How a Deal Was Made

"Look, "said Ribicoff, "this is a tough one for everybody "

The controversy over the warplane sale might never have come to the Senate floor at all if Frank Church, the Foreign Relations Committee chairman-to-be, had not backed out of an agreement to support it. The story of how and why Church changed his mind provides an illuminating view of Congress at work. TIME Congressional Correspondent Neil MacNeil reports:

It all began on April 11 in the gracious apartment of Senator Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut. For dinner that night, he and his wife entertained Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Senators Frank Church and Ted Kennedy and Scotty Reston of the New York Times. Over duck `a I'orange, the men had a free-flowing talk about the nation's foreign policies, including the newly announced plan to sell military aircraft in a package to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, a matter already causing intense debate.

After dinner, Ribicoff took Vance off to a corner. The Senator had been puzzling over the arms deal, wondering if there were some way to avoid the acrimony that had already begun.

"Cy," he said, "this is a tough one. Is there any way we can work this out? Is there any give on this?"

"Yes," Vance said, "I think there is some give."

Vance was about to leave for Africa and Moscow, and Ribicoff that weekend flew out to Phoenix to make a speech. In his hotel room there, he watched CBS's Sunday program Face the Nation. Senator Howard Baker was the guest, and he suggested flexibility on the number of planes involved and the conditions of sale. Two days later, back in Washington, Ribicoff approached Baker on the Senate floor, privately.

"Howard," he said, "what you said has the makings of a solution to the plane deal. Are you interested?"

When Baker indicated a willingness to talk further, Ribicoff found Senators Church and Jacob Javits and brought them to Baker. Ribicoff told the group: "Look, this is a tough one for everybody. I think Howard has the makings of working something out."

After Baker left, Ribicoff took Church and Javits into a private room behind the chamber. Church was angry about the President's having presented the three sales as a package.

"It's an insult to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," he said. "The President has no right to do this to us. Each proposal has to come up separately. If that is done by the President, and we can work out something along the lines Baker suggested, I'd be willing to publicly state in the Foreign Relations Committee that we are for the sale of the F-15s to Saudi Arabia in the national interest." "So would I," said Javits.

Ribicoff was delighted. "If there's agreement between Baker, Church, Javits and Ribicoff," he said, "there's no one going to oppose it against that combination."

Ribicoff immediately went to consult with Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd and told him what he had in mind. "God bless you, Abe," Byrd said.

Meanwhile, Baker took soundings among his fellow Republicans. He met initial approval of the basic idea. Then he telephoned and asked to see President Carter. At the White House, the President took Baker into the Rose Garden to talk. Baker told the President that the package proposal meant a confrontation with Congress, that he and several other Senators would like to try to work out an accommodation. He said there was a desire to increase the number of warplanes to Israel and some feeling that the number of planes to Saudi Arabia should be reduced. "We need to give thought on how we can put restraints on the armaments and basing of the planes," Baker said.

Carter made no commitment. "I'd like to think about it," he said. A few days later, he called Baker and said, "We ought to pursue it."

Vance returned from Moscow and on April 28 invited the key Senators to a breakfast of scrambled eggs and English muffins in his private dining room at the State Department.

Church had another commitment but was later briefed on what happened. At the meeting were Ribicoff, Javits, Baker, Byrd, Clifford Case, Vance and two aides.

Some of the Senators asked for more time before the President submitted his package. "I can't delay," Vance said. "It's going in this afternoon." But Vance could agree to sending the proposals separately.

The Secretary emphasized, though, that the President reserved the option to cancel all the planes if any sales were rejected. The officials went through the whole business--basings of planes, armaments, more planes for Israel, fewer for Saudi Arabia. Vance was agreeable except on cutting the planes to Saudi Arabia.

Church came into the negotiations later that day, working out with Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher the language of the letter he was to receive agreeing to send up the three parts of the package separately. Church also wanted assurance that the Saudis would not buy any planes from the French. Christopher told him he would get him that assurance. On Sunday, May 7. Church appeared on Face the Nation and deftly laid out the conditions by which an accommodation might be reached.

On the morning of May 9, the senatorial group met again at Vance's private dining room at State. Now joining them was John Sparkman, retiring chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. They reviewed the agreement on the accommodation, as one participant put it, "to make sure everyone understood."

Javits raised anew the idea of pledging extra planes to Israel, and Vance said the Administration would agree to 20 more F-15s for Israel. Church pressed Vance for a promise that the President would never again send up a package proposal on arms. Vance could not do that, but he agreed that Carter would describe this one as "a unique situation," and that satisfied Church. "At that point," said Baker, "I thought the matter was settled."

That afternoon Church presented the agreement to the Foreign Relations Committee. He spoke fervently on behalf of the compromise, and his speech was credited with winning the support of at least two Senators (Charles Percy of Illinois and John Glenn of Ohio). But three others--Joe Biden of Delaware, Richard Stone of Florida and Paul Sarbanes of Maryland--spoke out emotionally against the deal. Those three young Senators may well have shaken Church's hopes for a large committee majority in favor. Javits expressed doubts. Church himself began to waver. He told Byrd that "we don't have the votes." "Yes, you do," said Byrd, who figured it at 9 to 7, "with your vote."

"I'm on the other side," Church said. It was a stunning switch. To the participants who had negotiated the compromise agreement, Church and Javits seemed fully committed to the agreement that they had helped work out. Had Church and Javits stuck, those who negotiated the accommodation believed firmly that the issue was totally over.

Why did Church and Javits switch? Church claimed he would have stayed with the deal if there had been a clear consensus in the committee but changed his mind when there was not. Javits later said he had never been committed to the deal.

There is another view. Israeli Premier Menachem Begin had indicated on Meet the Press that he would accept the package, if unhappily. But about May 9 the Israeli government signaled its embassy in Washington that it really opposed the package fully and totally--and that the embassy should do whatever it could to influence the vote. "At the last minute, they came out against the sale," says Byrd.

The fact is that the Israeli ambassador did call Church shortly before the committee vote and informed him that Israel definitely was opposed to the package deal. Late last week Church, sounding shaken by the whole experience, insisted that the ambassador's call made no difference. It was clear, however, that Israel had shifted its position and, for his own reasons, so had Frank Church.

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