and in effect the head of government, leans toward Sadat, but has remained uncommitted.
The Saudis told Carter that if Israel offered self-determination to the Palestinians, Saudi Arabia would use considerable influence to bring Syria, Jordan and the moderate Palestinians into the talks. If the Saudis were to give Sadat strong support without first receiving such assurances, the House of Saud would become a prime target of Arab radicals.
Implicit in the discussions was one basic fact of modern oil diplomacy: the U.S. vitally needs Riyadh's continued cooperation. To help the U.S. meet its future energy needs, Washington has urged the Saudis to increase their productive capacity from 11.6 million bbl. per day to 16 million bbl. by the early 1980s. The Saudis can thus exert pressure simply by limiting production.
At the Israeli-Egyptian Defense Ministers' meeting in Cairo next week, the two sides will continue to work on a formula for a Sinai agreement. In exchange for the right to retain their settlements and military installations in Sinai, the Israelis have already offered the Egyptians an equivalent amount of territory in Israel's Negev desert.
Such concessions have cost Begin some support among right-wing Israelis. Last week one of his closest friends and aides, Shmuel Katz, resigned, fearing the negotiations were leading to a "sellout of Israel's basic interests." The outspoken and often abrasive Katz, who has been serving as Begin's information adviser, was also miffed because Begin had not supported him for a Cabinet appointment. Said he: "I no longer have a common language with the Prime Minister."
At the Foreign Ministers' meeting, to be attended also by U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, the Egyptians hope to persuade Begin's government to accept the principle of Palestinian self-determination by 1) offering an extended deadline toward achieving it--"Like maybe saying there could be self-determination after Begin dies," says one Egyptian, and 2) agreeing to demilitarization of the West Bank, thereby assuring Israel that its security will not be threatened.
Israel is understandably uneasy about the prospect of having a radical Palestinian state next door, considering the violence for which some Palestinian groups have shown a penchant. Last week those fears were once again reinforced. In London, the P.L.O.'s representative. Said Hammami, was shot dead by an unknown assailant. Only four days earlier, a short distance away, two passengers in a Syrian embassy car had been killed by a bomb. Hammami was known as a moderate who in the past had been savagely criticized by radicals for refusing to demand the liquidation of Israel. Fortnight ago, there were reports from Beirut that Palestinian extremists were plotting a new wave of terrorism; last week's murders in London presumably marked the beginning of that campaign.
-That resolution, adopted by the U.N. Security Council in 1967, in effect acknowledges Israel's right to exist. It also includes such phrases as "secure and recognized borders" (which the Arabs take to mean that Israel must withdraw from the occupied territories) and "refugee problem" (which, to Israel, means that the Palestinian problem should be solved by resettlement rather than by creation of a political state).
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