Slouching Toward Oslo

Can they accept a peace prize without a peace treaty?

An Israeli official: "We are exhausted.

We have exhausted our capabilities and our maneuvering powers. There is nothing more to discuss."

An Egyptian official: "We are in a holding pattern. America is the controller and must get us safely on the ground before we crash or run out of gas."

An Israeli official: "If the Egyptians do not initial the draft we will settle down and wait. What will the U.S. and Sadat do? Deport us?"

Thus after ten weeks of strenuous haggling, of constant commuting by jet between Washington and the Middle East, of reassuring hand holding by President Carter and Secretary of State Vance, the two principals nudged their way reluctantly, morosely toward something that might pass for agreement. One thing that might serve to lure them closer together is the Nobel Peace Prize, which the two are due to receive on Dec. 10. But Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat were slouching toward Oslo, counting every pace and grumbling over every step.

To all appearances, the peace treaty, every word of which seemed to have been carved on stubborn stone tablets, was complete. The eighth draft of the text, in fact, was put before the Israeli Cabinet for the second time last week and was approved after surprisingly little debate; after hearing some of Washington's latest suggestions for a settlement, which were closely aligned with Sadat's, the

Cabinet decided that the eighth draft proposal was not so bad after all.

Nonetheless, the vote was a genuine victory for Premier Begin and his Washington negotiators, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Defense Minister Ezer Weizman. It was Dayan who had phoned Begin, saying "Let's for once be ahead of the Egyptians. Let us be the first to say yes, and leave Sadat to fight his own way." Begin agreed, and the Cabinet fell into line by a vote of 15 to 2.

Why, then, the delay? It was Anwar Sadat, with U.S. backing, who balked this time. The text did not include a timetable for concluding negotiations for Palestinian autonomy in the Gaza Strip and on the West Bank, and it was this timetable that lay at the heart of Sadat's proposals for "linkage" between a treaty and the pursuit of a wider peace in the Middle East. Nor did the document take into account Sadat's new suggestion that in devising the plan for Palestinian autonomy, the negotiators should concentrate first on Gaza, then turn later to the question of the West Bank.

Disregarding Jimmy Carter's pleas to both sides that they refrain from publicity blitzes and rhetorical upstaging, Sadat decided to force the timetable issue by going public. He authorized Cairo's semiofficial newspaper al Ahram to publish the text of the peace treaty, apparently in an effort to show Sadat's suspicious Arab colleagues that Egypt was attempting to bargain for the good of all the Arab states. The immediate effect was to prompt the U.S. State Department to release the official American version of the draft to the press (see box). Washington also released the text of one annex to the treaty, dealing with future diplomatic, cultural and economic relations between Israel and Egypt. As it turned out, the dry, legalistic documents contained references to the pursuit of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, but no timetable for achieving local autonomy on the West Bank and in Gaza.

Three times last week Sadat spoke to Carter on the telephone, explaining why the timetable was so important to Egypt and the rest of the Arab world. He rejected the Israeli complaint that he was raising the ante in negotiations by placing more emphasis on the issue than before, although it was true that he had strengthened his case during the Blair House talks.

For their part, the Israelis were in no mood to take the linkage question much further than the oblique reference in the treaty preamble to "a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its aspects." The Israelis want to retain a free hand in dealing with the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza; and they are fearful that, if a future agreement with the Palestinians should fall apart, it could jeopardize their peace with Egypt. Accordingly, the Israelis bluntly described the draft treaty as a sort of final offer; Moshe Dayan called it a "take it or leave it" document.

Perhaps he was caught up in the momentum of the peace process, but by week's end Sadat was reported to be ready to agree to a further compromise. Like the Egyptian President, Administration officials refused to believe that there was no further room for maneuver on the question of linkage. "We think the issue is not determined yet," said Secretary Vance last week. "It is still an open issue."

In short, Washington is still holding out for a timetable for West Bank negotiations, to begin within a month of the signing of the peace treaty and to conclude by Dec. 31, 1979. First, however, there is that other timetable: if Sadat and Begin expect the celebration in Oslo to have any real meaning, they had better reach an agreement soon. -

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