Out of Step Again

As partners in the European Community, the British do not care what they do actually, so long as they renounce it correctly. At least that was what many Europeans were tempted to conclude last week as Britain again vexed the rest of the Community on several key issues. It thereby provoked new laments that maybe Charles de Gaulle was right in wanting to blackball les anglais from membership in the first place.

Ever since it joined the Community in 1973, Britain has had quarrels with the other eight members over everything from butter to oil policy. But this time Britain's foot dragging threatened to block agreement on some of the most crucial problems to face the Community in recent years. Though an effort was being made to mute some of the quarrels for the present, diplomats predicted that a major clash across the English Channel could soon break into the open.

Foremost among the issues was the proposed European monetary system, which came under the scrutiny of the Community's Finance Ministers in Brussels last week. Devised by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing to insulate Europe from fluctuations of the dollar, the plan had won approval in principle at a Common Market summit in Bremen last month, and had been presented to President Carter and other leaders of the industrial West at the subsequent Bonn summit. British Prime Minister James Callaghan, however, remained cool toward the idea. In the first place, the British--and for that matter, the Italians as well--are reluctant to tie the pound and other weak European currencies to the superstrong West German mark. Second, London feels that the scheme was somehow imposed on the rest of the Community by what it regards as a fast-developing and potentially dominant Franco-German alliance.

To the French, it was understandable that the British should raise legitimate questions about a scheme that still puzzles many experts. They were outraged, though, that the Labor government should try to use that skepticism about the plan as a bargaining counter--against French privilege. According to the French, Britain tried to trade possible support for the monetary plan in exchange for reform of the Nine's longstanding agricultural policy, which is sacrosanct to subsidized French farmers and anathema to British housewives, who believe it has raised their food prices. The French were having none of it. "We cannot link the monetary problem to the agricultural question," snapped a French foreign ministry official. But the British called it basic fair play. Countered a Tory M.P.: "The hypocritical French have maintained the agricultural policy against all comers to appease their farmers, and no one calls them anti-European."

Another point of conflict was the proposed construction of a new, 200-seat B10 European Airbus, a mainly Franco-German project that is aimed ambitiously at loosening the U.S. hold on the world's commercial aircraft market. To enhance the Airbus' chances, the French and Germans have tried to persuade the British to join in its development, with a standing offer to build the wings and other key parts.

The British, however, are torn between the Airbus proposal and two competing offers from the U.S. One is from McDonnell Douglas, which is seeking Rolls-Royce engines for its medium-range ATMR; the other is from Boeing, which wants both British engines and wings for its 757. Supporters of the Boeing project claim it would mean 17,000 new jobs for British industry. Even Britain's most strongly pro-European newspaper, the Guardian, argued that "Callaghan should choose the project which promises to sell the most airplanes. This is not a dilemma in which Euro-loyalty ought to play too large a part. There can be scarcely any doubt about the sales prospects. Boeing or Douglas have the best chance of selling their products to the main market for passenger aircraft, which is the American one."

Some British Cabinet members last week were hoping that a two-way deal could be pulled off so that British firms could be involved in both the Airbus and one of the U.S. projects. If Britain were to opt for the U.S. deal, in angry Continental eyes that would compound the suspicion that deep down Britain is more interested in maintaining its mid-Atlantic "special relationship" with America than in being a true Common Market partner. Squabbling continued through the week not only about money and planes but also over a common fisheries policy for the E.C.; the British are threatening to veto the policy unless they are guaranteed the lion's share (60%) of the catch. Said one exasperated West German official: "The British once and for all have to make up their minds whether they are in or out!"

In the never-ending conflict between continent and island, the basic problem seemed to be just that: they cannot. After nearly a decade, British public opinion still has failed to swing behind the Common Market; moreover, both Tories and Laborites are still internally divided on the question. With a general election looming in October, even pro-European politicians in Britain were not anxious to promote an unpopular cause. All they had to do was look at the polls. The most recent one showed that a majority of Britons--48% to 43%--favor quitting the Common Market altogether. qed

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