Israel's Secret Contacts

Behind-the-scenes meetings set the stage for Sadat's initiative

The "spirit of Jerusalem" has disappeared; the Peace Initiative launched by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat when he made his historic trip to Jerusalem last November has all but failed. The tragedy is that it very nearly succeeded.

This is one conclusion that can be drawn from a review of the secret diplomacy that took place immediately before Sadat's visit. From its birth in 1948, Israel had always maintained secret contacts with its Arab enemies, largely through Mossad, the intelligence service that operated as a sort of underground diplomatic corps for the Jewish state. TIME has learned that these contacts between Israel and a number of Arab states, notably Morocco, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, bolstered Sadat's confidence and set the stage for his Peace Initiative. The following narrative is based on TIME'S reporting from several of the nations involved:

Perhaps the most crucial single event in the secret diplomacy of this period was the decision by the Israeli government in July 1977 to advise Egypt, Sudan and Saudi Arabia of some important information that Israeli intelligence had learned: namely, that leftist Arab extremists, trained in Libya and supported by that country's radical leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, were plotting to overthrow the moderate governments in Cairo, Khartoum and Riyadh. Acting on the information provided by Israel, those governments quickly arrested a number of the plotters. Sadat went further: he launched heavy commando raids against

Libya on July 19, 1977, thereby setting off the brief border war in which a training camp at Oasis Giarabub near the Egyptian border was destroyed.

Sadat quickly signaled his appreciation for Jerusalem's warning. On July 14, he had declared that Egypt would not establish diplomatic relations with Jerusalem for at least five years after a peace treaty was signed. Two days later, after Egyptian intelligence had confirmed that the Israeli information was correct, he announced: "Egypt is ready to sign a peace treaty with Israel that will guarantee Israel her place in the area." It was a momentous change, perhaps the first step toward his trip to Jerusalem four months later.

The Israelis responded to the Arabs' gratitude by sending newly appointed Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan on a round of secret visits to Middle Eastern capitals. Premier Menachem Begin had come to power a month earlier vowing that Israel would retain the West Bank and Gaza, Arab lands captured during the Six-Day War of 1967. Nonetheless, the fact that he had agreed to warn Sadat, and the other moderate Arab leaders of impending danger, gave them the feeling that Begin had the stature and the courage to make significant concessions in peace negotiations.

During the next four months, Dayan flew incognito to many Muslim countries. He met at least twice with Jordan's King Hussein and Egyptian officials and three times with King Hassan II of Morocco. He also met twice with the Shah of Iran, who had taken an active role in trying to encourage a Middle East settlement.

The center of this diplomatic activity was Morocco, which has had close but secret relations with Israel since 1962. In the summer of 1976, while Sadat was visiting Rabat, King Hassan invited Yitzhak Rabin, then the Israeli Premier, to make a secret trip to Morocco. During the ensuing visit, Hassan urged Rabin to negotiate directly with the Egyptians, and said that he would try to arrange a meeting. Rabin, who is well known for his wariness and caution, was delighted. "There are many issues," he assured the King, "that can be solved in direct, face-to-face negotiations."

Rabin's optimism was bolstered by the fact that for about two years Washington had been arguing that Sadat would welcome some kind of rapprochement with Israel. According to Jerusalem sources, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told Israeli leaders: "Egypt's interests are in the West and not in the East. There is a lot of attraction for the Egyptians in the Libyan desert. There is oil, there is almost no population, and there is the coastline."

At their summit meeting near Rabat, Hassan urged Rabin to begin by meeting quietly with the Saudis, who bankroll the Egyptian economy. With Rabin's approval, Hassan then proceeded to arrange a rendezvous in Morocco between the Israeli Premier and Saudi Arabia's influential Crown Prince Fahd. Fahd agreed to the meeting, but a week before it was to take place, in early 1977, the Saudis canceled it without explanation.

Although the Rabin-Fahd meeting was aborted, the Premier's mission to Morocco led directly to a series of sessions between top-level Egyptian and Israeli intelligence officials in Rabat. By the time the Israelis learned, through intelligence sources in Libya, of the radical Arab plotting against Sadat and the other moderate Arab leaders, Menachem Begin had become Israel's Premier. Begin ordered Israeli Intelligence Chief Yitzhak Hoffi to fly to Morocco to deliver the information directly to his Egyptian counterpart, General Mohammed Shoukat.

It was against this background that Dayan in late July set forth on his odyssey to Muslim capitals in search of a peace formula. Dayan assured his Arab hosts that the Begin government was prepared to make more "generous compromises" than previous Israeli governments. He specifically told the Egyptians and other leaders: "We are ready to transfer the airbase at Sharm el Sheikh to the U.N. and keep some civilian installations there for a limited period. We are ready to restore your sovereignty over all of Sinai and to put our settlements in the Rafah area under your flag. We suggest small Israeli civilian settlements [in Sinai] instead of army installations. The buffer zone between the two armies in Sinai should be enlarged so that there will be no chance of a future confrontation."

Dayan also offered significant concessions on the West Bank and Gaza. Israel would agree to a declaration of principles involving the future of these occupied territories and the 1.1 million Palestinians living there. He said that Israel would agree not to annex those areas, not to establish any more settlements there once a joint declaration had been achieved, and to maintain only enough military force there for its own security. He added that the Begin government would be prepared to accept a West Bank administration composed of Israeli and Jordanian representatives and local Palestinians.

Coming as they did on the heels of Israel's much appreciated intelligence tip to Egypt, Dayan's proposals may well have persuaded Sadat that a dramatic trip to Jerusalem could bring a quick end to the 30-year Middle East impasse.

Alas, this did not come to pass. What went wrong? Dayan apparently promised more than the Begin government was willing or able to deliver. Even though he acted in good faith, the Foreign Minister may have misinterpreted Begin's intentions or miscalculated the new Premier's flexibility. Beyond that, it now seems clear that, when they finally met, Begin and Sadat neither liked nor understood each other. Right from the beginning the misunderstandings were apparent. Sadat, for example, said in Jerusalem that the last Israeli settlement in the Sinai should determine the Israeli border of the buffer zone. The Begin government interpreted this, or chose to interpret it, as a green light to expand the Sinai settlements before a peace agreement had been concluded. When the Israelis began leveling land for enlarging the settlements last January, Sadat became furious at what he considered bad faith on Begin's part. The Israeli Premier, in turn, was angry at what he took to be Egyptian duplicity in demanding a reduction of the buffer zone. Some of the confusion could perhaps have been cleared up, by a careful rereading of the transcript of the private talks between Sadat and Begin in Jerusalem. Unfortunately, no record was kept of those meetings.

Other grievances quickly developed. The Israelis were angered by Sadat's invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization to attend the Cairo peace talks in December. The Egyptians were enraged when the Israelis, after declaring that they would recognize Egyptian sovereignty over all the Sinai, later insisted that the airbases and Jewish settlements there must remain under Israeli control.

By mid-January, when an impatient Sadat abruptly broke off the political talks in Jerusalem, the promise of a sudden peace was dispelled. Gone too, so far as anyone knows, were the secret negotiations that had contributed so much to the only serious peace initiative between Arabs and Israelis in a long time. -

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