A Move in the Chess Game

The wary players agree to meet at Camp David next month

These were the early days of the fasting month of Ramadan. In the darkening sky over hot, humid Alexandria a crescent moon glided toward the evening star, a pattern suggesting an Islamic flag. When U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance arrived in that ancient Mediterranean city last week, few could imagine that Ramadan's omen of peace and tranquillity would bear fruit. Yet by the time Vance took off for Washington two days later, an extraordinary effort to revive the peace talks had begun. Like Israeli Premier Menachem Begin, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had accepted Jimmy Carter's invitation to attend a trilateral summit meeting on Sept. 5 at Camp David, Carter's retreat in the Catoctin Mountains of Maryland.

On his arrival in Alexandria, Vance had waited six hours for the sun to set and for Sadat to break his daylong fast. At 8:50 p.m., the Egyptian greeted his guest and escorted him across the well-clipped lawn of the presidential summer home toward two wicker chairs. By that hour the Mediterranean seashore had disappeared into the night, but the palatial rest-house grounds were lighted by high-intensity arc lights.

Moments later, the Secretary of State produced a crisp white envelope and read aloud the contents of the five-page handwritten letter. Sadat nodded his head slowly as he learned of the meeting, which Carter suggested be held in the U.S. on Aug. 26, and of Begin's acceptance. Sadat said that he preferred not to travel until after the end of Ramadan. Vance offered to change the date. Replied Sadat: "I accept."

Vance was both stunned and elated. When presented with a similar letter the previous morning, Begin had agreed to the meeting without a moment's hesitation. But this did not surprise U.S. officials, since the Israelis had been saying for months that they were prepared to attend another high-level session with the Egyptians.

Sadat, however, had grown increasingly impatient over what he considered the lagging Israeli response to his peace initiative. Two weeks earlier, special U.S. Ambassador Alfred Atherton Jr. had briefed him on the U.S. position and on Jerusalem's stance in the wake of the foreign ministers' meeting at Britain's Leeds Castle in July. Sadat became enraged by Begin's refusal to make a gesture of conciliation on the Sinai or any further significant concessions for peace. Sadat heatedly declared that the Israeli position was "negative and backward" and that Begin himself was the obstacle to peace.

Clearly something had to be done. Personal attacks by the Israeli and Egyptian leaders were getting nastier. The Administration was unhappy about Sadat's repeated threats to abrogate the United Nations mandate to police the Sinai II disengagement line--an action that could once more throw the area into chaos. Washington was also worried about Saudi Arabia's pressure on Sadat to reconcile his differences with Syrian President Hafez Assad. That could lead to an Arab summit at which Egypt would be accepted back into the Arab fold, thereby bringing the current negotiations to an end and raising new uncertainties about what course the Arab world might then take.

Of all the possible U.S. responses, the most effective, but also the most dangerous, was the suggestion of a face-to-face meeting between Sadat and Begin, with Carter as host. Politically, that could burnish Carter's slumping image at home. But the risks were huge: if the meeting failed, it could leave little or no room br further maneuver. A breakdown could lead to growing instability in the area and a return of Soviet influence, and it could also lead to another Middle East war.

After a night of deliberation Carter made the decision to proceed with the invitations. "We felt time was getting away from us," explained a top-level Administration official. "There were risks involved in doing it, but greater risks in not taking the initiative."

Administration officials went to unusual lengths to keep the plan secret. For the first time since Vance became Secretary of State his staff deliberately misled the press concerning the real nature of his trip to the Middle East. Officials later apologized to newsmen, but defended the need for confidentiality. The reason was obvious: the Administration had not realized that Sadat would accept Carter's invitation so readily.

The Egyptian President had previously declared that he would not talk with the Israelis again until they had agreed in advance to withdraw from all the occupied territories. Indeed, Vance got no new concessions from the Israelis during his two-day stopover there. The talks were unusually cordial, but Begin repeated that Israel was prepared only to discuss the question of sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza five years after the signing of a peace agreement--the same position that Sadat had rejected earlier.

What Sadat did get were some new concessions from Washington. The White House said that the summit would seek a "framework for peace"--a reference to the declaration of principles that Egypt and the U.S. have been seeking and that Israel has been trying to avoid. More important, Vance announced that the U.S. was now prepared to enter the negotiations as a "full partner"--implying that the U.S. might now be ready to take a more active role in offering its own proposals. This, again, is something that Egypt wanted and Israel feared.

Delighted at Washington's concessions, Sadat pronounced his meeting with Vance "a very happy occasion" and referred to the Secretary as "my friend Cy." Some observers suspected, in fact, that Sadat's tough talk in recent weeks had been a deliberate tactic aimed at getting the negotiations moving again. As one of his closest advisers, Hassan Tuhamy, remarked to TIME Cairo Bureau Chief Wilton Wynn, "So you are surprised? We were not. It's only another move in the big chess game." Like Begin, Sadat agreed to refrain from gratuitous insults, and to avoid making statements about prospects for the Camp David meeting. In addition, Begin privately assured the U.S. that his government would resist the impulse to establish any new settlements on the West Bank or in the Sinai during the next four weeks. That assurance, presumably, did not extend to Israeli settlements now abuilding (see box).

In preparation for Sept. 5, all three sides will be busy writing position papers and devising strategies. The Americans hope that the isolated conditions at Camp David will enhance the chances of success. Vance was pleased with the atmosphere at the Leeds Castle talks. There mediators mixed casually, dined together and strolled quietly around the grounds, while the press was kept at a distance. At Camp David the participants will be able to mix business and pleasure; there is swimming, bowling, tennis and skeet shooting.

Sadat plans to arrive in Washington Sept. 4 and go directly to Camp David. Begin may arrive a day or so earlier. There will be no preliminary gathering of foreign ministers, and the delegations will be small. Each head of government will bring three principal advisers and a few other aides. Carter will open the session by conferring with Sadat and Begin individually. He will then chair the first trilateral meeting. No time limit has been set for the talks. "They could last two, four, even ten days," says one official. "Whatever is required." The best guess is two or three days.

Nobody harbors the illusion that the summit will produce a comprehensive settlement on the Middle East. For the moment, after all, the critical issues that separate the Israelis and the Arabs--the future of the West Bank and Gaza and of the Palestinians --are as unresolved as ever. So the objective at Camp David will be to make some measurable progress on the outstanding questions and, most important, to reach an agreement to keep the negotiating process alive.

"There is an obvious element of risk involved: no one is hiding that," acknowledged Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in a discussion with TIME Correspondent Christopher Ogden, who covered the latest Vance mission. But the Administration was determined, Brzezinski added, to take an optimistic view. "Pessimism is a luxury that policymakers can't afford," he reflected, "because pessimism, on the part of people who try to shape events, can become a self-fulfilling prophecy."

In Alexandria, Sadat took an almost identical line. "I am optimistic by nature," he declared. "Whatever happens, I shall decide the next step later. To use the British proverb, 'Let us not cross the bridge until we reach it.' "

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