Searching for a Fig Leaf

Sadat is hoping for an accommodation from the Israelis

There is a very severe difference between us," Anwar Sadat concluded sadly last week after the latest meeting between Israeli 'and Egyptian officials. The renewed effort was indeed a failure, since the two sides remained deadlocked on a variety of issues. But perhaps the most remarkable thing about the meeting was that, coming as it did only two weeks after the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon, it had taken place at all.

At midweek Israel's Defense Minister Ezer Weizman flew to Cairo for the fifth time since last November. This was the first high-level meeting between Israeli and Egyptian officials in nearly two months, and for that reason alone was interpreted by some observers as a new, tentative step toward serious negotiations. After two rounds of talks, and three hours of discussion between Sadat and Weizman, the Egyptian government announced that the Israelis had offered no new proposals and that there would be no more formal meetings of the political or military committees until Jerusalem had changed its position, notably on the future status of the West Bank and Gaza. Nonetheless, the Weizman visit was likely to be the first of a series of informal talks aimed at getting the full-scale negotiations moving again.

A few days earlier, Weizman had written to his Egyptian counterpart, War Minister Mohammed Abdel Ghany Gamassy, urging that the two meet to review the results of the recent and unsuccessful talks in Washington between Israeli Premier Menachem Begin and President Carter. Gamassy referred the proposal to Sadat, observing that he was not sure whether the Egyptians should meet with any Israeli officials while the Israeli armed forces were still in southern Lebanon. Sadat overruled the objection, noting that Weizman had emphasized in his letter that the Israelis were getting ready to pull out of Lebanon, and that that was good enough for him.

On Weizman's previous visits to Cairo (along a flight route that he jocularly refers to as "the Weizman corridor"), the Egyptians had allowed him to mingle with the masses. This time they kept him virtually out of sight of both the press and the public. Apparently the Egyptians did not want the Israelis to exploit the visit as evidence that Jerusalem is growing more flexible in its pursuit of peace; indeed, the Cairo government emphatically denied Israeli reports that the visit marked a resumption of formal negotiations.

What most seriously divides the two sides is the issue of Palestinian self-determination. Sadat wants the Israelis to accept the "Aswan summit language" favored by Sadat and Carter at their January meeting: a declaration by both sides that the Palestinians should be allowed to participate in determining their own future, and that the Palestinian problem must be solved "in all its aspects." Begin has budged slightly from his previous position, but still wants to restrict Palestinian participation to those living in the West Bank and Gaza. Sadat insists on including those in the diaspora; otherwise, he argues, the problem cannot be solved "in all its aspects." The Aswan summit language, say the Egyptians, is the "fig leaf that Sadat must have if he hopes to make bilateral negotiations respectable in the eyes of his doubting fellow Arabs.

If Sadat ever gets that concession, he will quickly commend it to the other Arabs as the basis for a comprehensive settlement, and will leave it to the others to do their own negotiating with the Israelis. At that point, Egypt and Israel could quickly reach an agreement on the Sinai, leading to what many Arabs fear would be a separate peace. This prospect alarms them, because it could perpetuate the split within the Arab world and render the Arabs incapable thereafter of mounting a serious military threat to Israel.

The tone of the Cairo meeting was friendly. Weizman is clearly Sadat's favorite Israeli; the Egyptian leader said of his guest last week: "I have confidence in him. He is true to his country and to peace." But later, trying to sum up the present status of the peace talks, Sadat was pessimistic as he told TIME: "No one can agree to what Begin is saying. He wants peace, land and sovereignty--everything. My initiative was an attempt to jump over the psychological barriers. My visit to Jerusalem said, 'We recognize you, we are asking for normal relations and open borders, we want to be good neighbors.' But look at the result. We agreed to direct negotiations and normal relations. Mr. Begin gives nothing at all and says Judea and Samaria belong to Israel. Tell Begin that repeating this is an insult to me; tell him that it is an insult to keep the settlements and guard them with the Israeli army.' That is what I told Weizman to tell Begin.

"Begin's proposal is to legalize the occupation, while we ask that the land be liberated. Let me be frank. The desperate state of the Palestinians is pushing them to fanaticism. Begin's hard line damages everything and pushes them to desperation."

Menachem Begin quite obviously does not agree. But other Israeli voices and sentiments suggest that disenchantment with Begin is beginning to grow. A poll published last week by the Tel Aviv newspaper Ha'aretz disclosed that on the eve of Begin's trip to Washington in mid-March the Premier's popularity rating stood at 59.4%--not bad by the lights of Israeli politics, but down sharply from his showing of 68.4% in January and 78.3% in December. Even Begin's Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan told TIME last week that Israel must seek a new relationship with its Arab neighbors. Said he: "I bear in mind that we have to be bold enough to take daring new steps."

In the Knesset, meanwhile, Opposition Leader Shimon Peres attacked the Begin government's policy of permitting the establishment of new settlements in the occupied territories. Taking issue with Begin's hard-line interpretation of United Nations Resolution 242, Peres argued that Jerusalem should acknowledge that the document applies to Israeli withdrawal from some of the West Bank and Gaza (as well as from the other occupied territories). To accept the original intent of 242, said Peres, "might not bring King Hussein of Jordan into the negotiating process, but it would enable Israel to conclude an agreement with President Sadat." After eight hours of heated debate, the Knesset supported Begin's peace plan by a vote of 64 to 32, but several members of Begin's coalition partner, the Democratic Movement for Change, abstained.

The focus of national attention still remained on southern Lebanon, though most Israelis assumed that the withdrawal of their forces would continue. Jerusalem officials believed that although the invasion had killed or wounded 2,000 civilians and had made 265,000 homeless, it had damaged the fighting ability of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The Israelis said they had captured some 20 tanks, 100 artillery pieces and a large number of rocket launchers. Last week they discovered a huge bunker near Tyre that was full of naval equipment and explosives, obviously in preparation for another naval operation against Israel. The Palestinians, however, maintain that their fighting ability remains intact and the military equipment losses are of no consequence. P.L.O. Leader Yasser Arafat said his forces would observe the ceasefire as long as the U.N. replaced the Israelis in south Lebanon. But on a visit to his troops (many of them mere youngsters) on the banks of the Litani River he said he was prepared to fight on as long as necessary.

U.N. peacekeeping forces, meanwhile, were gradually moving into place in southern Lebanon. After attending an Easter Mass in the field, French U.N. troops took up such tasks as maintaining checkpoints and guarding the port of Tyre.

The big question is how long it will take the U.N. force to establish a presence that the Israelis feel will justify their complete withdrawal. The P.L.O. guerrillas have promised to observe the prevailing cease-fire only so long as it suits their purpose. As a high-ranking Palestinian official told TIME Correspondent Dean Brelis: "We are prepared to resume military operations whenever and wherever we feel the alliance between Israelis and Lebanese Christians is planning new moves to endanger our presence in the south."

The Israelis, on the other hand, were concerned about whether the U.N. is capable of preventing the Palestinians from returning to the border area. If they do come back, the Israelis will face a worse dilemma than before: whether or not to raid an area containing not only guerrillas but also U.N. soldiers who are desperately trying to keep the peace.

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