A President and a King At Odds

Once the closest of allies, Egypt's President Anwar Sadat and Jordan's King Hussein are now sharply divided over Sadat's 14-month-old peace initiative and the Camp David accords. Seated in the sunbathed garden of his Aswan house overlooking the Nile, Sadat, confident, incisive, expansive, described to Time Inc. Editor-in-Chief Hedley Donovan, Chief of Correspondents Richard Duncan and Cairo Bureau Chief Wilton Wynn the basis for his commitment to a peace treaty with Israel as the first step toward solving the problems of the Middle East. He spoke angrily of the role the Syrians, the Iraqis and others have played in obstructing his actions. Later, in the Jordanian capital of Amman, a gloomy Hussein, speaking in a voice so low as to be almost inaudible, reflected his pessimism about Sadat's dealing with Israel. Smiling bitterly, the 43-year-old monarch explained why he believes an Egyptian-Israeli treaty would harm the Arab cause and should be blocked. Excerpts from the interviews:

SADAT:

On peace talks with Israel: I am optimistic. The only important items left concern the timing for establishing an autonomous entity on the West Bank, and "linkage." I believe it will all work out before too long. After Camp David, no matter what happens, there can be no going back to a "No war, no peace" situation.

On Jordan's refusal to join the peace process: King Hussein really has misunderstood me all along. After the signing of the treaty, we shall be calling upon him officially to take his responsibilities on the West Bank. If he chooses not to do this, I shall take over in his place, because the peace process must not be hindered. I shall leave the door open for him. But the man is still acting according to the rules of the old Arab world.

On Egypt's Arab neighbors: The situation is serious. On my western border, I have [Libyan Strongman Muammar] Gaddafi and the Soviets. In Algeria, whoever is chosen President, I think there will be ten years of instability. [As for Syrian President Hafez Assad], I wonder what would happen to him if he applied what I am applying here: shutting down the concentration camps, bringing in a permanent constitution, a parliamentary system, a multiparty system. The Syrian leaders would not survive one hour.

On the impact of the change of government in Iran: Bakhtiar has said that Iran will not be a policeman of the Persian Gulf region. That is wise of him; no one wants him to fill that role. That leaves Iraq, and I consider the Iraqis much more vicious than the Soviets. You know that the Iraqis consider Kuwait to be an Iraqi province; I would not be surprised at any time to hear that they have taken it over. As for Egypt, its commitment to defend [Kuwait and Saudi Arabia] the moment they are attacked still prevails and will continue to prevail.

On the U.S.: We don't want the U.S. to serve as a policeman in the Middle East. What we need is a "Carter plan" on the lines of the Marshall Plan, for helping us defend our borders and for raising our standard of living. You should make it easier for your friends to buy arms from you so they can defend their soil and live in a free country. I don't want a loan or aid from you, I want a partnership. For example, I have some of the richest soil in the world here. Let us take 100,000 acres and build an agro-industrial complex. The production of food will be needed until the end of the world. Well, come and be my partner; take your share and give me mine.

HUSSEIN:

On the shortcomings of the Camp David accords: I would have preferred some effort that would bring others into the peace process. We still think that it is the only way in which a true peace is likely to come about. Perhaps we should return to the Security Council or ask for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference. Certainly the situation has changed since Camp David, but from our point of view there is no progress. As for linkage [between an Egyptian-Israeli treaty and negotiations for the West Bank and Gaza], the two agreements would be too unbalanced, one with a tight time frame, the other open ended.

On the requirements for an Arab-Israeli peace: There are two conditions. One is Arab solidarity, in order to strengthen the Arabs and put them in a better position to negotiate. The other is that Carter and other international figures should subscribe to the Arab concepts of what is needed for peace. For one thing, I think it would be a good idea for the U.S. to begin talks with the P.L.O.

On Jordan's changing relations with Iraq: They are much improved. There is no possibility of Iraq's threatening Kuwait. We don't think Iraq would take advantage of the current instability in the region.

On his objections to the creation of an autonomous Palestinian "entity" on the West Bank: Jerusalem is excluded from the area in which Begin offers self-government. This "greater Jerusalem" amounts to one-fifth of the West Bank. Then there are the Jewish settlements, which take more of our land. Therefore the offer of self-government under these conditions does not appeal to us. Jerusalem does not belong to any of us; it belongs to hundreds of millions of people around the world.

On Sadat's determination to negotiate a West Bank agreement with or without Hussein's cooperation: Let him try if he wishes. But the future of the West Bank and Gaza is not for Sadat to decide or for me or anyone else except the Palestinian people.

On how the other Arab states will react if Sadat concludes a separate peace with Israel: Some measures will have to be taken. This will not be difficult. In 1950 Egypt proposed a resolution to the Arab League, which was unanimously adopted, calling for expulsion from the league of any state that signed a separate peace with Israel. If Sadat signs the treaty with Israel, I think the break [with the other Arabs] would be irrevocable.

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