The Zimbabwe Dilemma

What should the U.S. and Britain do about the Muzorewa regime?

One of the most difficult problems facing both the Carter Administration and the new British government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is what to do about Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, as the breakaway British colony will be known after the June 1 installation of a black-led government headed by Methodist Bishop Abel Muzorewa. Both Washington and London would like to move cautiously on the questions of whether to recognize the new Salisbury government and whether to lift the economic sanctions currently in effect against Rhodesia. Neither capital is convinced that Muzorewa can run his country effectively, and neither is anxious to offend black African states by acting hastily on so sensitive a subject. But last week, in a move that was surprising for the size of its support, the Senate voted 75-19 for a resolution asking President Carter to abolish sanctions against Rhodesia within two weeks after the Muzorewa government is installed.

The vote only expressed the Senate's impatience over the Administration's handling of a highly complex subject, but it embarrassed the President nonetheless. Under the terms of the Case-Javits amendment, approved by the Senate last year, the President is obliged to lift sanctions against Rhodesia if he determines that the Salisbury regime has held elections that were free and fair and displayed a willingness to negotiate with the leaders of the Patriotic Front guerrilla organizations that are waging civil war.

Carter had promised that he would make a decision on Rhodesia by June 15, and had written to Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd urging him "not to support any initiative that would preempt existing law or prejudge the issue at stake." This is exactly what Senator Jesse Helms, the North Carolina Republican who has long supported the white Rhodesian cause, had been thumping for. When Helms' position seemed to be gaining strength last week, the Senate settled for a compromise resolution that was not legally binding on the President. But one senior White House aide acknowledged that "some policy alterations look inevitable" in light of the Senate action.

Carter has consistently tried to avert a future crisis in which the U.S. might find itself aligned with the white-led regimes of southern Africa against black African armies backed by Cuba and the Soviet Union. With this in mind, the U.S. and Britain have been trying for the past two years to assemble an all-parties conference on Rhodesia that could lead to peace and black majority rule.

That plan went awry last year when Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith made a shrewd deal with three moderate black politicians to form an interim black-white government and prepare the country for his own version of black majority rule. That version enables the country's 212,000 whites to have a disproportionately large representation in Parliament and retain control over the police, the army, the judiciary and the civil service for at least ten years. Last month's elections, though far from perfect, were successful to the extent that they produced a black Prime Minister and an estimated 64% turnout of eligible voters. Andrew Young, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, has denounced the elections as fraudulent because candidates loyal to the Patriotic Front leaders were excluded. In answer, critics of Young argue that it is most unlikely that the guerrilla organizations would allow any free elections at all.

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was due to be in London for three days this week, primarily to discuss the Rhodesian problem with the new British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington. Both men will be scratching hard for some new ideas. Indeed, one Foreign Office veteran wonders if either Carrington or Vance will say to the other, "Have you thought up any dodge that I haven't thought up?"

Some Tory right-wingers would like the Thatcher government to recognize the new government in Salisbury immediately. The Prime Minister, however, is well aware that Britain cannot afford to offend African members of the Commonwealth. One index of their growing importance is that Britain's trade with Nigeria now exceeds its trade with South Africa. Nevertheless, as an indication of current Tory sentiment, Thatcher has decided to send a senior envoy to Salisbury, replacing the junior official there now The prevailing view in Whitehall, however, appears to be that action on both recognition and sanctions can be delayed until after the Organization of African Unity's meeting in July and, more important from London's point of view, the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka Zambia, in early August. Similarly, President Carter is being urged by some oi his advisers to welcome the Rhodesian elections as a step in the right direction. After that, these advisers believe, the Administration should wait three or four months before taking any action to see how things go in the new Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, both in terms of the war and majority rule.

In Salisbury, government officials were greatly heartened by the Senate vote. Ian Smith called it "refreshing and hopeful," and the black Co-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kesiwe Malindi, declared, "I am confident that President Carter, himself a champion of human rights, cannot continue to ignore the welfare of Zimbabweans and the wishes of his own Congress." Some officials in Salisbury are convinced that Washington and London will insist on a high price for recognition and an end to sanctions. Among the possible demands: the complete and final retirement of Smith, who is believed to be angling for the powerful war post of Minister of Defense and Combined Operations; another round of elections, this time under international supervision and with the participation of the Patriotic Front. Since these conditions, if met, could easily lead to Muzorewa's downfall, his acquiescence seems unlikely.

For the moment, the bishop seems intent on stepping up the antiguerrilla war; under certain circumstances, he might well be able to count on troop support from South Africa. That kind of commitment by Pretoria could encourage the Patriotic Front leaders, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, to lean more heavily on Cuba and the Soviet Union. Some American advocates of lifting sanctions question whether there would be greater Soviet pressure in the region, arguing that Moscow's fear of jeopardizing Senate passage of the Strategic Arms Limitation treaty will curtail its role in southern Africa. U.S. intelligence officials are more worried about Cuba's intentions in the conflict. According to latest reports, there are now 20,000 Cuban troops in Angola, 13,000 in Ethiopia and 2,000 scattered in camps around Mozambique, where they have been aiding and training Mugabe's guerrillas.

The real question about Muzorewa is whether the mercurial bishop can establish his authority over his country. He could start by dropping Rhodesia from the name of his country, by launching a badly needed land-reform program and by discarding some of the constitution's least justified guarantees for whites. Both the White House and Whitehall seem to take it for granted that any move in favor of the Salisbury regime would jeopardize their relations with black African states. Yet some Western diplomats on the continent think that a number of those nations, which have no ironclad commitment to the Patriotic Front, would tolerate an easing of sanctions if Muzorewa began to deliver on his campaign promises of peace and social justice. Until then, both London and Washington would do well to reserve judgment.

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