Americanology

Jimmy Carter's popularity seems to be rising not only at home but also in the Kremlin. Soviet leaders still feel that the President is unpredictable and is overly influenced by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, whom they regard as anti-Soviet. The Russians nonetheless seem to believe that Carter has become more skilled in handling U.S.-Soviet relations. What most pleases the Kremlin, apparently, is the White House's growing preference for quiet, traditional diplomacy in contrast to the public criticisms that were often made during the Administration's early months.

Moscow's new appreciation of Carter was expressed last week by one of the U.S.S.R.'s most prominent experts on U.S. affairs, Georgi Arbatov, director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies. Sipping Georgian brandy in his spacious office several blocks from the Kremlin, Arbatov discussed key issues with a few U.S. newsmen, including TIME Correspondent Christopher Ogden. Excerpts:

On Carter. Very recently we have seen certain positive changes in the way that the Administration conducts its policy toward the U.S.S.R. Now there seem to be no attempts to tie the important question of SALT with questions that have no relevance, such as human rights. Almost anything has to be better than last summer [when Washington, among other things, criticized the trial and conviction of Soviet Dissident Anatoli Shcharansky]. President Carter is more experienced; he has learned from unsuccessful policies. We don't regard him as a weak President. But neither can we call him a strong President. He is a President in the making.

On Emigration. I'm sure that we'll never encourage it.

On Arms Talks. SALT is the most important part of our relationship. Signing SALT II will improve the atmosphere and help solve some of our other problems. Politically it will show that we can agree on the central issue of our relationship. It is hard to say how long [voluntary arms] restraint can last. Delay can stir suspicion and mistrust and could have tremendously serious consequences.

On the Soviet Arms Buildup. You say that you have slowed down and that we have not. This is not correct. We too have slowed the development of systems of missiles and planes; I cannot name them, but I'm certain that we have. All we are doing is catching up with you.

On China. We consider it important that China be brought into the mainstream of detente. But all we get from the Chinese is their saying that war is inevitable. If your military relationship with China changes, we will have to reassess the situation. If normalization of your relations with China is part of a general move toward detente, it will be understood as such. Our relations with Peking may also change in time. But if you normalize with China in a way that has definite military and political undertones of an anti-Soviet nature, it may be seen as a sign of something very sinister.

On Trade. The Carter Administration attempted to use trade to pressure the U.S.S.R. But you have to stop using trade as a lever--or a carrot. Trade has to be a normal part of relations. In fact, there is no way to pressure us economically because the Soviet Union has a strong economy.

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